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SOCIOLOGIA URBANA E RURALE

**Socio-natural disaster,
resilience and vulnerability:
The territorial perspective
in italian current debate**

*Disastri socio-naturali,
resilienza e vulnerabilità:
La prospettiva territorialista
nel dibattito italiano attuale*

edited by - a cura di
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SOCIO-NATURAL DISASTER, RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY

“VULNERABLE ITALY”: BETWEEN ACADEMIC DEBATE AND A MOLTITUDE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTORS

by *Alfredo Mela, Silvia Mugnano, Davide Olori**

The purpose of this special of *Sociologia Urbana e Rurale* (Urban and Rural Sociology) is to introduce a significant overview of Italian sociologists' reflections on the topic of disasters. The use of English language aims at facilitating the circulation of such articles within today's multidisciplinary, international scientific community. In fact, although Italian sociological literature on the topics of risk, emergencies and short- and long-term consequences of disasters has remarkably grown over the last four decades, most of the texts are in Italian language, which undoubtedly limits their impact on a worldwide scale.

Though Italian sociologists do not exclusively deal with calamities affecting their own country, the latter has been the main focus of their studies. On the other hand, as is known, Italy is -at least in Europe- one of the most risk-exposed countries in terms both of natural disasters (the peninsula is largely seismic) and in terms of its particular building heritage and weak prevention policies. The articles included in this issue focus on the catastrophes affecting the country from the '60s to date - from the Vajont disaster (1963), to the earthquakes in Belice (1968), Friuli (1976), Irpinia (1980), Abruzzo (2009) and Emilia (2012) - decades in which sociological disciplines have progressively grown hand in hand with the attention to social, economic, political and cultural implications of environmental problems.

In order to better frame the contents of this issue within the wider debate on the subject of disasters, we deemed appropriate to start this introduction article with a brief reconstruction of the sociological reflection on the topic, putting it in relation to the changes that took place in intervention strategies

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in the event of a calamity. Later in this article, it will be stressed how a territory-oriented approach, whose importance and actuality are undeniable, could highlight both the specific character of each context affected by catastrophes and the peculiar composition of the different forms of capital on it. In doing so, the latest seismic events that hit Italy will be included in the analysis.

1. A short overview on Italian literature on sociology of disaster

The earliest literature on disasters in Italy appeared in the same period when the public debate on the topic arose in the country. Contrary to what happened in the United States, where the momentum came from the requests and the money of the military environment, in Italy the strong political, social and institutional debate was the driving factor for such a change.

In 1966, volunteer groups freed Florence from mud after the Arno river flood and stood out as one of the first examples of spontaneous youth mobilization in Italy; in 1968, a strong earthquake hit the Belice Valley, in Sicily, causing 370 casualties and over 70,000 displaced persons, and highlighting the deep gap between Southern Italy and the rest of the country. The massive volunteer mobilizations, the disaster scenes, the lack of humanitarian aids and the reconstruction scandals were broadcasted countrywide on TV for the first time¹. As a result, the disaster started taking the shape of a *social problem* (Stalling, 1991). At the dawn of mass communication era, factors such as the deep emotion of the event and the pressure from the public opinion as well as from certain political sectors contributed to set the “post-emergency” phase as a priority and to overcome the fatalistic approach towards the interpretation of disasters.

In addition, it has to be underlined the concern of the military and institutional Establishment with regards to social movements, whose initiative and potential in terms of mobilization and organization were making them ever more influential, also² in emergencies. The flow of volunteers, often

¹ Not less important were the disastrous events occurred during the Italian postwar period: the flood of Salerno in 1954 (318 casualties and 250 injured, 5.500 homeless), the landslides and floods in autumn 1951 (70 deaths in Southern Italy, 100 deaths in the Po river area), the Valanidi flood in Reggio Calabria (51 casualties, 100 missing), the Ariano Irpino earthquake in 1962 (6500 displaced persons, 80% of the heritage damaged) etc. are less renowned but not less remarkable.

² At that time, Italy was going through a particular political situation: following the Yalta Treaty (1945), which divided Europe along the Iron Curtain, Italy was swallowed up by

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organized in basic political units, was seen as a risk in the delicate post-disaster period; the clashes between the population and/or the volunteers and the police were quite relevant (Londero, 2008). It was within this scenario, that the legislative proposal on the creation of the National Civil Protection was put forward. Although such proposal had repeatedly failed to pass in the past³, it represented a new development in the Italian public debate. The last legislative proposal on the subject of disasters and humanitarian aids to population had been submitted in 1950: the bill, whose first signatory was the Minister of Interiors Mario Scelba⁴, was anyway part of an emergency body of law. That was a time of political instability therefore an instrument like the “Civil Defense” -an *operating machine* centralized in the hands of the Government whose main task is to play the role of the “inner front” in the event of a war- was the spark for a harsh debate between majority and opposition parties. Although the bill was not finally passed, there were no real consequences as the Department of Civil Defense was *de facto* already operating after it was founded in 1951 through a discretionary decision; according to historian Nicola Tranfaglia, Scelba «employed officials who, in the Fascist era, had already gained experience with the Secret Service and with a political police absolutely unknown -at least officially- to the people».

As already mentioned, the legislative push towards the creation of a civil protection body resumed only at the end of the 1960s, though the bill remained stuck in Parliament due to a decision impasse. As Ada Cavazzani writes: «After the last major earthquake in 1980, it became clear that Italy did not have a Civil Protection system and that the only law approved for

the NATO Bloc, while the Italian Communist Party became the largest Communist party in the Western Bloc. The tense post-war climate (the debate over “protected democracy”, the ferment among European extra-parliamentary sectors, etc.) raised concerns among military top brass, who feared emergencies could be a trigger to uprisings.

³ The embryonic idea of civil protection appeared in law No. 2248/1865, which included a description of the relevant administrative procedures and the definition of the *extra ordinem* powers bestowed on prefects and mayors. Only in 1908 (in the aftermath of the Messina earthquake), a turning point took place when law No. 208 of 8th April 1909 provided for the introduction of the State of Siege and the appointment of a Special Commissioner. The debate over the creation of a Force able to take action in the event of a natural disaster was spurred by the discussions which followed the 1920 earthquake in Garfagnana. In 1928, prefects were empowered to take action, though the matter was officially regulated in 1931 when emergency aids were included in the public safety laws; Civil Protection became part of the so-called Public Order, thus stemming the confusion of roles between prefects and other bodies and asserting the inherently political nature of disasters in a dictatorial regime.

⁴ Leading figure of the Christian Democratic right party. On the strategic political use of the Ministry of the Interior in the Scelba era, see G.C. Marino, 1995; R. Canosa, 1976.

this purpose in 1970, after the Belice earthquake, was still inoperative due to the non-approval of the regulation by the Parliament» (Cavazzani, 1981).

In those years the political, theoretical and scientific debate on the emergency was becoming stronger in the country. On the one hand, critical interpretations of society were strengthened and their field of analysis was widened in order to include also disasters. On the other hand, a double dynamics was going on in the academic field: the autonomous role of the Disaster Research was arising in international academic circles, and social sciences were establishing themselves on the Italian scientific scene. All these factors contributed in different ways to the occasional appearance of the first studies on disasters in Italy.

In the early '70s, the first critical articles by G. Mottura, "Terremoto capitalistico e pratica sociale" (1971) and by A. Cavazzani, "Potere e Calamità Naturali: il terremoto di Ancona" (1972) are published in the newspaper L'Inchiesta; the long research called "Longarone 1963-1973, Sociologia del disastro e della ricostruzione", edited by Capraro and published in 1975, is more extensive.

Only after the tragedy of Vajont (1963) and the earthquakes that devastated Friuli Region in 1976 and extensive areas of the Regions Campania and Basilicata in 1980, the government implemented the law on Civil Protection. Despite being far from the concept of "Civil Defense" that was more connected to an authoritarian idea of the emergency management, this law was strongly influenced by the political situation of the time.

«The description of the planned operations does not seem to refer to a programming control, but rather to a principle of preventive control to be put into effects in order to ensure especially the maintenance of public order. [...]». As the sociologist A. Cavazzani goes on to say, «To confirm this orientation, also the volunteer participation in the operations of rescue and assistance to affected populations is planned to be regulated in a bureaucratic and inflexible manner, according to a logic of 'militarization' and control of 'specialized corps', which directly report to the Ministry of Interior and the prefectures».

The Civil Protection model that is explicitly taken as a reference is the Command and Control, typical of advanced Western countries such as the US and Japan, based on the principle of *violent break* and on the decrease of populations' response capacity (still today the operations center in emergency situations is called Di.Coma.C. - Department of Command and Control).

Despite the above mentioned examples of scientific production developed in the '70s, social sciences' work on the Italian disasters remains oc-

casual and random. In the presentation of the first volume in Italian on the topic of disasters, Emilio Quarantelli states that when American researchers came to Italy to study the 1963 Vajont disaster, the 1966 flood in Florence, the 1968 earthquake of Belice, they found no Italian counterpart. It would be superficial to underestimate many Italian works, such as F. Cagnoni's work on Belice "Valle del Belice: terremoto di Stato" (1976), A. Musacchio's "Stato e Società nel Belice" (1981), G. Cerruti's works on the case ICMESA (1976), M. Conti's work about Seveso (1977) or M. Conti's and D. Serrani's works on the earthquake in the Marche Region (1977), as well as the aforementioned Cavazzani A. and G. Mottura's works. Nevertheless, what the Dean of the Delaware University meant is that a structured and coordinated research, which the international centers could be related to, was missing.

In the same years, the most important research center on disasters based at the Delaware University, the Disaster Research Center (DRC), was implementing a strategy of internationalization aimed at broadening the disaster analytical field. It began to encourage comparative research (over 650 fieldworks just for the DRC) and established a network of contacts with European researchers from France, Germany, England and Italy, through workshops and academic networks. Also thanks to this incentive, the number of studies on disasters and of centers that identify them as a priority multiplied in Europe: in West Germany, for example, where SIFKU (The Institute of Social Sciences for Research on Catastrophes and Accidents) was already working; in France, where CEPSP (Centre of Psychological Studies of Disasters and their Prevention) was active especially on the subject of psycho-sociology; in Sweden, but also in Italy, where two centers were increasingly growing: CESCAN (Centre for the Study of Natural Disasters) of the University of Calabria and the Department of Sociology of Disasters of ISIG (Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia). Although it is possible to date the first research in the field of environmental sociology in the early Seventies, we have to wait till the 1976 earthquake in Friuli to find more structured studies (De Marchi, Pellizzoni, Ungaro 2001). As Cattarinussi writes, «The greatest number of studies and researches were done by social researchers, both Italian and foreign, about the consequences of the earthquake in Friuli [...]». It is important to mention, among them, the hard work done by the Department of Geography of the University of Edinburgh (SJ Hogg, 1980) and especially of the Institute of Geography of the "Technical University of Munich". Also Confindustria (the General Confederation of Italian Industry) and the Institute of Geography of the University of Udine cooperated with ISIG, whose work is collected in three

volumes (A. Strassoldo, B. Cattarinussi, 1978; B. Cattarinussi, C. Pelanda, 1981; C. Pelanda, A. Moretti, 1981) and which collaborated closely with the DRC led by Quarantelli. The research used qualitative and quantitative techniques, examined the themes of displacement, labor, migration, reconstruction, organization and emergency and focused both on short-term and on the medium-long term post-event period. The research center of the University of Calabria funded by CNR, instead, dealt with the Irpinia earthquake that hit also Naples (1980). Nevertheless, it was more focused on urban issues and social control; these topics will also be the subjects of non-academic theoretical and political production (C.N.R., 1981). In this context, it is important to highlight the influence of the territorialist perspective shown both by the presence of geographers and city planners investigating the post-disaster phase and by the issues related to the reconstruction, the displacement etc. This trend emerged in the 1st Italian Congress of Sociology, “Consent and conflict in contemporary society”, held in Rome in 1981. Here, in the section “Urban and Rural Society in Italy” we can find B. Cattarinussi’s (ISIG) and A. Cavazzani’s (CESCAN) articles. As Avallone writes, studies promoted in the field of the sociology of disasters can be seen as an “important opening to environmental issues” (Avallone, 2010: 225). With a dynamics similar to that of the US, where the two close disciplines of mass emergency and ecology had established an osmotic relationship that made the Disaster Research go beyond the emergency phase, also in Italy the sociology of environment and territory made a major contribution to the increase of the studies on disasters. While the work at CESCAN ended after the CNR funding program, the ISIG “Mass Emergencies” program continued its research thanks to the work done, among others, by De Marchi and Pellizzoni during the ’90s, which broadened the research in the issues of risk and emergencies. Meanwhile, especially after the disaster in Seveso, the focus gradually shifted on the environmental disasters and on issues related to the risk, which then merged with social science debates about climate change. The experience in Friuli will always be a symbolic moment when the social sciences were involved in a social process triggered by a disaster, from supervision to participation, in a relational dynamics with the stakeholders and with unprecedented effective outcomes in the Italian scenario, which would not find the same success in the future. At the same time, also the debate on the institutional architecture of the civil protection developed, until, in 1992, the National Service of Civil Protection was created. In 1999, there will be an attempt to reform it, in order to transform it into an autonomous and independent agency, only “monitored by the Interior Ministry”. This attempt of empow-

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erment was stopped when G. Bertolaso took office in 2001, “reaffirming the Department’s full powers”, through a constitutional law (3/2001) that transformed the “Directorate General of Fire Services and Civil Protection” into Department of Fire brigade, of public rescue and civil defense. Once more, also through the symbolic return to Civil “defense”, the idea of a centralized “military” Civil Protection emerged. This became a direct function and application of the Executive power⁵, not only in relation to emergency situations.

This is how the Civil Protection led by Bertolaso faced the earthquake in L’Aquila (2009), showing critical issues in all post-event phases: during the emergency (A. Ciccozzi, 2010), in camps and aids management (Bonaccorsi, 2009), in urban planning (Frisch, 2009), in the reconstruction (Bazzucchi, 2010), in the post-disaster recovery (Alexander, 2013) etc.

Again, while a lively public debate was going on, the production of social sciences related to the analysis of the disaster resumed strongly (Carnelli *et al.* *infra*). This production is often random and carried out by young researchers or small academic groups who struggled to consolidate a systematic work, but whose productions will echo in national conferences, publications, Summer Schools etc. The only structured reality will be partly represented by the Department of Urban and Regional Studies of the Gran Sasso Science Institute, which started right after the earthquake in Aquila thanks to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These institutions, having recognized the exceptional moment for the Apennine town, fostered the creation of a university center for teaching and research in the capital of the Abruzzo Region, which would include a department focused on the socio-territorial issue of the post-earthquake phase.

2. The actuality of the issue: the Central Italy earthquake (2016)

At the time this special issue was being set up, in 2015, much attention was still drawn - both in the scientific debate as well as in the political and media one - to the last decades’ two serious seismic events (Abruzzo and Emilia) and to the respective reconstruction programs, whose trajectories, after all, proved to be very different. Unfortunately, during the drawing up

⁵ «It is necessary to eliminate any dangerous power and institution fragmentation, giving back a central role to the Prime Minister, in order to recreate a unitary body including all the interests of the sector». Report accompanying the decree on the Department of Civil Protection in 2001.

of this issue another earthquake -similar in magnitude to L'Aquila's- occurred in Central Italy within an area comprising Marche, Umbria, Abruzzo and Lazio. This new seismic event, started on 24th August 2016 with a 6.0 magnitude shock and which caused 299 casualties, was followed by several other events, the most remarkable ones being those of 26th October and above all of 30th October (6.5 magnitude). After August's quake, the most damaged towns were Amatrice, Accumoli and the villages within the upper valley of the Tronto river; the shock of 30th October, instead, strongly hit the town of Norcia. As we write, the emergency phase is still ongoing and it is impossible to predict when the earthquake swarm will come to an end.

This new disaster proves once again the importance of the mobilization of scientific knowledge, whatever its form, to face the complex situations arising from a catastrophe and to contribute to prevention and risk mitigation. In this sense, sociological reflection over more or less recent calamities, like the ones proposed in this article, is part of this knowledge. They highlight, indeed, two aspects of post-disaster dynamics which are only apparently contrasting. On the one hand, in fact, thanks to an accurate study of the short- and long-term consequences on the territories affected by a natural disaster, it is possible to learn important lessons on the role played by different factors in strengthening or weakening the community's resilience as well as on the strong and weak points of the relationship between local people and administration bodies and between local and external actors. Therefore, it is possible to collect knowledge also in the sociological field - just like it happens in many other sectors - and obtain useful information for the future.

On the other hand, however, from this analysis on the current or past processes it is possible to learn another important lesson: each event has its own peculiarity, which is not only connected to the nature of the phenomenon that triggers the disaster, but also (at least as far as sociology is concerned) to the special features of each area as well as to the peculiar interaction between social systems and both natural and built environment. Interpreting such particular local interactions represents a specific contribution offered by environmental and territory sociology, which is different from what any other sociological discipline may offer. It would be, however, a mistake to think the collection of knowledge from past events would end up devalued; if anything, it stresses the need to look at knowledge consolidation as an open path and the need to not learn from strict action outlines (in emergency or reconstruction stages). One should rather constantly adapt these outlines to various contexts and social dynamics originating from each situation. However difficult it is to provide reliable assessment

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on an ongoing event, as is the seismic swarm in Central Italy, the above proposed considerations seem applicable to this case too. In fact, despite the spatial proximity of the currently affected area to the one hit by the Abruzzo earthquake and the temporal proximity to the Emilia earthquake, the new event appears different from both of them. It initially affected a limited area, mostly mountain areas, and a population scattered among small, hardly accessible villages. Part of the building heritage consisted of second houses and the high number of casualties was also due to the fact house owners and tourists were crowding the area in August. The following shocks, most probably connected to the activation of new fault segments further north, across the border between Umbria and Marche, hit historically and artistically - yet not strongly urbanized - valuable areas (see the town center of Norcia). Some villages were completely destroyed and providing aid has become more and more difficult; nevertheless, a significant part of the residents opposed the proposal of evacuating the area and moving to the coastal area. In this sense, an essential character of the local community's resilience is emerging: the strong bond to the homeland as well as the sense of identity, which originates from the relationship with the landscape and the cultural heritage. This character increases the fear that moving away from the area -albeit temporarily- may not only produce an uprooting effect and serious problems in the reconstruction of social bonds; it may also lead to the irreversible decay of the affected areas or to their radical transformation, which could threaten the continuity of local identity.

3. The territory as a puzzle of different capitals

In other words, it seems that the Italian context is showing that each natural disaster is following its own peculiar trajectory both in the emergency and recovery phase. And as the international literature has strongly argued, there is an important relationship between natural elements and the cultural, social and economic organizations of the affected society. Indeed, the probability of a disaster having more devastating effects in one place than another depends on the local vulnerability of the place (Cutter, 2003). And therefore, there is a correlation between the potential risk and resistance and reliance of a specific place (Kasperson, Kasperson, Turner, 1995; Cutter, Mitchell, Scott, 2000).

Looking in this perspective, a natural disaster cannot be only evaluated, ranked and studied in physical terms, such as number of buildings destroyed and number of victims, but also in terms of the political, economic

and social impact that the hazard has had on the territory. So, how the social, economic and political capitals of the area are put under stress, transformed and reshaped when a disaster occurs? The sociological literature on disasters offers a rather rich debate on the ability of a social system to respond to and recover from disasters as well as on the topic of social capital. On the other hand, it is still quite limited as far as the subjects of political and economic capitals are concerned. While the concept of local vulnerability looks at features of the social systems for a potential harm, the idea of resilience includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a threat (Dynes, 2006).

In practice, immediately after a natural disaster, volunteers actively take part in first aid operations. Local knowledge might play an important role in directing some stages of rescue operations, for example by suggesting the best site to carry out excavation works. It could be wrongly argued that - especially in an emergency - a “new social capital” might develop; instead, that is the existing social capital, which is transformed and reshaped by the event. In this line, Dynes (2006) underlines that a distress in the social order could lead to the creation of a new and distinctive ordering of priorities, to the expansion of citizens’ role and to a reinforcement of social networks and family ties.

However, the debate is missing out on different aspects. First of all, the intensity and the ability to maintain the social capital is the combination of the counter-effect of the disaster and the pre-existing social conditions of the area hit by the disaster. Existing formal and informal norms, traditions, and values relevant to the local context, therefore, interact with the tragic event by transforming, empowering and expanding the response and shaping the aid and the recovery agenda. Secondly, social capital means the network of relations among the actors of a specific territorial entity, which can be located in an urban neighborhood or a rural community. Taking into account social capital with respect to its role in disasters is necessary also to highlight the importance of the spatial structure of such relations. In fact, the link between internal and external relationships within the relevant entity is important in preventing disasters as well as in facing emergencies. It is likewise important the trend towards strengthening the existing networks or creating new ones.

To use Putnam’s words (2000), it is important to understand to what extent local societies, while facing a catastrophe, are either inclined to strengthen their internal, face to face bonds (*bonding*) or able to seize the

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opportunities for effectively interacting with external, mutually heterogeneous actors (*bridging*). The ability of a local community to bounce back from a disaster often depends on its ability to maintain solid internal relationships -by defending its own identity- as well as on the capability to actively and equally negotiate with the “outside world” (rescuers, higher-level institutions, both national and international) to obtain an adequate support not only in terms of practical needs but also in terms of social and cultural support, without falling into dependence on external aids.

The recent events have indeed shown that other dimensions should also be taken into account when dealing with disasters. Bringing a community back to normal means also promoting sustainable recovery plans. Indeed, the economic impact of a natural disaster could also jeopardize the community’s existence. The collapse of the local economy, the shutting down of local industries as well as of any other economic engine means forced migration, social exclusion and deprivation. The economic drivers of a territory need to be deeply explored and taken into further consideration when studying disasters. The Emilia earthquake is known as the first “industrial” earthquake. The area accounted, and fortunately still accounts, for 2% of the Italian GDP, with the bio-medical sector being the major economic driver and a leader in Europe. The bio-medical production requires high technology machinery, high qualified workers and -last but not least- needs to be continuous and constant over time. Due to the earthquake, most of the factories were severely damaged and this could have irreparably knocked down the local economy, thus forcing international buyers to explore new markets. Most of the victims of the second earthquake (on 29th May 2012 at 9:00 a.m. - 5,8 magnitude) were workers and employees who died because they went back to work earlier than planned. The combination of a clear, well-defined political strategy (securing warehouses had been one of the first priorities set by local mayors), the strong collaboration between the local economic actors (e.g., machinery or warehouse sharing) and the high loyalty of international actors (some foreign buyers doubled or tripled orders to help increase the profit and allow local producers to pay for their damages) made it possible to re-start local economy and to prevent local workforce migration.

The economic features of an area are a key aspect in any phase of a disaster, and the most recent event has also shown the vulnerability of tourist destinations. International literature has partially explored the issue by stressing that flourishing tourist destinations might become much more vulnerable than other places if badly affected by a disaster. The economic organisation of the tourist industry is often characterised by small and me-

dium size local business or international investors (Ciocco, Michael, 2007), temporary and seasonal workers (Faulkner, 2001) which, in itself, is not an indicator of vulnerability but, in practices, are risk factors in case of a disaster. International investors might no longer find economic benefits to invest in a devastated area, small business are more likely to not survive, seasonal workers are more likely to be more vulnerable than residents in the emergency phase because it is more difficult for them to have access to information and to local knowledge regarding safer places and so on (Mugnano, Carnelli, 2016). The Amatrice earthquake (2016) has also highlighted that even this debate needs to be re-thought. The different types of tourism segments require indeed deeper attention in relation to the issue. One of the symbols of this disaster is “Hotel Roma”, 100 years old, which was accommodating nearly 70 guests: the hotel collapsed and the majority of the guests died also because they couldn’t find the way out. The economic drivers of an area have to be taken into account also in the recovery phase. The Amatrice area is characterised by a peculiar tourism segment: the second/holiday homes. In this case, neither the debate on tourist destinations nor the one on residential areas is applicable. However, the specificity of the housing sector cannot be undervalued in the recovery phase. The Government reassured that all houses will be rebuilt (giving priority to residents). However, it might be questionable that the recovery model should follow the previous path: rebuilding the same house on the same site. First, it would be more important to understand how many second house owners in the area will be willing to spend their holidays on a seismic area again, what is their sense of place belonging and how they want to reinterpret the relationship with this devastated place.

The previous section has also highlighted that different areas respond to natural disasters in different ways due to the role played by institutions. The political capital, in terms of degree of *civicness* (Putman, 2000; Almond, Verba, 1963), is indeed a very important aspect in the disaster cycle and Italy has a very interesting specificity. In the event of a disaster, as in other international contexts, the complex structure of the Italian political system (City Councils, Provinces, Regions and State) has to work harmoniously. Besides, Italy has a long tradition of voluntary activity, which takes a large variety of forms: professionals trained to first aid (such as *psicologia dell'emergenza*), national active groups (such as the boy scouts and the volunteers of the Civil Protection structured by Regions) and local associations. Finally, an aspect that distinguishes the Italian context from others, is the active and pro-active role of the Civil Protection (*Protezione Civile*). As previously underlined, it was founded as a voluntary body and has increas-

ingly become a professionalized body with a powerful role in emergency phases (see also the so-called *Metodo Augustus*, the reference emergency plan used by the Civil Protection). The history of natural disasters in Italy can be therefore divided into three major phases related to the role interplayed by three actors. A pre-Civil Protection phase, until the 1976 Friuli earthquake, where State and local government were the major actors. In the following phase, this voluntary body has increasingly become formalised, professionalised and gained an important role in the emergency management. This phase ended with the tragic and negative experience of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake. In the third phase (Emilia earthquake, 2013) active local or national citizenship started gaining importance. Here, we refer - particularly as for the emergency phase - to the interesting experience of the informal tent camps organised by the citizens in Emilia to contrast with the Protezione Civile’s tent city. The construction of informal tent camp responded to the need of the homeless to be closed to their damaged house and able them protect the house from looting and also create the conditions to run their family business.

Last but not least, among the different forms of capitals it is worth mentioning the idea of “territorial capital” (Ocse, 2001; Camagni, 2009), which focuses on the relationship between material and immaterial assets and can be considered as the summary of the different forms of “capital”. In the Italian context, there is a high presence of historical “iconic” attractions which are part of a remarkable heritage and the symbol of local identity. The latest tragic event has hit the core of the Italian -and probably Western-medieval heritage. Certainly, although the collapse of part of Norcia is a serious artistic loss, the damages suffered by the entire area have been equally severe and extensive. The latest earthquake crater includes micro-realities rich in territorial capital. 60% of buildings in Castelsantangelo sul Nera, only 70,67 sq km and 280 residents, were damaged. This small town is home to an unbelievable historical heritage: 22 churches (one in every 12 inhabitants) dated between 1200 and 1300 *a.d.* Besides, the richness of this territory is priceless in terms of immaterial capital. The Amatrice earthquake occurred on the 24th August, just a few days before the traditional yearly food festival started. The disaster involved also Castelluccio, a small village in whose area a very famous variety of lentil is produced and then exported worldwide.

In conclusion, it seems clear that in the disaster studies the role of the territory is becoming more relevant and central. This special issue has been thought and realized bearing in mind this goal. The contributions selected have in common the idea that the multidimensional aspects that compose

the territory are put all under stress when a natural disaster occurs and that the responses might vary depending on the context. Italy is an interesting case for a twofold reason: it is a country that has unfortunately experienced a high number of natural disasters in a rather short time and at the same time it is a cohesive - though fragmented and diversified country - in which micro, meso and macro dynamics can play different roles in responding to a disaster.

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*A SOCIO-SPATIAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT: INSIGHTS FROM THE 2012 EMILIA EARTHQUAKE
(ITALY)*

by *Fabio Carnelli, Ivan Frigerio* *

Introduction

A so called “disaster” is usually represented and narrated by survivors as a disruption in their daily lives and life-stories, as a rift in time and space (Carnelli, 2015). At the same time, as shown in *disaster research* an earthquake can “act” as an accelerator of processes at different levels (Calandra, 2012; Saitta, 2015). The factors (e.g. socio-economic dynamics) already present in the social system (Bolin, 2007; Perry, 2007; Wisner *et al.*, 2004; 2015), can be amplified or revealed by the “faults”, which are apparently activated by the triggering agent: «frequently, in fact, the difference in material damage which occurs in diverse sectors of an area hit by a disaster, or the type of intervention post-earthquake that the State or other institutions plan, describes a great deal regarding the degree of inequality existing in a society» (Saitta, 2015: 10)¹.

The management of the 2012 Emilia earthquake (Northern Italy), is currently presented by local institutions as a virtuous model driven by regional and local actors. Even if apart from institutional analysis and data, a sociological analysis of Emilia aftermath has not yet been produced, this article aims to provide an initial framework to build a spatial analysis of the case of Emilia in order to understand how the interaction of certain factors (social, territorial and demographic) can explain processes involved in the area. Using Mirandola as a case study, one of the most affected places, and through the analysis of spatial and secondary data, the aim of this paper is to depict a social zoning (i.e. how socio-demographic factors can be spatially distributed in a place potentially affected by a hazardous event) in order to find some space-temporal dynamics of vulnerabilization at stake during and after, at a local level.

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¹ Translation by authors.

1. Theoretical references

Since the 60s onwards a *disaster studies* tradition has emerged. Within this context a geographical approach, called *hazard tradition*, begins to define a disaster as the intersection of a destructive potential agent with the aftermath on the social system. Recently, thanks to this approach (Hewitt 1983; Wisner *et al.*, 2004), research has focused on the concept of vulnerability, reflecting on the social consequences caused by the agent, thus questioning the supposed nature of a “natural disaster” (Wisner *et al.*, 2004). Based on the *vulnerability approach*, is the awareness that «the material conditions of daily life, what one might call “normal life”, also underlie, or, as Hewitt puts it, “prefigure” disasters» (Wisner *et al.*, 2004: 20).

These conditions can be seen as the product of root causes and a progressive chain of causal factors that create the preconditions of insecurity factors that transform an event in a disaster; within this perspective and considering the huge amount of literature on the concept of vulnerability (Oliver-Smith, 1994; Weichselgartner, 2001; Cutter *et al.*, 2003; Wisner *et al.*, 2004; Adger, 2006; IPCC, 2014), as the set of «characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or a process)» (Wisner *et al.*, 2004: 11).

Moreover, as underlined by Alexander (1993), vulnerability may be viewed as a set of overlapping differential dimensions. As regards this, the social science community identifies some main common dimensions that influence vulnerability at a socio-economic level (Cutter *et al.*, 2003).

The social component of vulnerability is a theoretical concept that potentially is not quantifiable: to make this concept countable it is necessary to develop a method to make it observable (Hinkel, 2011). For this reason, socio-economic variables can be used to assess social vulnerability through the construction of different indicators. For example, considering social vulnerability, it is possible to evaluate how an indicator (e.g. age, socioeconomic status) changes over time or how it can differ according to geographic or social entities (Hinkel, 2011). In the reviewed literature, most of the authors use an inductive approach to aggregate social vulnerability indicators into a composite index.

One of the most cited studies in which an inductive method is used to assess social vulnerability toward natural hazards is the “*Social Vulnerability Index*” (SoVI) derived from the *hazard-of-place* model approach (Cutter *et al.*, 2003). The SoVI index is used by Cutter combining it with what she calls

biophysical vulnerability to grasp the concept of *place vulnerability*, by putting physical dimensions (the geographic context) together with the social ones (the social fabric).

Many other scientists have exploited Cutter's methodology to assess social vulnerability in different backgrounds and there are diverse socio-economic aspects that seem to have a great impact in the determination of social vulnerability and also even influencing the recovery process.

Various studies have shown that social vulnerability appears to be definitely a product of social inequalities (Cutter *et al.*, 2003; Bolin, 2007; Bourque *et al.*, 2007), produced by inequalities of income, class, ethnicity. Many factors often interact with each other, creating a vicious circle in which, for example, «lower-income households successively inhabit homes and neighbourhoods as they deteriorate physically, allocating poor and minorities to older and poorer-quality homes in less desirable and potentially more risky neighbourhoods» (Peacock *et al.*, 2015: 357). Furthermore, due to vicious circles, living in a more "at risk" place, this can also compromise (in a post-disaster phase) the subsequent access to resources in terms of money or information related to recovery and reconstruction (Wisner *et al.*, 2004). In this way lower social classes will take longer to return to their homes or have permanent housing, or they will even accept choices made by others or transform (or, eventually to accept) temporary housing into permanent ones (Lindell, 2013).

On this subject, Peacock *et al.*, analyzing the recovery in the United States after hurricanes Ike and Andrew (in 1992 and 2008), argue that living in a low-income neighborhood, being renters and having suffered significant damage adversely affects the recovery process after both hurricanes. The literature has thus shown that «renters are much more likely to be displaced, for they have few if any rights to the property, only to the contents within them, whereas single-family homeowners can often choose to stay despite the damage» (Peacock *et al.*, 2007: 296). In addition, rental houses need usually more time to be repaired (Peacock *et al.*, 2007): due to the increasing of rents of available buildings after a disaster and to management policies typically addressed in favour of "single-family middle-income homeowners" (such as the United States) less numerous families, with a job (Morrow 1999) and with more economic resources can usually afford better houses (Peacock *et al.*, 2007).

Population density/growth can be another factor of social vulnerability: high population density makes evacuation harder and increases risk of losses and a rapid population growth is unlikely to be absorbed by the country by creating a lack of services to the population (Cutter *et al.*, 2003).

Age is another important dimension to take into account in order to assess social vulnerability (Wisner *et al.*, 2004; Bolin, Stanford, 1998; Cutter *et al.*, 2003): it is generally accepted that children and youth are more vulnerable, highly dependent on adult members' decisions and not addressed in recovery policies (Babugura, 2015). Also aging (being older than 65) can influence vulnerability, according to social norms and culture: limited mobility, illiteracy, economic vulnerability, marginalisation, prejudice and needs of specific care sometimes hide the role of the elderly as bearer of traditional knowledge and local practices of risk management that can be shared in disaster risk reduction (Ngo, 2015).

To conclude, looking at ethnic factors, these cannot be easy predictors nor in terms of housing recovery, nor in terms of social vulnerability before and after the disaster. In disaster studies literature, researchers do not agree on how ethnic factors may positively or negatively affect social vulnerability (Fothergill *et al.*, in Bolin, 2006). For example, Cutter underlines that being a foreigner may negatively affect one's access to information or one's understanding of the access mechanisms to recovery and reconstruction; likewise, belonging to an ethnic minority can bring about a marginalization linked to more risky areas (Bolin, 2007; Gaillard, 2015). On the contrary, being part of an ethnic or religious minority with strong social networks can facilitate access to networks of mutual aid provided by ethnic-religious networks themselves (Gaillard, 2015). Taking the interaction of ethnicity with other factors, into consideration, such as age, social isolation, social networks and family structure may unveil different perspectives.

Although ethnicity can positively influence social vulnerability (e.g. the Afro-American diaspora after Katrina in New Orleans, among others Daniels *et al.*, 2006), one has to say that «the complex mechanisms by which certain ethnic (and racial, gendered, and classed) categories of people are disadvantaged in relation to hazardous environments will remain invisible as long as researchers are concerned with statistical *differences* between groups rather than the pervasive social *inequalities*» (Bolin, 2007: 117).

2. The 2012 Emilia earthquake and Mirandola case study

The sequence of events defined as *Emilia Earthquake* concerns a series of processes triggered by two major earthquakes: 5.9 MI shock on 20th May, 2012 with epicenter in Finale Emilia (Modena) and 5.8 MI shock on May 29th with an epicenter area among the towns of Mirandola, Medolla and San Felice sul Panaro (Modena). In the face of 27 dead and 400 injured, 42,000

people were evacuees (Emilia Romagna Region, 2013); after the immediate activation of the National Department Civil Protection (DPC) and the local civil protection coordination, 28 relief camps were built. In addition to the strong presence of tent camps and self-managed shelters, hotels, schools, gyms, barracks and sleeping compartments in trains were set up.

On May 22nd, 2012 a *State of Emergency* was declared and on 2th June, by procedures (*Augustus method*²) the Command and Control Headquarters (DI.Coma.C) was established by the DPC (OCDPC 3/2012) which managed the emergency for 60 days; on August 2, 2012, the coordination was transferred to the administration of Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto.

With four deaths and several damage, Mirandola is one of the most affected place: the historical center was severely damaged, many buildings partially collapsed; thanks to the emergency decree, a *Red Zone* was established³. The biomedical district, an important district at a European level, is based in Mirandola and 70% of its companies had some damage. In addition, important historical and artistic heritage, as well as the local cultural landscape landmarks were damaged (e.g. the Town Hall, the *Pico* Castle and the Cathedral).

Together with an initial survey of the building with *AEDES* compilation sheets for practicability, a tool used by DPC engineers to evaluate the type of damage of buildings⁴, five tent cities were immediately set up. Next to the tent cities, there were numerous “spontaneous tents”, in front of uninhabitable homes or in parks and, particularly, in “rural” districts (Mirandola has six districts) or in farmhouses, where the rhythms of agricultural work require a permanent presence *in situ*. The tent camps managed by the DPC were then reduced to four in mid-September 2012, to three at the end of September and finally closed between 18th and 20th October 2012. Since the day of the earthquake and up to the assignment of provisional housing units (PMAR and PMRR⁵) or the eventual recovery of one’s damaged home (in June 2015 in Mirandola 70% of reconstruction documentation was already on going), the

² www.protezionecivile.gov.it/resources/cms/documents/Piani_2013.ppt.

³ The gradual reopening is visible through different local decrees available here: <http://www.comune.mirandola.mo.it/aree-tematiche/ricostruzione/progetti-in-corso/elenco-ordinanze-zona-rossa>; link accessed on April 15, 2016.

⁴ The sheets distinguish between 5 different types of damage: A=termed as habitable, B=termed as temporarily habitable but with slight damage, C= termed as partially habitable, D=termed as temporarily habitable but to be reviewed, E=termed as inhabitable because of structural, non structural or external risk F=termed as inhabitable because of an external risk.

⁵ They are, respectively, temporary housing (i.e. removable housing units) in urban and in rural contexts.

solutions put forward to assist the affected population were as follows: “official” and self-managed tent cities, municipal facilities, hotels, buildings rented by the Municipality, social and health facilities reserved for the disabled and elderly, rental properties agreed privately between citizens. For those who had chosen or were able to rent an house/apartment (e.g. second home), a “contribution to the rent” was available, valid until the house was repaired.

In the first emergency phase 4674 people⁶ (the 19% of the total population) were reported to have had uninhabitable or partially uninhabitable houses: among them up to 1653 (35%) were assisted by tent camps set up by the Civil Protection, up to 1004 (21%) in hotels and the rest in other forms provided or self-managed.

In December 2012 PMAR and PMRR were assigned based on a list established by the City Council «based on the following priorities: the high number of components in an household, the presence of people with disabilities not less than 67%, of dependent people, elderly people over 65 years, minors» (Capriotti, 2014: 54)⁷. Even if PMAR were seen a “residual solution”, «only in case of worse damage and poor availability of housing for rent» (Capriotti, 2014: 17)⁸, about 800 people would benefit from this solution, that is 17% of affected population.

Finally, following Regional Law n. 16/2012, a Reconstruction Plan is adopted by Mirandola on 27/11/2013, in order to evaluate the conservation and restoration of valuable architectural-historical buildings, the safety and restoring of historical centre, the opportunity of relocation and the reduction of urban sprawl.

At this regards, Campagnoli (2015), an Emilia architect, associates the recovery and reconstruction process ongoing to the huge urban growth that took place in Emilia in last decades. Indeed, the growth of the urbanized area was on average of 76% in the Region between 1976 and 2003, bringing with him an identity conflict that, at the time of the earthquake, emerges into the faults and interrogates Emilia and Mirandola inhabitants: «What does represents our identity that deserves to be recovered and brought into the future?» (Campagnoli, 2015: 104). Posing the question in terms of vulnerability, which factors may become drivers of vulnerabilization, if not considered in the recovery and reconstruction process?

⁶ Data elaborated by authors processing dataset produced by Mirandola local Council.

⁷ Translation by authors.

⁸ Translation by authors.

3. Methodology

Literature about the assessment of social vulnerability to natural hazards in Italy is poorly considered; there are only a few works that have handled this phenomenon on a national scale producing and mapping different composite indices of social vulnerability (Frigerio, De Amicis, 2016; Frigerio *et al.*, 2016a; 2016b). Even though these studies permit a wide-ranging analysis of this issue, on the other hand there is no evaluation at a local scale.

Within this backdrop, the proposed methodology allows a step forward in the social vulnerability analysis on a more detailed scale. Regarding this, dataset of Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) of 2011 Italian population and housing census (ISTAT, 2015) was adopted to perform a socio-demographic zonation of Mirandola population.

We used a GIS based approach to identify different spatial patterns of socio-demographic indicators providing the basis for determining a frame of social vulnerability at the moment of 2012 earthquake. The method for assessing social vulnerability to seismic event for Mirandola consists of three principal steps:

1. constructing of Social Vulnerability Indicators (SVI);
2. evaluating a buildings damage index (BDI)
3. testing for bivariate spatial clustering between SVI and BDI.

3.1 Constructing social vulnerability indicators

After a careful review of the most relevant factors that influence social vulnerability to natural hazards, 5 indicators that contribute to increase vulnerability were selected. Table 1 shows the 5 indicators with their proxy variables collected for each census track of Mirandola.

Table 1. Variables and indicators.

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
Elderly > 65 years	Age
Migrants	Citizenship
Buildings built before 1971 ⁹	Residential property

⁹ The variable Buildings built before 1971 refers to the Italian law on the classification and regulations for buildings in seismic zones.

Rental house	Socio-economic status
Property house	
Single-parent households	Family structure
Large family	

3.2 Evaluating a buildings damage index

BDI was calculated using geo-referenced information of damaged buildings available for the whole Mirandola territory. We used a binary model to classify buildings in function of their status after the earthquake event: 0 was assigned to buildings considered habitable (class A of *AEDES* compilation sheets for practicability) and 1 for those uninhabitable (B, C, D, E and F). The socio-economic indicators are aggregated at census track level.

The following equation was used to up-scale the damage at census area:

$$BDI = \frac{\sum_i^n (E_i * D_i)}{\sum_i^n E_i}$$

Where E is the building surface of the unit i (census area) and D_i is value of the damage for unit i (1 or 0).

Despite the fact this index spread the damage caused by earthquake in the census unit, it still allowed us to correlate the seismic event with socio-economic characteristics of Mirandola community at census scale.

3.3 Spatial clustering

Our research hypothesis is that the type of association between different social vulnerability indicators and damage vary geographically. We use the bivariate LISA statistic (Local Indicator of Spatial Association) (Anselin, 1995), to test for spatial clustering between SVI and BDI and also to map these associations at the census tracks. This technique is a widely used spatial autocorrelation test (see e.g. Myers *et al.*, 2008; Cutter, Finch, 2008; Gaither *et al.*, 2011; Zhou *et al.*, 2014; Poudyal *et al.*, 2012).

In our case, the correlation statistic indicates how observations of an indicator in a given location (census track), is associated with observations of

a BDI variable at neighbouring locations. This test allows identifying significant statistically ($p\text{-value} < 0.05$) concentrations of the different obtained clusters. We also used a 999 permutation to increase the significance level of results cluster maps (Anselin *et al.*, 2006).

In the maps presented in the next section (Figures 2 - 7), the black colour indicates clusters of high damage located in neighbourhoods or clusters with high value of related SVI (High-High). The medium grey clusters denote low damage in clusters with low values of SVI (Low-Low); low damage and high SVI are presented in light grey (Low-High) and high damage and low SVI clusters are coloured in dark grey (High-Low). White areas represent census tracks where the spatial association between BDI and SVI is not statistically significant.

3.4 Analysis of regional documents and processing of local data

In the final section of our paper we will reflect on possible vulnerabilization processes at stake in the aftermath of the earthquake. Since the earthquake is pretty recent and there is neither census nor accurate official spatial data to analyse, we have tried to contextualize and understand on going processes analysing documents and data processed by some local offices of Mirandola: the registry office, demographic services and social services.

This data were elaborated during the emergency phases and without following standard models, it is thus partial and not complete; at the same time, they are a precious and unique source of information in order to explore how vulnerability factors are considered (or not) in the disaster management and during the reconstruction phase.

4. Results and discussion


4.1 Analysis of vulnerability factors

Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the damage after the earthquake, which was obtained using BDI index. This distribution is quite heterogeneous with a very high concentration in the historical centre, in few rural areas and in the industrial zones (the three census tracks black coloured that are located outside the historical centre).

We can notice that 129 undamaged census tracks (41% of the total) are located immediately outside the historical centre, in the mid-central zones. It


is possible to explain this situation considering that in the historical centre, nearly 30% of the buildings were built before 1919 and about 15% of them were built between 1919 and 1945 (Comune di Mirandola, 2014a). Differently, due to the lower density of buildings in the rural area, the damage is classified as medium and low.

Figure 1. BDI spatial distribution. Quantile classification: Not damaged, Low, Medium, High.



Another analysis in support of this interpretation is to evaluate the spatial relationship between damage and the age of buildings (Figure 2). Indeed, the analysis highlights significant (p -value < 0.05) spatial clusters both for the historical centre, which is characterized by high damage and very old buildings (High-High), and for its surroundings, which suffered low damage and have younger buildings (Low-Low). The results confirm that housing quality is a significant indicator in evaluating social vulnerability to natural hazards. The value and quality of residential constructions affect potential losses and recovery (Cutter *et al.*, 2003). Furthermore, it is closely tied to personal wealth: poorer people often live in more poorly constructed houses that are especially vulnerable to hazardous events (Eidson *et al.*, 1990; Morrow, 1999; Daley *et al.*, 2005; De Souza, 2004).

Figure 2. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between older buildings and damage in Mirandola.



Another indicator that affects recovery from hazards is family structure. The map presented in figure 3 shows that large families, located in the rural part of Mirandola, suffered less damage (High-Low): this result is not consistent with the literature review (Peacock *et al.*, 2007), if not correlated to typologies of buildings and socio-environmental aspects. In fact, the historical centre has a lower presence of large families but greater damage.

At the same time, as figure 4 shows, significant clusters (High-High) between single-parent households and damage are concentrated in the historical centre and in the surrounding belt. Moreover, single-parent households are more likely to require financial support, transportation, medical care, or assistance with ordinary daily activities after disasters (Cutter *et al.*, 2003; Wisner *et al.*, 2004; Morrow, 1999; Puente, 1999).

Figure 3. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between large families and damage in Mirandola






Figure 4. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between single-parent households and damage in Mirandola.



Another important contribution of our research is the result of spatial relationships between migrants and damage (Figure 5). The map clearly defines a statistically significant High-High cluster in the historic district. These findings are supported by Mirandola Structural Plan showing that the most significant percentage of migrants (36%) is found in the old town, where more than a third of the population living there is composed by migrants. This outcome plays a key role being partially linked to the social vulnerability indicators previously considered in our research.

As highlighted by several authors, many migrants live in more vulnerable buildings, because of a lower socio-economic status (Bolin, 2007; Lindell, 2013); furthermore, they could have recovery problems caused by difficulties in accessing information in all phases of disaster cycle (Cutter *et al.*, 2003; Morrow, 1999; Bolin, 2007; Peguaro, 2006).

Figure 5. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between migrants and damage in Mirandola.




Another relevant indicator to assess social vulnerability explored in this analysis is age. The map presented in Figure 6 highlights a clearly spatial pattern High-Low in the rural area of Mirandola where the elderly were more concentrated. Contrary to the literature that considers elders to be one of the most vulnerable groups in disaster events, the results show that in Mirandola, the elderly has been little affected by the earthquake. In fact, they are con-

centrated in the rural districts in the eastern part of Mirandola (e.g. San Martino Spino and Tramuschio), away from the main urban centres, where damage was low, or immediately outside of the historical district (Low-High clusters) where the quality of house, due to the age of buildings, probably limited the negative effect of the earthquake.


This is also strongly related to the spatial pattern of migrants that focuses on the historical centre where the average age of migrants, from 2012, is lower than the provincial capital (Modena) and the average age in the whole of Mirandola.

Figure 6. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between elderly people (over 65 year) and damage in Mirandola.



Comparing the spatial variation in the pattern of property and rental houses vs damage, we note an opposite trend. As can be seen in Figure 7, considering “rental house” variable, there are relevant spatial clusters (High-High) concentrated in the whole historical centre, while for the “property house” variable, the High-High clusters are located just outside the centre. This particular result is also confirmed by a growing trend in the centre, where the percentage of rental houses has changed from 43% (2001) to 47% (2011).

Figure 7. Bivariate LISA based spatial clusters showing the local association between property house and damage (A) and rental house and damage (B) in Mirandola.



Furthermore, we have to consider that renters, as mentioned by Cutter, can be generally more vulnerable in all disaster phases, because «people that

rent do so because they are either transient or do not have the financial resources for home ownership. They often lack access to information about financial aid during recovery. In the most extreme cases, renters lack sufficient shelter options when lodging becomes uninhabitable or too costly to afford» (Cutter *et al.*, 2003).

The objective of this section was to analyse the relationship between some proven social vulnerability indicators and the uninhabitability of the houses hit by the earthquake. The employment of LISA statistics technique allowed us to identify significant spatial relationships among the underlying indicators and the negative consequences of the seismic event. The results reveal that the indicators *Migrants*, *Single-parent house*, *Rent house* and *Building before 1971* show a significant and positive correlation with the housing damage. Given the aforementioned maps, we can thus sustain there is a strong correlation between having suffered more damage when one is a migrant, younger, single, living in the historical centre and in rental houses.

4.2 Possible vulnerabilization dynamics in the recovery process

The relationships between these factors highlight and unveil an amplification of vulnerability factors in the recovery process, since the first emergency up to the planning of the reconstruction plan: social vulnerability components related to damage can be seen as being amplified and spread in space and time, even though the recovery process was led by principle as equity, simplification, governance and transparency (as presented by Regional and local institutions, see Capriotti, 2014).

Considering one of these dimensions, we managed to outline an image of the recovery process for migrants by showing in two graphs the progress of assisted people¹⁰, according to our available data:

¹⁰ We have to differentiate three main different “contributions for rent”: CAS (max 600 euro per household, 8/2012-6/2013), NCAS (max 900 euro per household 7/2013-6/2015) and CLL/CDA (7/2015-ongoing for who is in good standing with reconstruction sheets), mainly addressed to people that resided in uninhabitable houses or in houses located within the Red Zone. These citizens were not assisted with other types of accommodation (people with disabilities or elderly were favoured).

Fig. 10. Percentage distribution of Italians and migrants in “official” tent cities, hotels and beneficiaries of the three different contributions for a rental house.





Fig. 11. Numbers of people in PMAR (2013-2016). A value of percentage ratio between Italians and migrants is reported on each bar.



The two graphs clearly show the different conditions of Italians and migrants in the recovery phase. The first one outlines a general framework of the main emergency and recovery solutions adopted in Mirandola, according to our data¹¹. It highlights an unequal distribution in accommodating migrants: a low presence in good recovery solutions such as CAS, NCAS and CCL/DTA and a higher presence in tent cities. The second graph represents the progressive decrease of assisted people in *PMAR* and the parallel progressive increase of the percentage of assisted migrants. Since these solutions were considered as residual solutions mostly for disables, elderly and minors, the impact of this imbalance is even stronger. Thus, “being migrant” became a strong driver of social vulnerability, since the access to the best accommodation was precluded: as time goes by, the slower their rehousing is. Namely, the percentage of migrants in tent-cities was double if compared to the percentage of migrants hit by the earthquake; furthermore, four years after the earthquake a great number of Italians have received a contribution for rent or they have just recovered their home, while a great number of migrants are remaining in provisional housing units.

This issue leads us to questioning if the reconstruction plan considers the displacement of the people affected and the social and urban implications of a two-speed recovery. Indeed, the relationship between migrants, damage and age of buildings points out a process of urbanization and relocation that was already on going and that, without a policy considering this issue, could lead to the classical processes of urban sprawl driven by shock economy (Frisch 2009; Ciccozzi 2011; Carnelli, 2012; Ciccaglione, Pitzalis, 2015; Olori, Ciccozzi, 2016). In order to rebuild a less vulnerable historical centre, policies should consider not only a micro-seismic zoning and safety issues, but also a social zoning to slow down vulnerabilization processes already there and amplified by the earthquake.

Our analysis clearly shows why it’s necessary and urgent to consider the socio-demographic characteristics and their local spatial interactions in disaster management, especially in emergency/recovery and reconstruction policies.

Actually, looking at the urban development of Mirandola, we can see that since the 70s the growth of the urbanized area was huge¹² and brought along the identity conflict that emerged immediately after the earthquake (Campagnoli, 2015). Namely, Mirandola had already adopted a recovery plan of the historical centre fifteen years ago, and the centre was precisely the place

¹¹ We didn’t have reliable data for the other aforementioned recovery solutions.

¹² From 5,9 Km² (1976) to 14,05 Km² (2008). Elaborations by authors using DUSAF data.

where we had the most damaged buildings: Mirandola had already experienced centrifugal tendencies in both residential patterns and economic activities, as highlighted in the Organic and Structural Plan, drawn up in 2014 (Comune di Mirandola, 2014a; 2014b); at the same time, the recovery and enhancement of the historical centre was the core of the Organic Plan, too (Comune di Mirandola, 2014b). This comprehensive plan includes the urgency and the need to rebuild “the identity” of Mirandola starting from the historical centre, a centre described as something to be «regained» as «a civic and vibrant centre» (Comune di Mirandola, 2014b: 6), which has also to provide a more animated connection with the surrounding belt - the less damaged area. If the urban regeneration of the urban belt focuses on the restoration of essential services such as sport services, schools, the bus station, the restoration of the historical centre is seen more as a “heritage” issue than a social one; the centre is described as a «showcase», which has to represent «all the historical, cultural social and commercial values of the municipal area and, more generally, of the whole area affected by the earthquake» (Comune di Mirandola, 2014b: 7).

In specific, if we look at this process analysing past and emergency relocation processes, we can find how root causes (Wisner *et al.*, 2004) interact with present recovery conditions, in a vicious cycle that amplifies social vulnerability factors. To give an example related to the historical centre and to the aforementioned process, we can look at commercial activities: between 2001 and 2011 the historical centre lost 59 commercial activities (Comune di Mirandola, 2014a). Then, this relocation was accelerated by emergency measures, but even welcomed by retailers, precisely because of the socio-economic conditions of the historical centre at the moment of the earthquake. As we seen, the fragile housing conditions favoured the settlement of the population mostly affected by the earthquake; furthermore, this scenario was strengthened by a general perception of the historical centre as seen as an area “made worse” and “expropriated” by migrants (Ciccaglione, Pitzalis, 2015). As a consequence, the “historicity” of the historical centre could have been preserved only as a consumption place inserted into a heritage paradigm (Ciccaglione, Pitzalis, 2015), whose role as a “showcase” without inhabitants would provoke an urban sprawl and a desertification of the centre itself. In this sense, our socio-spatial analysis may work as a useful tool in order to outline and prevent vulnerabilization processes potentially ongoing in disaster management.

Final remarks

In sociological disaster research, spatial analysis and GIS based approach are usually addressed to disaster and risk management (Thomas *et al.*, 2007). Considering the *vulnerability approach* in disaster research literature (Wisner *et al.*, 2004), we processed a spatial analysis in order to assess correlations among socio-demographic factors at a local level. We confirmed some results derived from the literature for some factors (e.g. rent/property, building age, family structure) and found different correlations for other ones (citizenship, age).

Some innovative points of our research consists in: the use of a damage index (instead of a hazard map), a detailed level of spatial correlations (through the use of census tracks as research units) and the analysis of the detailed data produced by a local administration. Some different stages of the disaster management were also taken into consideration - being fully aware of the limits imposed by the emergency management and the different units of analysis considered. In our opinion, the relevant issue that comes out is the importance of space as a dimension where the relationships among vulnerability drivers emerge in interesting ways. At the same time, the “materialization” of vulnerability has not to be seen as something pre-defined and “over there” (Benadusi, 2013); indeed, social vulnerability is not a fixed property, but the result of many processes, which are continually shifting and acquire different meanings in relation to each other. Actually, a spatial analysis of some of these dimensions allows us to potentially draw a social zoning of an area hit by an earthquake, in order to identify and eventually prevent some vulnerabilization processes occurring in the disaster management cycle.

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POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION IN CONSTITUCIÓN, CHILE

by Davide Olori*

1. A territorial perspective on vulnerabilities during disasters

Over the last decade, an increasing attention has been paid to the issues related to natural hazards and post-disaster recovery; this has been due the growth of, on the one hand, the so called *real* facts¹ (IDMC, 2015) and, on the other, all those factors contributing to the social construction of disasters (Hewitt, 1983). The combination of the two has called into question the causes as well as the consequences and the social implications of natural hazards, both in the scientific and in the public debates². It is important to point out is that the attention paid to disasters has covered all the phases of the phenomenon, from its pre-conditions to its effects. The phase that involves long term recovery and differentiation processes, political strategies, socio-spatial impacts, resilience practices, etc. is what the Disaster Research (DR) literature defines as “post-disaster”. As discussed in a recent work by Yi and Yang, this represents a crucial moment for the increase of scientific production on the topic (2014). In this phase the concept of space, considered in its twofold dimension of social construct and social actor (Mela, 2016), plays a fundamental role. For example, it represents both the area where major conflicts and disputes materialize (Letelier, 2013) or the symbol of that sense of community that frequently emerges during the resilience processes in post-disaster recovery. Nevertheless, as Fothergill and colleagues have pointed out in their work on disasters and gender issues, there is a deep gap, in terms of scientific production, between the sociological research and the (still developing) “territorialist” research on spatial equity and environmental justice (Fothergill, Maestas and Darlington, 1999). Two main reasons could be identified to explain such a shortcom-

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¹ For example, the increase in the number of natural events and of people directly hit by them, the urbanization of the problem, the relevance of environmental migration flows, the rising economic impacts of natural hazards, etc.

² For instance, the increasing relevance of post-apocalyptic genre in film production and in narrative, the central role acquired by natural hazards and environmental issues in political agendas, public opinion and in trans-national politics, etc.

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ing: the search for a more defined disciplinary autonomy and the epistemological definition of the object under study. Especially in the US context, the closure of the discipline, in a perpetual state of tension between contamination and autonomy, has inhibited the attempts to broaden the definition of the field beyond the extreme and acute event (Tiefenbacher, Hagelman, 1999). As a result, a wide range of environmental disasters has not been taken into account despite equally affecting people's lives, as extensively reported in geographic and social research (Cutter, 1995). This frames its works in the historical and socio-economic contexts where disasters occur (Pellow, Weiberg, Schnaiberg, 2005) (King, McCarthy, 2005), by analysing the intersection between demographic (e.g. ethnicity, class, gender, social vulnerability) and structural variables. In so doing, it specifically addresses the production of urban space in the aftermath of a disaster, thus its socio-spatial impacts. The focus on the pre-disaster local conditions has partly influenced the inclusion of the ecological factors in the analysis of the social processes that precede, accompany, and follow the environmental disaster as such. Yet accounts of this type remained marginal until the first studies on Katrina were published³. The first attempt may, in fact, be traced in the *Crisis Cities*, a book by Gotham and Greenberg, in which the authors evaluated and compared the reconstruction of New Orleans and New York. Inspired by the concept of "landscape of risk and resilience", the sociologists sought to evaluate the relationship between poverty/segregation and vulnerabilities/risk exposure in some areas of the analysed cities. Their research showed that, in both cases, the production of space is not just the simple outcome of specific urban policies and local real estate dynamics but of their combination with (historical and ethnical) contextual features and the ability of communities to have access to resources and aids, during and after the emergency phase (Gotham, Greenberg, 2015). It is mainly in the study of minorities and socially vulnerable groups that the territorialist perspective may provide relevant contributions to the sociology of disaster, as highlighted by Bob Bolin in the Handbook of Disaster Research (book by Quarantelli):

To enrich future disaster research, a better grounding in the historical geographic development of class and race relations in particular places is necessary. This should be combined with more attention given to theoretical issues regarding race and class processes and to spatial analysis of patterns of segregation. Environmental justice research and vulnerability studies both provide models for such analyses

³ For some important exceptions see Kroll-Smith (Kroll-Smith, Couch, 1991) Peacock (Peacock, Morrow, Gladwin, 2001).

that could be incorporated into the ensemble of methodologies already deployed by disaster sociologists (Bolin, 2007).

As it will be discussed more in detail in the following contributions, sometimes studies on social differentiation and vulnerability have become an obstacle; nevertheless, thanks to them, space has been included among the main determinants of the social processes that are simultaneous and subsequent to socio-natural disaster. By overcoming the definition of social vulnerability as something merely related to marginal populations living in high environmental risk urban areas, studies have emphasized the emergence of new forms of spatial vulnerability that exist before and after the event. The relationship society/environment affects the vulnerability of individuals and groups and, despite being subverted by the event, may re-emerge, sometimes even more consolidated by the shock. During the last twenty years, DR has thus abandoned the definition of community as a unitary monolith in favour of a wider one that encompasses all the subgroups constituting the community itself (Tierney, 2007). Such a perspective may be traced in the work carried out by Stalling (2002). By recalling Moore's classical research, *Tornadoes Over Texas* (1958), he re-interprets post-disaster recovery not as a communitarian act of resilience, but as a form of resistance by some privileged residents to restore a more advantageous social order.

The aforementioned study has been at the basis of the assumption, today largely accepted in DR, that socially disadvantaged groups go through processes of vulnerabilization during disasters as well as in the post-disaster long term recovery. The investments for the reconstruction do not improve their condition. On the contrary, it further exacerbates it (Fox, Gotham, 2015).

Nevertheless, although classical DR frequently referred to the ecological dimension of the phenomenon under study, it continued to be trapped in an "extreme" structuralist and macro perspective. By contrast, the latest investigations have succeeded in understanding the plurality of the social processes before and after natural hazards, by shifting their focus on the subgroups level. Yet they have not managed to apply the territorial perspective to the micro scale (see the studies on neighbourhood communities during reconstruction processes contrasting with the macro-regional research of the 60s and 70s).

Although this research approach, built on a case-study methodology, continues to inspire most of DR investigations, it remains limited from the ecological point of view. As Elliot and Pais (2015) state, this stems from

the methodology adopted. A case study approach does not allow researchers to build a strong comparative base to interpret the post-disaster long term reconstruction as an agent of spatial change. Moreover, contemporary analyses have not included how the environmental aspect of a socio-natural disaster affects the spatial redistribution of socially vulnerable sub-populations in the space, in the aftermath of a natural event. Quoting Bolin:

As discussed extensively in environmental justice studies, the focus on the relative statistical effects of race versus class obscures any understanding of the concrete ways that race and class are bound together and embodied in human subjects, structuring people's everyday lives, including where and how they live, and their particular ensembles of capacities and vulnerabilities (Bolin, 2007).

In most cases, such variables have been neglected: environmental parameters have not been identified among the variables that determine the social and spatial transformation after a socio-socio-natural disaster. In the light of the above, within the environmental justice literature, two competing yet complementary hypotheses emerge:

1. Displacement hypothesis: after a major environmental disaster, socially vulnerable sub-populations are the most subject to risks of displacement. Especially in those urban areas targeted by massive real estate investments and going through redevelopment processes, such sub-groups lose their ability to re-establish "normality". In urban sociology, such a model recalls the literature on the socio-spatial impacts of urban renewal: according to it, the direct consequence of the implementation of mega-projects is the displacement of disadvantaged groups from neighbourhoods, in favour of the arrival and of the establishment of better off sub groups (Elliot, Pais, 2010).
2. Concentration hypothesis: given the decrease in the economic value of the land and the lacking infrastructure, better off sub- groups prefer to move out of the areas hit by the environmental disaster. Hence, they are re-densified by socially vulnerable groups. (Dash *et al.*, 2007). The outcome is a jeopardized reconstruction model characterized by a high percentage of empty and vacuum estates, abandoned places, etc. To a certain extent, this paradigm evokes the so called "transition-zones" model: disadvantaged and socially vulnerable sub-populations tend to cluster in derelict areas, less profitable for investors to renew. Such a scenario is also shared by the so called "move-in paradigm", adopted by several territorialist

researchers: socially vulnerable sub-groups spontaneously cluster in areas lacking urban benefits and amenities, but more economically sustainable. In both scenarios - the displacement and the concentration one - the ecological factor represents an important agent in post-disaster long term recovery, which brings about both direct and indirect impacts. The former include all the physical damages to the environmental system - e.g. the destruction of sewage systems, infrastructures, industrial parks - which directly affect the decision on timing, costs and location of the reconstruction. The latter are connected to all those means, such as private insurance policies, public assistance programs, community networks, which, on the one hand, are very selective in the identification of the beneficiaries (mostly better positioned residents with an already high socio-economic and cultural capital) and, on the other, foster speculative real estate practices.

Having introduced the two paradigms, here I explore the moderating hypothesis by Elliot and Pais. Its main argument is that the ecological system plays an important role in the aftermath of a socio-socio-natural disaster: impacts are, in fact, largely determined by the local context, in particular, by the density of the urban development before the socio-socio-natural disaster occurs⁴ (local development coalitions and so on). As a consequence, as the recovery costs substantially increase, the coalitions of actors interested in the redevelopment become more organized and aggressive. Their main aim is to ensure larger capital returns. The combination of such dynamics may have two possible outcomes: 1. they may further boost the displacement and the concentration of socially vulnerable sub populations (*intensification hypothesis*); 2. they may induce inverse situations (*divergence hypothesis*). In their work on the spatial redistribution of socially vulnerable sub groups after the hurricanes in Louisiana and in Miami, Elliot and Pais sought to combine the case oriented approach with the comparative one to corroborate the two aforementioned hypotheses. The result was a divergence between the two contexts: while in the case of New Orleans the concentration hypothesis could be verified, in the denser areas of Miami the displacement model was the most accurate to interpret the post-disaster long term recovery. Therefore, the two authors validate the *moderating hypothesis*, thus underlining the relevance of local contexts in DR.

⁴ The denser an area is, the larger the number of the people hit by the disaster and the higher the land economic values become.

The approach used to analyse, a small town located on the Chilean coast, is based on this hypothesis, whose main assumption is that scholars have to take into account local real estate dynamics and regulatory systems when examining the socio-spatial polarization and the displacement of socially vulnerable sub populations.

2. Housing subsidies and socio-spatial dynamics in Chile

Housing policies in Chile belong to the neo-liberal model codified in the National Constitution by the Military Government in 1980. The *Política Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano* (National Policy on Urban Development) denied the scarce availability of urban land, thus reducing edification costs and launching a phase of extreme dynamism for the real estate market, which is still going on⁵.

This policy was in contrast with what was happening during same period in other South-American countries, where informal settlements (e.g. *poblaciones, favelas, etc.*) were being demolished without giving any kind of guarantee to evicted families: in Argentina, for example, the military operation respected the slogan of Buenos Aires' Mayor "the city is for those who deserve it". On the contrary, in Chile, the government adopted an interventionist policy, aimed at building new neighbourhoods in the urban outskirts to be assigned to disadvantaged social groups. Such a strategy, quietly strange for Chicago Boys' model of the "minimal state intervention", was employed for two main reasons: to stabilize the precarious national real estate market characterized by a dangerous and critical macro-economic instability; to neutralize potential conflicts and tensions that would have put the normalization and pacification of the national security at risk (Renna, 2011).

As this policy was not accompanied by a strong urban planning regime, its concrete spatial outcome was an unregulated expansion of Chilean cities beyond their borders. Several negative externalities followed. Among them, here I mention, without being comprehensive, the main issues that emerge in scientific literature (Bazzucchi, 2010): lacking mobility system and increasing vehicular congestion in large non-decentralised towns; the efficacy of public transport; the criticism of urban services management, etc. mar-

⁵ The latest Chilean Capital's town plan (Plan Regulador Metropolitano de Santiago - PRMS100), approved in 2013, disciplined an increase of 10,200 hectare of building land (Riedel, 2014).

ginalization of periphery areas, marginalization of vulnerable groups, etc. urban sprawl had direct consequences on their (socio-cultural-spatial) structures as it gave impetus to the further marginalization and exclusion of socially vulnerable groups from the social and cultural city life.

Behind the spread of cities there was mainly the policy on housing subsidies aimed at reducing extreme poverty. This actually brought about the diffusion of dormitory neighbourhoods and enhanced socio-spatial segregation. A new social category thus emerged: “los con techo” (who have ‘just’ a roof), which derives from the expression “*los sin techo*” (who haven’t a roof, homeless). This was used to refer to the poor who lived in subsidized houses in the Chilean peripheries. Such a rhetoric artefact clearly showed that the ownership of a small dwelling did not concretely improve disadvantaged groups’ living conditions (Rodríguez, Sugranyes, 2005).

This is the reason why, although in 2012 the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank applauded the Chilean government for its attempts to diminish the number of homeless, the government itself implemented a plan aimed at demolishing part of the *viviendas sociales* estates (cost: \$ 23 billion, in 2013). This explains why those houses, built without a regulation framed within a well-defined urban vision, had a high cost for the community and probably represented a clear damage for the whole society (Tapia, 2014).

3. The earthquake and the acceleration of the model

On Saturday 27th February 2010 at 3:34 a.m. an earthquake with magnitude 8.8 Mw hit the central Chilean region for almost three minutes. After the natural event in Valdivia in 1960, long considered the strongest in the world history, it was one of the most intense earthquakes registered in the country. Induced by the settling of the Nazca plate on the South American plate off the Pacific coasts, it caused a tsunami that, 35 minutes later, destroyed the central Chilean coast and placed other 53 countries on the Pacific Ocean on a state of alert.

Since the epicentre was located underwater and not far from the coast, in the BioBio region and in part of the Maule region, the natural event and the subsequent seaquake reached the eighth degree of the Mercalli scale, thereby expanding beyond the coastal areas and moving to the mainland for hundreds of meters. According to official reports, 525 people died, although some statistics are probably underestimated because they are based on certified deaths and family identifications. Almost 500,000 dwellings

were irremediably damaged. Two millions of people were evacuated. The Plan de Reconstrucción - Reconstruction Plan - write by Government describes the dramatic moments after the disaster as follow:

[...] diffused damage in all national economic sectors, generalized collapse of communication and of basic services' provision, closure of commercial activities, and acute crisis of public order and security. The country lacked in communication for hours and, during the aftershocks, many citizens looked for their relatives in the rubble, helped by Carabineros, Firefighters, regional authorities and civilians, who reached even the most isolated places to collaborate in this difficult task. Also attacks to public order and to private property were documented (or registered). (MinVU, 2010)

Almost 75% of the Chilean population (12,8 million people) were affected by the earthquake. Among the 2 million people hit by the disaster, 83% belonged to the two fifths of the most socially vulnerable groups. According to official data, ten detention centres either collapsed or could no longer provide minimum living conditions for detainees; prisoners were thus forced to evacuate to survive. Yet, in the most affected areas, composed by five cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, 45 with more than 5,000 inhabitants, and about a thousand rural or coastal villages, 370,051 houses that were severely damaged: 179,693 were completely destroyed; 108, 915 seriously damaged, and 179,693 were no longer habitable (ONU, 2010). Likewise, the infrastructural system was greatly damaged: highways, bridges, harbours, railways, irrigation and energy systems. So were hospitals, schools, public amenities, etc. Although such loss did not really affect the population, it tragically compromised the environment and the whole post-disaster phase. As the International Labour Organization (ILO) declared, in the aftermath of the disaster about 93,928 individuals lost their jobs; 34,438 in the BioBio region and 38,090 in the Maule region. Small enterprises, which guaranteed 81% of paid employment, were the most affected (International Labour Office, 2010). Although deaths were miscalculated, the Chilean earthquake and seaquake clearly represented destructive events that “profoundly affected the national social life with multidimensional and complex effects and with evident consequences for the medium-low social sectors” (Letelier, Boyco, 2011). After the first dramatic emergence phase and through an intense period of violence against malls and retails, characterized by military interventions and the imposition of cur-

few⁶, one of the moments that clearly expressed the social complexity of the phenomenon was the post-disaster phase, in particular, the reconstruction. The policies implemented during that phase did not really benefit from the creation of institutions *ex-novo*; on the contrary, they extended the number of existent subsidies, including those assigned to the families hit by the earthquake. Through the distribution of public vouchers, the flows of public investments increased, thus fostering the real estate market. Hence, to understand the social consequences of the reconstruction, both in their individual and collective dimensions, it is important to focus on such financing procedures and on the mechanisms adopted to assign public aids. By encouraging access to credit and direct purchase, subsidies turned into devices used to support the expulsion of those who were not able to financially integrate them.

The government's aim was to allocate 220,000 dwellings in two years, as many as those allocated in 2007 when there was no earthquake emergency. Unfortunately, the goal, although objectively sustainable, was not achieved. The main reason was the reduction of profit margins for the real estate enterprises engaged in the construction of subsidized housing. In such a case, in fact, the strategies to obtain a return of capital are to use land with low economic value or to operate in economies of scale. These conditions, if any, may be found only in peripheral urban areas and not ever. For instance, in case the dwellings just required to be repaired, real estate enterprises did not foresee any reasonable profit returns. Hence, they simply decided not to invest in it. Even when households owned the land or the estate, the subsidize mechanisms favoured the construction of new dwellings. As public vouchers were not enough to cover the repairing costs, families integrated them with the profit from the sale of their properties, so that they could later buy new houses in remote outskirts. Such a dynamic went hand in hand with the gradual, and already consolidated, phenomenon of eviction. Due to the large number of displaced people after the disaster, it greatly accelerated the expulsion.

In Talca, the capital of the Maule region, the expulsion of the population from the city centre involved a lot of poor people, contributing altering the heterogeneity of the area. Already in 2007, a study carried out by the Minister of Planning and Housing (Ministero de Vivienda y Urbanismo - Min-

⁶ It was a dramatic moment for the country and its institution in 2010 chaired by Michelle Bachelet, an ex-political prisoner which his parents murdered by civic-militar government of Augusto Pinochet. The after-quake was the first time with soldier in the streets since the end of dictatorship. For a deepening view on the looting of Chilean post-disaster see Aguilera S., 2010 and on the role of the Army in the history of Chile see Maira L., 1999.

VU) documented a lack of housing projects for low and medium income subgroups in the central areas of the city. The research, prior to the earthquake, pointed out that once the poorest groups were thrown out the centre of Talca, they moved to the small villages of the San Clemente area, in the South of the city. Indipendencia and San Patricio, two large real estate enterprises, gathered more than 70% of the total subsidies of the three municipalities. Most of it was spent to finance the new urbanization of Maule, a small town that has grown over the last decade by 150% mainly through the construction of new housing estates that have affected the city's social profile (Letelier, Boyco, 2011). Due to the increase in demand and supply during the post-disaster phase, this trend towards urban sprawl further intensified and became even more restrictive. Moreover, it caused the expulsion of those people who could not afford the repairing costs, the construction in situ and the purchase of better dwellings. In many post-disaster contexts, this meant that socially vulnerable groups were excluded from urban centres. Areas that had been always characterized by social heterogeneity and high rates of liveability and accessibility were now marked by polarization and differentiation.

Beside the critical issues of the voucher system concerning the selection of the beneficiaries (such as the difficulties for socially vulnerable individuals to access the credit system, the non-recognition of informal settlements and insolvency, etc.), it is important to point out that no value was attributed to the localization before the natural event. Households did not receive any indication on where to invest the public aids. They could decide autonomously and independently. Housing subsidies were thereby turned into powerful devices to unravel the social fabric of the vulnerable groups who were most affected by the natural event.

This mechanism which was in the grip of the increasing of the market, was not only limited to the housing sector. The lack of neighbourhood planning, the resulting empowerment of local investors, and the low urbanization costs brought about serious shortcomings in terms of urban planning, which, in turn, engendered negative outputs in terms of liveability, accessibility, disaster recovery security, etc. In order to identify the instruments that most influenced the urban reconstruction, it is important to combine the bottom-up dynamic behind the post-disaster subsidies with the consolidated procedures of vouchers assignment to the most socially vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, we must also recall the main models of public planning interventions which, in almost all cases, were entrusted to pri-

vate actors. Due to the institutionalization of EGIS⁷, private companies were in charge of the whole housing construction process, from the organization of the demand to technical design and building construction, while joint ventures of foundations, enterprises, research centres, etc., were entitled to define priorities concerning the public space design. Their aim was to define the content of Planes Maestros (PM). These regulatory instruments, whose guarantor is the MinVU, were mainly based on the formalization of public private partnerships (PPPs) among municipalities, regional governments, companies, and social organizations. Such practices also showed some problematic issues: as Letelier states « [...] it is particularly significant that large economic groups have been in charge of many of these plans. They have operated arbitrarily to promote the city as a tourist destination and to attract private investments, rather than meeting the needs of the earthquake victims» (Letelier, Boico, 2010).

In general, such plans were directed to orient the decision-making process, especially concerning the works to be carried out, the distribution of housing subsidies, the reconstruction of infrastructures and the local long-term planning and investment criteria. The non-legally binding nature of such plans shows that both their success and their implementation relied on investors' strength. This clearly corroborates the hypothesis on the urban density factors developed by Elliot and Pais.

According to MinVU, 162 reconstruction plans were implemented in the aftermath of the disaster: among them 25 Planes de Reconstrucción Estratégico-Sustentable (PRES) - plans for sustainable and strategic reconstruction-, 2 Planes de Reconstrucción Estratégica (PRE) - Plans For Strategic Reconstruction-, 110 Planes de Regeneración Urbana (RU) - Urban Regeneration Plans-, and 25 Planes Maestros del Borde Costero (PMBC) - Master Coastal Plans, for coastal areas reconstruction. Aimed at promoting innovative, responsible and sustainable urban planning strategies, they set priorities and selected the proposals to be realized over the following eight years. As the cost of a single building was about 2,000 million pesos, such plans provided a sum of 16,000 million pesos to be allocated in the six regions hit by the earthquake by 2011. Some scholars argue that the lack of an institutional framework to regulate the time and the financial resources invested in the post-disaster phase turned the reconstruction plans into utopias (Cociña Varas, Boano, 2013). The Chilean government itself defined such

⁷ Entidades de Gestión Inmobiliaria de Empresa (EGIS) They are usually offices, owned by construction companies and/or NGOs and foundations that collect and organize housing subsidies, in order to include individual applications into collective projects.

plans as “non-binding strategies: the Master Plan is not an instrument for territorial planning, but rather a technical tool” (Frequently Asked Questions - FAQ - on the National Reconstruction Plan).

In conclusion, I would argue that the poor effectiveness of PRESs did not depend on the emergency situation in the disaster aftermath; the instruments were, in fact, directly subordinated to the will, the ability and the power of each PPPs. It is paradigmatic that the consultancy offices in charge of the planning instruments’ design were more effective when closely tied to stakeholders and investors. By adopting these plans, the State ultimately delegated the planning to economic actors that were profoundly interested in return of capital from the reconstruction phase. Nevertheless, Rodriguez stresses, this did not represent a guarantee of effectiveness (2010).

4. The Constitución case

The above-mentioned double dynamic, bottom-up and top-down, fully emerges in the context of Constitución, a small-medium sized town on the Maule Coast (41,000 inhabitants), hit by the earthquake and the tsunami, and with a high number of victims.

Here, the PRES-Constitución planning strategy was added to the above mentioned dynamics of Chilean subsidies market, accelerated by the expansion of subsidies for the earthquake victims. This produced a double process characterized by the expansion of the urban area, although the population did not increase, the relocation of a marginal group of citizens in the new suburbs and the emptying of the town centre, followed by a gentrification process.

Supported by a consortium of local investors, the Strategic Sustainable Reconstruction Plan - PRES-Constitución - together with the housing subsidy policy have reshaped the face of the town. Unlike many other plans, the PRES acted incisively and crucially in the urban recovery process. It is/was, indeed, the result of an agreement between the municipality and the private sector, represented by the cellulose enterprise ARAUCO Y CONSTITUCIÓN (CELCO), a company that had strong economic interests and employees in the town.

The government grant amounted to \$ 102 million (Barrientos, 2012) in addition to 55 million from the private sector; the project was carried out by

Elemental⁸, a Chilean design office, linked to the holding group headed by the cellulose company. Even if we do not take into consideration the problems linked with the role of CELCO in local environment pollution (olca.cl, 2014), according to some authors, the major issues were the lack of transparency and horizontality of the means. Firstly, it was highlighted that, although the donations made by private institutions for PRES were publicized, it was «impossible to determine explicitly and recognizably who or which entity made the donation, nor what the donated amount was» in the MinVU website. Despite this, it is sufficient to point out that, out of the total investments made by the private sector to Planes Maestros in the Maule region, the largest share of donations was concentrated in the town of Constitución (65%). «The unequal geographical distribution of investments, in which you cannot identify a unified methodology», was, therefore, clear (Barrientos, 2012). In other words, what emerges is a process of prudent investments rather than one of scattered investments: this suggests that the financial support of the strongest private enterprise in the area represented a mere economic interest rather than social philanthropy.

Secondly, the vertical and specialist nature of the PRES of Constitución should be pointed out. According to the scholars of Observatorio Reconstrucción, PRES did not have a medium- and long-term vision and a strategic planning, due to the lack of a real horizontal involvement (OR, 2013). In fact, the referendum to decide about the local administration and the investments with binding effectiveness, involved less than 10% of the citizenry. After a citizen consultation (134 voters), in the initial phase, the studios in charge of designing the plan (one of which is/was owned by CELCO, while a European one was commissioned by the same company) specified that the planning strategy priorities would include: 1. Tourist development 2. Costanera (road along the sea and the main access road to the cellulose plant); 3. Natural environment; 4. Public spaces and green areas; 5. Security. In this list of priorities, the direct interest of the multinational corporation CELCO and of other investors are clearly recognizable: PRES concentrated its proposal only on the town centre and on the river coast, disregarding the overall reality of urban space, the problems of accessibility, the demand for new residential areas and other relevant issues emerged after the tsunami-earthquake. As argued by the Movimiento Nacional para una Reconstrucción Justa (MNRJ), the investments plan has been constituted basically as a short-term strategy with an immediate economic return. Accord-

⁸ The Chilean architect Alejandro Aravena is the executive director of Elemental S.A. and he won the Pritzker Architecture Prize in 2016.

ing to this perspective, the mitigation park “Parque Fluvial Borde de Constitución” was created. It cost around 9,000 million Chilean pesos and destroyed the habitat of dozens of small fishing families of the area⁹, consequently causing their expulsion, but it made it possible to satisfy a (supposed) demand of security and green areas¹⁰. More in detail, the short-term strategy produced three main results: a) it became a driving force for the recovery of tourist development, revamping the image of the seaside resort and then re-stimulating tourist and commercial investments b) it build an important route of access to the cellulose factory, which had been previously longer and forced the transportation of incoming and outgoing goods through alternative routes because of the peculiar density of the old town planimetry c) it conveyed a powerful symbolic message, since the renovation of the centre and the construction of infrastructures, which could ideally counteract the impact of the natural agent, was carried out by the Angelini family (owner of CELCO).

As the image illustrates, PRES interventions were destined exclusively to the centre of Constitución, thus fostering a gentrifying trend that supported the dynamics of expulsion of vulnerable groups (figure 1).

Indeed, the sum of these two processes (the PRES interventions and the market of subsidies) has exacerbated the socio-economic polarization phenomena and the gentrification of the town centre. They boosted each other and contributed both to the worsening of vulnerable people’s living conditions and their relationship with space.


As pointed out by some authors, the central area of the town has undergone a socio-functional distortion and a change in the inhabitants composition, characterized by signals of gentrification following the emptying of the old town by earthquake victims and the hypothesized investments outlined in the reconstruction plan of PRES. The governmental participation in the reconstruction of the town centre was limited to 5.5%, while 51 buildings were built for residential use on privately owned lots (2.3% of the total). The restructured houses represented 0.001%, while about 200 remained empty, waiting for the real estate speculation to make them exploitable and habitable. 50 buildings are still being demolished (4.3%), while

⁹ Except for some fishermen who were self-organized in grassroot committees and were able to obtain that the State took charge of the public housing project “La Poza 2”, located on the edge of the river that flows into the ocean, not far from the evacuated area.

¹⁰ There are no studies that prove the ‘anti-tsunami’ effectiveness of the park: the outcome of the impact depends on its strength and on some secondary factors (mechanical, social, temporal, etc.)

approximately 3 hectares of derelict land in the area next to the market increase the perception of urban decay (Contreras, Benitez, 2015).

Figure 1 - Top-down (Pres) and bottom-up (subsidies) dynamics in the post-disaster reconstruction of Constitución



In the image above, two maps are overlaid: the first one indicates the relocation of families hit by the earthquake from the centre to the new urbanized area (arrows) at the periphery of the urban area, highlighting the urban voids (polygons), the areas abandoned in the city centre (Prieto, 2015). This is superimposed on the map of Pres interventions: it includes the “anti-tsunami” park (1), new access routes (dashed lines) to the Celco plant, the panoramic viewpoint “Mirador” (C) and the pedestrian zones linking the square (D) to the park through the bridge (B) and through the new commercial area, down to the tourist port (Pres, 2011).

In the flooded area, about 200 houses have been repaired by the earthquake victims on their own initiative: they were mainly lower-middle class people, who could not have access to mortgage credit because of their state of insolvency (in most cases, related to the previous loans obtained to buy a house, later destroyed by the tsunami). We should note that 13.2% of the lots were bought by supermarket chains and medium-sized or large stores, converting them to commercial use.

The analysis of this trend, alongside the progressive depletion and consolidation of the “transition zone”, namely urban areas left unused and abandoned, shows an emerging gentrification process of the area, due to substantial investments made by the private sector to improve tourist infrastructures, to the centrality of the places and to the proximity to the river and the seaside. All these factors are transforming the centre into an object of speculation, with negative consequences for the habitat and for the disadvantaged people who remained in the city centre. Contreras and Benitez, who have studied the gentrification process of the city centre, have highlighted the increased real estate value of the entire central area, especially in the station area and around the central square, redeveloped in the PRES projects.

For this reason, the projects that MINVU endorses and to which SERVIU (the local authority of MINVU reference, for projects application and implementation) suggests/offers to the earthquake victims, are all located outside the urban centre and in poorly accessible areas, although the 45% of them lived in the old town. Apart from some few organized families of fishermen in La Poza, who were able to get a reconstruction on the spot after the struggles made together with the grassroots neighbourhood committee, the earthquake victims were delocalized in the apartment buildings of Cerro O’Higgins (partially collapsed during the earthquake); or in the complex of Vista Hermosa, Las Araucarias, Las Cumbres, Villa Verde, built by CELCO company for its displaced workers, or in the Bicentenario project and Quinta Gaete, a complex designed to respond to the pre-27F housing needs and increased in volume after the earthquake (figure 1).

Hundreds of families, who were relocated in the extreme periphery in a very short period of time after the earthquake, lost their habitats: as it emerged from the qualitative analysis of the Chilean post-earthquake¹¹, the

¹¹ The results presented here have been obtained thanks to an extensive fieldwork carried out by using mostly qualitative techniques with ethnographic sensitivity. The years I spent in Chile were useful to prepare my doctoral thesis called *Processes Of Socio-Spatial Vulnerabilization In Contexts of Post-Disaster Reconstruction*, presented at the University of Bologna in

acceleration of urban sprawl has enabled the socio-spatial vulnerabilization processes for certain categories, which generated multiplier effects of existing vulnerabilities. Precariousness has made the most vulnerable groups insecure (elderly, single mothers, etc.) and it has been a crucial issue in the vulnerabilization process. Those who have had few social and economic resources, therefore difficulties in accessing credit, in dealing with the bureaucracy etc., have fallen into negative spirals when tried to improve their situation but failed to invest in social and relational capital. Insecurity, uncertainty, urgency, and the concept of aids and subsidies as a generous charity rather than a right, pushed individuals to develop short-term strategies which turned out to be counterproductive for individuals and communities in the long term. At the same time, the issue of accessibility represents one of the pillars of sub-groups segregation in the periphery. Also in this case, it is useful to highlight the experiential differentiation of individuals according to the resources they had. We observed that the lack of services forced the categories expelled from the city to resort to private mobility. Moreover, when focusing on timing and manner, we can state that mobility is one of the dimensions where the vulnerabilization processes develop, connected to the subject-environment relationship: individuals who are able to activate the few resources they own can overcome the obstacles that environment and relocation pose; otherwise, these obstacles operate as multipliers of existing problems. After the disaster, having access to a dwelling is experienced as a gift by many people: one more reason to affirm that the ability to implement strategies to face the consequences of the relocation is often connected with the ability to analyse the existing possibilities and to recognize them as equal in a range of rights.

However, what really affects the vulnerabilization processes is the activation of capitals, resources or networks to reformulate a strategy; the alternative is being crushed in a spiral that progressively drags a person in more critical conditions. The relationship between offshoring and sudden increase in the number of vulnerabilization processes is, therefore, a key point for interpreting the changes in the post-disaster reconstruction. This vulnerability does not focus exclusively on the pre-existing conditions (consider the jobs where social vulnerability vectors are crossed with those of environmental hazards to define the socio-spatial vulnerability zones), nor on the post-disaster phase (Dash *et al.*, 2007), but it reflects also the dynamics of the production of space as a result of the urban processes, the

joint supervision with the University of Chile and the *Centre de Investigación en Vulnerabilidades Desastres Socio-Naturales* (CIVDES) of the *Facultad de Ciencias Sociales*.

historical neighbourhood characteristics, the social inequalities before the disaster, the ability of the communities to access resources and assistance during the emergency and the ability to reconstitute in the aftermath. This perspective also allows to spatialize “micro” studies or case-based studies, and to use the post-disaster reconstruction as a socio-spatial device that accelerates the vulnerabilization exclusionary processes of the most vulnerable groups, characterized by general tendencies of marginalization which are at the basis of the mechanisms of social habitat production.

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SPACES OF RESILIENCE: IRPINIA 1980, ABRUZZO 2009

by Anna Maria Zaccaria, Sara Zizzari*

Introduction

The disasters are *processes* (social, organisational and technical) rather than sudden events. Some issues are by now crucial in the analytical frame of disasters sociology: identifying the factors determining their latency; grasping the crucial role of information, obeying rules by management, stakeholders' *familiarity* with the places where the crisis occurs; investigating dynamics causing the failure of forecasts (Turner, Pidgeon, 1997). But how can we study disasters? The debate on methodologies and "critical" variables has not generated a shared analytical paradigm. Nevertheless, some fundamental points seem to emerge. On a methodological level, the productivity of *case-studies* with a wide space/time coverage is by now a fact. The long-term perspective and the situated analysis of the effects of catastrophes, on people's lives and on the society as a whole, turn into a useful methodology to read processes of change (Duyne-Barenstein, Lee-mann, 2013), to break up established thinking patterns, to re-conceptualise non-linear processes. In this perspective some studies examine people's immediate responses to earthquakes in different cities. These studies revealed the centrality of the physical, household and social *setting* in which people are located at the moment of the seismic shock to understand the different emotional responses to earthquakes (Lindell *et al.*, 2015). The analytical productivity of *case-studies* has also fostered the recovery of a territorial perspective in disaster studies; the themes of space, unfolded in its conceptual ranges (environment, territory, place, local), are more and more used by scholars. In general, the territorial approach can offer sophisticated and effective analytical criteria to approach concrete phenomena (Osti, 2010). Within this perspective, the choice of the local territory as an interesting field of analysis is proving to be promising. It allows to focus attention on local actors and the complex network of relations between them and with "external" actors. This perspective does not ignore the features of the local socio-economic context (Ercole, 2014). All the above

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matches the idea, widely shared by scientists, that disasters are not to be considered as a result of extreme geophysical events, but as a consequence of the co-evolutive process connecting social system and environment (Davico, Mela, Staricco, 2009), and of historical and structural processes (Bankoff, 2003). More recently, Saitta (2015) has noted that areas affected by the disaster are very interesting “ethno-methodological” situations for the qualitative researchers. “Entering” the place and time of the disaster allows us to capture the multidimensionality of experience: individual and collective, private and public. Last but not least, the centrality of the space/time categories in the territorial perspective opens the way to memories and oral histories as precious sources to reconstruct events, experiences, practices, meanings and representations connected to them. It also opens the way to the Social Network Analysis approach (Norris *et al.*, 2008) aimed at investigating the networks developing in a crisis scenario. Both of these approaches are particularly useful to grasp dynamics that embedded spaces and times socially defined.

On an analytical/conceptual level, scholars’ analysis starts from the need to integrate environmental and social variables. *Risk*, *vulnerability* and *resilience*, connected to *sustainability*, are the concepts which fulfil this need, especially if considered in their reciprocal interaction. While the concept of vulnerability gives the sense of a society not well equipped to face risk¹, resilience «gives more importance to the inner resources of a local society (or wider) and to its capability of self-transformation in response to the impact of a negative event» (Mela, 2014: 240). This represents a more productive interpretation in terms of prevention/control of the risk (Mela, 2014) and, more generally, in a perspective of sustainable development (Folke, 2006). The fortunate rising of this concept in different fields, even very distant from materials science where it originates², has produced a wide range of definitions; its operationalization have become more and more articulated (Landi, 2012; Mela, 2014). Nevertheless we could identify some concepts shared by many scholars. First of all, resilience should be seen as an “ability” rather than a “property” of a system, as an elastic skill to recover after an external shock, to absorb an unexpected change of state (Folke, 2006). This ability should be intended as collective rather than in-

¹ Vulnerability refers to the «characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard» (Blaikie *et al.*, 1994: 9).

² In this field, resilience is intended as the physical property of a material that can return to its original shape or position after deformation that does not exceed its elastic limit (Cimellaro, Reinhorn, 2011).

dividual. Secondly, the “structural” and “dynamic” dimensions of resilience should be considered in mutual interaction, but without confusing them (Mela, 2010). The first one refers to the features of the social system and of the natural and built environment as well as the relation between the two systems. This is the dimension more directly interwoven with the concept of vulnerability of a community. Dynamic resilience refers to the adaptive evolution of communities facing a catastrophe, the network taking shape between the local system and the various external levels, and to the capability of fostering social cohesion and negotiate resources (Ungar, 2008). Furthermore, resilience should be seen as a process, in terms of a situational and dynamic concept. As Norris (2008) highlighted, resilience is not an immutable condition but rather a set of adaptive capacities to be continuously attended to and modified to prevent their loss: it must be recognised, fed, nurtured. In this perspective, the space/time dimension of the processes, in which resilience takes shape, becomes crucial to understand its performance.

What we have presented so far constitutes the analytical framework underlining our study about two violent disasters happened in Italy: the earthquake of 23rd November 1980 and that of 6th April 2009. The first one destroyed a wide area between Campania, Apulia and Basilicata; the second one hit the city of L’Aquila and some surrounding municipalities in Abruzzo. Our contribution will focus on the periods immediately after the earthquakes to propose an interpretation of the social dynamics taking place in the areas of the craters, which suffered the heaviest damages. The main analytical category will be resilience, in its situational and dynamic dimension. Our study will be carried out on two main levels, deeply interconnected but kept separate here for the sake of analysis: the institutions’ level and the inhabitants’ level. The first one refers to the Mayors in charge at the time of the event, whose role had deep implications in the various stages of the disaster (from risk to rebuilding), and in the re-settling and re-organisation of the socio-territorial spaces. The second level refers to the people living in the areas hit by the earthquake, their personal experiences and individual representation of the catastrophe, their relation with public and private spaces. The capability of local societies to create organised forms of interaction (such as committees, cooperatives, etc.) and of collective activism will be investigated too. These can be considered as resources for *community* resilience (Norris *et al.*, 2008). We will mainly embrace the actors’ point of view, reconstructed through the individual and collective memory of the events.

1. Earthquakes

Earthquakes are, by nature, processes. They have a long history which periodically explodes in disastrous events. Though not predictable, they are at times announced. They upset the socio-environmental contexts, draw a deep brake in personal biographies and social histories. Nonetheless, they can generate changes that stimulate local cultures to develop adaptation strategies, mitigation tools, networks of structural and social protection. Italy is a country with a long seismic history, of which memory is often lost (Gribaudo, 2015). The lack of historical reconstructions and a transitional, even if substantial, corpus of laws (Guidoboni, 2015) contributed to inhibit resilience of territories and their institutions. As a consequence, the vulnerability between earthquakes increase. An adverse mechanism which seems to always deny the past. Referring to the earthquake which destroyed Messina in 1908, Parrinello (2015) highlighted that: « (...) While issues such as the port renewal and peri-urban reforestation expanded the urban reform debate, minor earthquakes struck the city in 1895, 1905 and 1907. Surprisingly, those earthquakes did not provoke any response by authorities, despite the persistent memory of past disasters. The lack of effective measures after those earthquakes contributed largely to the extent of destruction in 1908» (Parrinello, 2015: 11). After 1915 earthquake in the Abruzzo area of Marsica: «The decision to rebuild Avezzano according to a new urban plan which does not respect its old urban structure has been determined (...) by the absence of a historical memory, by a voluntary cut with the past»; a decision which brought to the progressive emptying of the new “garden city” (Ciranna, Montuori, 2015: 24). The earthquake of 6th April 2009 in L’Aquila had been preceded by more than six months of tremors: « (...) on a historical point of view, the analysis of the major earthquake crisis of L’Aquila and Abruzzo defined nearly a seismic style (...) with major shakes preceded by weeks or months of tremors not lower than magnitude 3» (Guidoboni, 2015: 769). These dynamics recall processes of “perceptual rigidity” (for example “phishing phenomena”, that is wrong interpretations of the alarm signals) which contribute to feed incubation of disaster and crisis (Turner, Pidgeon, 1997) and to inhibit resilient behaviours on various levels. More recently, the interest of social sciences towards earthquake in a diachronic perspective, revealed its explanatory potential for the understanding of the processes of social change. In particular, in the Italian history of earthquakes a model of institutional and social response systematically come up. First, early the discomfort then the strength of survivors after the shock, digging in the ruins and managing the

emergency. Secondly, the shift in the collective representation between the poverty and underdevelopment (before the earthquake) and the new modern wealth (after the earthquake). Finally, the acceleration of modernisation processes, already started/envisaged “before”, on a wider and more ambitious level (repositioning of entire historical centres or oversized infrastructure building), which generate stories of distorted modernization (Parrinello, 2015; Zaccaria, 2015). One can find here and there in these mechanisms traces of resilience, whose effectiveness can be measured by the time and spaces allowed to it.

2. Irpinia 1980 - Abruzzo 2009

On 23rd November 1980, at 7.30 pm of an hot Autumn Sunday, a violent earthquake burst 30 Km underground between Sella di Conza in Campania (AV), Castelnuovo di Conza and Laviano (SA)³. Until today the number of victims remains an approximate estimate of about 3.000 casualties. The main shake was estimated 6,9 Richter scale degrees, its intensity reached 10 degrees (totally destructive) of the Mercalli scale in the municipalities within the “crater”: over 15.000 sq. Km between Campania, Apulia and Basilicata. A huge area with different socio-economic backgrounds (Zaccaria, 2008; Ventura, 2010): rural contexts marked by precarious living and housing conditions, some characterised by tertiarization and infrastructure investments, others experimenting new industrialization policies using public funds (i.e. *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*). In the twenty years from 1961 to 1981, the demographic trend of the whole area was marked by heavy emigration. According to National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology data, the disaster hit 687 municipalities, 37 of which were totally destroyed; 60% of productive activities were seriously compromised. The homes destroyed or damaged were more than 300.000. These data reveal the vulnerability of the area hit by the earthquake. They tell us about the carelessness of the first technical norms approved after the earthquake in Messina of 1908; the building explosion of the sixties and seventies which witnessed improvised builders paying little attention to architectural, technical and

³ The case of the 1980 earthquake was analysed by Anna Maria Zaccaria, through a field-work and a campaign of interviews conducted in 23 municipalities of the crater between 2010 and 2014. A more complete presentation of the outcomes of the research can be found in: Zaccaria A. M. (2015). The interviews, many of which are in audio/video format, are kept at the Archivio Multimediale della Memoria (www.memoriedalterritorio.it) created at the Department of Social Science - University of Naples Federico II.

urban planning rules; the frenzy for new buildings diverted attention from maintenance of the old ones in brickwork. They recount the inadequate seismic classification of the areas, all with a long history of disastrous earthquakes. An unhappy combination of factors which inhibited structural resilience of the territories, both in the small municipalities of the hinterland and in the bigger, more urbanized ones. The Mayor of Balvano (PZ) at the time, Ezio Di Carlo, recalls that most of the 810 houses were converted caverns, old and stuck one on top of the other; 30% of them collapsed on 23rd November. Amalia Leo, who was at the time surveying the architectural heritage of the city, recalls that Avellino was completely: «torn (...) and the older people spoke of a worse destruction than that caused by war bombing in 1943».

Thirty years later, on 6th April 2009 at 3.32 at night, an earthquake of magnitude 6.3 hit the heart of Abruzzo⁴. While the 1980 earthquake was unexpected, the shake of the 6th April was the most violent of a series of tremors which had started in 2008, confirming the “seismic style” of the area. In this case the lack of “seismic memory” combined with the structural vulnerability of the territory amplified the damage. The area of the crater involved 57 municipalities between the provinces of L’Aquila, Teramo and Pescara. There were 309 casualties, of which 220 only in the city of L’Aquila, where the “Casa dello studente” (student house) collapsed, killing 8 students. The historical centre of L’Aquila was immediately declared unsuitable for use: more than 60.000 buildings were damaged, of which 18.000 become no anymore accessible to households (Fois, Forino, 2014). The damage to the city’s cultural heritage was inestimable. Onna, the eastern suburb of L’Aquila, counted 40 victims and was completely destroyed: «I got a phone call from somebody I never managed to recognise, telling me “Mayor, Onna doesn’t exist anymore “and he hung up» recalls the Mayor of L’Aquila, Massimo Cialente. Overall, there were 1.500 injured, 80.000 evacuated, about 30.000 homeless (Liel *et al.*, 2013). On a socio-economic point of view, in the twenty years before the earthquake minor centres⁵ in the crater were marked by an average population loss of 5% and by an economy mainly based on the primary sector, with a remarkable

⁴ The case of the 2009 earthquake is being analysed by Sara Zizzari. The research work started in 2013 and has gone on through several visits and participant observation. To date 40 interviews to L’Aquila citizens have been gathered. The interviews to the Mayors of the crater of L’Aquila have been carried out by Anna Maria Zaccaria (www.memoriedalterritorio.it).

⁵ The municipalities that we studied are: Acciano, Barisciano, Fossa, Sant’Eusanio Forconese, Villa Sant’Angelo and Tornimparte.

farming traditional activities (Clementi, Piroddi, 1988). In the seventies, with the tertiary sector building up, the centre of L'Aquila spreads in new neighbourhoods around the walls; urban economy was fuelled by a vital commercial and touristic activity. In the ten years before the 2009 earthquake, the population of L'Aquila grew steadily, probably because of the inurbanization opposite to the emptying of municipalities and suburbs around the city. The historical centre represented a "total" place, where work time and free time mixed up in the daily life of residents or those who lived the city. It was the functional barycentre of the city. Local institutions headquarters, public services, commercial activities and professional studios, the weekly market were all concentrated within the area of the historical centre. This is the space where primary and secondary functions mixed up spontaneously (Jacobs, 1961) instilling in the city a spirit of safeness. The earthquake altered violently this socially and historically established equilibrium, destroying the historical centre. Though distant thirty years from each other and therefore with different historical scenarios, the dynamics of these two catastrophes present elements of continuity and discontinuity which we will try to analyse with a focus on resilience. We will examine the phase coming immediately after the earthquake, covering the moment of the first "response" to the impact and the following one, the "recovery" (Drabek, 1986). In this phase the shocking event cancels the space/time coordinates, reveals the response skills of local social groups, amplifying their visibility.

3. The Mayors at the time of the earthquake

Immediately after the earthquake, local administrators were invested by "exceptional" responsibilities, powers and autonomy which they had to turn into emergency management, often in great solitude: «I remember, after the phone calls about the technical decisions (...) I had two hours of great solitude. I felt completely alone!» recalls the Mayor of L'Aquila, thinking back of the moment when he decided to declare all the historical centre unfit for use. Both in 1980 and in 2009 no Mayor was on duty when the earthquake occurred, since it happened on a Sunday in both cases. Everywhere the first response was personal: save oneself and one's own family. The Mayor of L'Aquila sheltered his family in the camping van parked near the house, to drive it to an outdoor area; the Mayor of Avellino, who was strolling along the main street, started searching the way home amongst the yellow dust cloud of collapsing buildings. But they recovered their roles and institu-

tional functions at once, fulfilling the need for a new individual and collective identity after the earthquake had broken the network of connections and mutual recognition. They use resources from their personal network which were available there and then. Together with their friends and relatives they dug ruins and offered first aid. In 1980 the Mayor of Conza della Campania (AV), which was completely destroyed, contacted immediately the *Carabinieri* of the near municipality, with whom he had kept a good relation thanks to a period of service in same corps. In 2009 the Mayor of Sant' Eusanio Forconese (AQ) was counting «those I met in the street and those who I knew had problems getting out of their homes, old people in particular. With other citizens we went where people were trapped in their houses, trying to give a hand as we could». Both in 1980 and 2009 local administrators took on a central role in the poor but effective network of relations which was taking shape in the first few hours after the earthquake. They activated their social capital resources, put back together what was left of the relational network of the communities, used their administrative and professional expertise⁶. They retrieved anything that could give back a meaning to their function, cancelled by local councils and committees thrown into disorder, collapsed institutional seats, territories without any administrative features left. Many remember the first, precarious meetings of the local council: «there were 12 or 13 of us left and started using the farming consortium for our daily evening meetings» (Mayor of Lioni-AV); «only four or five of us were governing the town, the local council had disappeared (...) in a kindergarten, at the children's desks we took on our responsibilities» recalls the Mayor of L'Aquila. In general, with a distance of thirty years and in different territories, both in the province capital city and in the smaller municipalities, Mayors appeared autonomous in their governance of the territory, oriented towards an ethic of responsibility and mitigation of damage.

When external actors appeared on the scene, dynamics became different in space and time. The location, the distance from the political center, the reachability of the earthquake-affected areas are some of the main elements that mark the differences. These elements are interwoven with the social fabric on which the earthquake impacts and with the state's intervention style, creating different paths of community resilience. The crater of 1980

⁶ In 1980 the Mayor of Balvano (PZ), Di Carlo, was also a doctor: «I dug wherever I could hear moaning, until four a.m. All the dead bodies on one side and the injured, stacked on a lorry, were sent to the hospital in Potenza. Then I had to respect the wishes of relatives crying for their beloved ones, shaking them desperately. I had to send people to the hospital even if I knew they were dead!».

covers a wide area, geographically distant from the political “center” and difficult to be reached because of the already poor infrastructures, also severely damaged by the earthquake. Small municipalities have a cohesive social fabric, in which the conflict is controlled in strong ties of kinship and neighborhood. The Mayor represents the institutional and political most immediate reference, the bridge with the central government, even when belonging to a different political party. The relationship between the Mayor and citizens have a direct and often a personal nature. Here, after the seismic shock the Mayors continued to be central nodes of a network which grew through the connections with external actors coming from everywhere to support the recovery. These were mainly volunteers in the first days. As we will see later, citizens too were part of this resilient networks, as individuals or organized groups. The State arrived later, with a “light” intervention and leaving a broad power to local administrators in the *recovery* phase. The coordination role of the extraordinary commissioner Zamberletti was supported by the operational cohesion of local administrators, and their availability to negotiation. They established regular contacts with the commissioner, but especially between them, exchanging information, tools, expertises and experiences. The Mayor of Salza Irpina (AV) was very familiar with bureaucracy and helped other Mayors asking for advice; after an agreement with *Marina Militare* and with the help of volunteers, the Mayor of Muro Lucano (PZ) created a field hospital which was also used by the near municipalities. In general, this cohesive action of local administrators fostered *familiarity* of external actors with local communities. Many bonds created with institutional actors and technicians not belonging to the local communities continued, and acquired also an expressive value over time. The Mayor of Calabritto (AV) still keeps pictures of the volunteers from the province of Milan, together with the memory of their profound friendships; two technicians from the province of Trento became godfathers to the sons of the Mayor of Balvano (PZ) and there were many who stayed in the town for a long time. These dynamics, although with different intensity, crossed the whole area of the crater, generating resources of structural and dynamic resilience. Avellino, capital city of the province and seat of the Prefecture, was partially involved in this dynamics. It became the crucial point of the technical and institutional network managing the crisis and for this reason the local govern was incorporated in an intermediate level of government, hindering its autonomy and resilience resources.

In the crater of 2009 the *recovery* phase overlapped with the *response* phase. The area affected by the earthquake is relatively circumscribed, it is accessible and not far from the political “center”. Especially, the epicenter

coincides with the provincial capital: an average city with a remarkable artistic heritage. External actors arrived a few hours after the shocking event, among them the *Protezione Civile* took on a fundamental role. The “heavy” intervention of the State marginalized the local government and inhibited the Community’s resilience. In this scenario the small municipalities developed different dynamics compared to the capital city of the province, somewhat similar to those of the 1980 earthquake, even though at a more hectic pace. Mayors kept autonomy and control of the territory; they put at stake their abilities and capabilities, they were central in the organisational networks, and negotiated resources between them and with external actors. In Villa Sant’Angelo «the *Carabinieri* arrived while it was still night, not even after an hour (from the earthquake). On 7th or 8th April the tent city had already been mounted, we were already surveying the buildings, meetings with Mayors had already taken place, we had already gone to talk with *Di.Comac*⁷». The relations with *Protezione Civile* were overall positive, even though its complex organisational apparatus did not produce the same effects everywhere: «in this municipality (Acciano) we, as local administrators, have always managed the civil protection service. The real volunteers from 6th April 2009 till today were and remain the members of the municipal administration»; in Sant’Eusanio Forconese: «aids started instantaneously. Of course it is a rather laborious procedure. I must say we were really lucky with the groups sent by *Protezione Civile* who mounted the tent city in the blink of an eye!». Relations of solidarity and cohesion took shape also with the volunteers arriving from other regions of Italy, but their brief stay in this area made them weak ties, with an instrumental rather than expressive function: «The relationship between the volunteers from Piemonte and the citizens of Barisciano still persists. But the meetings are fewer and fewer». In these small municipalities the recovery phase seemed to be basically managed within the local communities, with low levels of conflict, in a relatively short time and with resilience strategies aimed at recovering the same *normality* as before the earthquake. The situation in L’Aquila was very different. The enormous extent of the damage, the spectacularization of the disaster and of the “restoring” action of central government and *Protezione civile* (Bulsei, 2010), who became the leading characters on the scene, left little space for resilience. Generally speaking, in both cases we examined the *institutionalization* of disaster seemed to hinder the processes of resilience started soon after the earthquake, creating conflictual relations at various levels and increasing continuities and

⁷ Direzione Centro Operativo di Comando e Controllo, organ of *Protezione Civile*.

breaks. We have seen that in 1980 the town of Avellino, incorporated in an intermediate level of government, lost a great deal of autonomy a few weeks after the earthquake. The arrival of the head of the Berlusconi government at the time and of *Protezione Civile* at L'Aquila expropriated local administrators of their role in crisis management. In the municipalities of the 1980 crater the institutionalization of the earthquake was formalised by the ratification, in the Spring of 1981, of Law 219 which funded the reconstruction: the definition of the urban reconstruction plans involved different interests and visions obstaculating the autonomy of local institutions and communities. The controversial fronts enacted by this process shared a pivotal question: to rebuild as it was and where it was, or somewhere else, maybe complying with the myth of modernity? The Mayor of L'Aquila was strongly against the idea of transferring outside the city public offices, hospitals, universities, as well as their staff. This plan added on the building of the *new town* would have ratified "the death of the town": «I myself started making phone calls to find available industrial warehouses, or any building which was still standing, to host these structures!». In 1980 at Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi (AV) Rosanna Repole⁸ led a group of citizens to stop military lorries who had come to execute the transferring of the local seat of the Court, which was heavily damaged by the earthquake. In these *spaces* of institutional resilience, the recovery of *normality* occurs with the restoring of the places, their meanings, the symbolic and identitarian function of institutional districts.

4. People, homes, perspectives

The earthquake in 1980 suddenly upset the daily routine, that one of the 2009 disturbed it for a long. In the first case, population immediately run outside, as in 1962 and in 1930. Many people reminded that. The earthquake in 2009 came after two strong shakes which exasperated the anxiety which had already started with an earthquake swarm in December 2008. We will focus on L'Aquila, where some people decided to spend the night outside, others went out at first and then decided to return home; some others joined to their neighbours sharing the fear. Many remained at home, even if with some precautions. Ms. Vanna, for example, put the overcoats near the bed and gathered in a bag the mobile phone, some gold things,

⁸ She was only female Mayor in the seismic area of '80, designated at the night of November 23rd, after the death under the rubble of the Mayor on duty.

documents, money; her husband, who usually slept without pyjamas, decided to put one on that night. This range of different behaviours shows the uncertainty felt by people from L'Aquila before the disaster, since the experts of *Commissione Grandi Rischi* arrived in the town on 31st March. They had reassured them that the earthquake swarm did not announce a big shake, but allowed energy to run out. Actually, the seismic history of Abruzzo told a totally different story (Guidoboni, 2015) and people from Abruzzo knew it. Nevertheless, Antonello Ciccozzi (2013: 23) stresses, talking about his personal experience, that for many people the opinion of those authoritative scientists: «became the predominant judgment, a sort of vision because of my rational side considered exaggerate and embarrassing to interpret those shakes as signs of an imminent danger». The *word of science* divided population: those who trusted institutions and the infallibility of science stayed at home; those who preferred to trust memory and traditional practices came outside; the undecided, torn between rationality and tradition, fell into *cognitive dissonance* (Festinger, 1997) and got stuck. The reassuring opinion of experts was actually based on a wrong interpretation of the “phishing signs” and showed their poor familiarity with the places and their seismic history. In such dynamic memory is delegitimized as a source of resilience, and structural and social vulnerability grow. When the “rumble” exploded many citizens of L'Aquila were at home and did not manage to get out. The survivors remember: «the ceiling was forming waves. Five more seconds and we'd be dead, the building was suffering too much» (Gaetano D.); «the noise of a house breaking up is incredible!» (Piera G.). In the crater of 1980, like at L'Aquila, as soon the shock was overcome, people started looking for their family, friends and relatives. Those left unharmed by the shock started digging bare-handed among the ruins, gave first aid to victims, gathered things. The scene at the break of dawn gave an idea of the extent of the disaster. The earthquake cancelled the geography and history of the places. These places, and above all the built areas, are those where daily routines took shape, identitarian elements and social stratifications are materialized. The earthquake lost any meaning. Tony Lucido, manager of a local radio station at Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi in 1980, recalls: «There was the building symbol of the town modernity, erected at the beginning of the sixties, Palazzo Japicca (...) leaving in there meant a rise in the social status, there was a lift. That building wasn't there anymore. I saw the moon instead of the building. It was horrible!». For the citizens of L'Aquila it was a total loss of their own town: «I go back to town now, but I have no town» (Nadia C.); with this loss, orientation and safety are lost «the centre of L'Aquila was an immense park where you

could do whatever you wanted because nothing could harm you. There were porticoes where you could walk. L'Aquila meant protection, tranquility and safety» (Leontina V.). The sense of belonging to the historical centre was so strong to encompass anybody you met there: there were no strangers in those streets (Nadia C.). The red cloud rising that night, which everybody saw from miles away, meant the collapse of the whole historical centre.

In 1980 citizens of the damaged municipalities managed to keep control of what was left of the places, both in the phases of response and recovery. The desperate solitude of the days immediately after the seism triggered individual and collective resilience strategies. In Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi, Angelo Frieri, young medical doctor, took the first car he found to go to the hospital pharmacy and get medicines. Especially the young ones, felt "protagonists" of the recovery, in a climate which could become confrontational at times: «together with many other people (...) reanimating your dead town, shaking off it, and you felt useful» (Tony Lucido, Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi). In many municipalities of Irpinia, in particular, citizens got organised in committees to exchange ideas about choices and decisions, between them and with local administrators (Ventura, 2103; Zaccaria, 2015). In such a context, committees performed an important role in the recovery of the social fabric and the trial of early practices of *deliberative democracy* (Pellizzoni, 2005). Everywhere emergency shelters were set just near ruins and people could walk to the remains of their homes. There was never a complete break with the residential area. The prospect of going back to one's own home, which was never turned down in the immediate post-seism and fostered by the huge funds for reconstruction, supported resilient behaviours. School classes were resumed as soon as possible, practically in the open air. Life in a van and prefabricated buildings created new neighbourhood networks of expressive connections and long-lasting support. Local independent radio stations were reactivated in a short time to make communication easier. Local daily papers were published «to let people know what had happened, to remember» (Cesare D'Andrea, Sant'Angelo dei Lombardi). In Balvano, in 1981, many young couples got married and birth rate increased: a resilient response to the death, under the ruins of the mother-church, of 41 very young lives, almost a whole generation cancelled. Moreover, in Balvano as in other places, in the first few months after the seism some little shops opened, to meet the needs of all those who had come to give help, using the surplus of goods arrived in aid. This "economic resilience" was also at the basis of the many cooperatives arising in the earthquake area in the early months of 1981 (Ventura, 2013). Coopera-

tives mobilised economic, organisational and social resources, opening up local contexts to an outlook of modernisation and development. Nevertheless, except in rare cases, they did not last for long, especially because they were overlooked by public funding; Law 219 did not fund cooperatives directly (*ib.*). A case of institutional short-sightedness?

The historical centre of L'Aquila became *red zone*. The *Protezione Civile* was very efficient in setting up the tent city where most of the population found shelter, losing at once any physical contact with the town. The first appreciated prompt intervention of *Protezione Civile* soon became over control and passivation of the population (Musmeci, 2015). «We had to move around carrying several cards, for transport, to enter the tent city. There were only uniforms everywhere, there were only militaries» (Ornella C.). 35.690 evacuated people chose to settle in the 179 tent cities set up around the town rather than move to the hotels around the coast, to stay near their homes. Imposed and limited spaces, “stranger” neighbourhoods, denial of intimacy and pervasive control by volunteers and *Protezione Civile* to avoid disorders, generated deep discomfort in the tent city of L'Aquila. The social cohesion caused by sharing the same drama, turned into intolerance and violence on several occasions (Zizzari, 2015). Separation from places and homes prevented citizens from becoming protagonists. After about four months tent cities started being dismantled and many families were transferred to the new semi-permanent homes of the C.A.S.E.⁹ project, a *new town* complex around the capital city of the province. Nimis (2009) underlines how the project started with strong ambiguity as regards its duration: accommodations which were meant to be durable but at the same time temporary. Living in the C.A.S.E. brought citizens of L'Aquila back to the same dissonance which anguished them before the “rumble”, suspended in the vagueness of prospects. The home is the place where the spaces are at the same time intimate and shared, subject to economic and nursing investments, pregnant with meaning and family histories: those accommodations could never be called “C.A.S.E.” and anyhow they were never perceived as such. Moreover, this new “temporary” arrangement of the built and social space, become almost definitive. Suspended in time and space, disoriented by the loss of material and social points of reference¹⁰, people from L'Aquila did not manage to express significant forms of dynamic resilience. The passage from tents to C.A.S.E. was initially felt as a

⁹ Complessi Antisismici Sostenibili Ecompatibili. Only one area is in the town centre, while the other ones are up to 30 Km away from it.

¹⁰ «Even street signs are dead, replaced by the burgundy signs of Protezione Civile indicating (...) the temporary camps. A town of just acronyms!» (Ornella C.).

relief, but once physical fatigue was over, discomfort took its place: «At the beginning I was happy. My God, how wonderful, I have a home! anything would do for me, anyway I had nothing. Later, in the C.A.S.E. project we were so-so; we didn't know anyone. I felt a bit ill. But it was... I don't know, well we missed our home a bit» (Giusi V.). The combination between the small spaces in the houses and the great distance between blocks killed relations. Old people could not gather at home, nor visit each other frequently; the younger ones felt the lack of autonomy and privacy; parents prevented their children from playing outside the C.A.S.E. because it was not safe enough, without a neighbourhood network exercising social control. The crushing of the local community, triggered by the earthquake, shows itself in the citizens' everyday life. In general, both for women and men, this accommodation was the denial of domestic life and daily routine: «Before (the earthquake) I was sure I would meet somebody sooner or later, which was good. From C.A.S.E. you had to phone somebody and take an appointment, then you had to take your car ... but it wasn't the same thing also because where could you go? Downtown? To do what? *Out within the Progetto*: let's not talk about it, please! How disgusting! In the end I shut myself up at home. Home? That wasn't even my home!» (Mauro S.). The loss of home and domestic life was even more traumatic for women. Many of them lived in suspension of the usual daily routine, which they kept postponing to the - indeterminate - moment when they would go back to "their own" home: «Me? At the C.A.S.E. I felt I was not breathing. No, actually I decided to hold breath; I was waiting, I was only temporarily there. I was waiting for better times, never come (...) and that's how it's going to be forever at this point» (Giusi V.). The fracture between feeling a place and the present built environment caused an identity crisis; inhabitants and places shared the same state of alienation (La Cecla, 1993). The words of Barbara V. become emblematic: «I don't even have my iron. I've got one here, but what do I do with it? Who cares anyway even if I go out with a wrinkled sweater!»

Resilience found limited space in this situation. The entity of the damage, the separation from town and home, the degradation of the social networks made the recovery of "normality" not too credible, at least in a short term. The uncertainty of prospects, perceived as regulated "from the external actors", gave weak motivations to re-build a future. Many teachers resumed classes as soon as possible, recreating classes as they were before the seism; even those teachers who were living in the hotels on the Adriatic coast chose to "restart" at L'Aquila with their own students, despite the long hours of commuting this would entail every day. For what concerns

collective action, many committees of citizens were established, a promoting initiatives of “opposition” to the central government, rather than horizontal cooperation. The most significant initiative was the “protest of the wheelbarrows”: in February 2010 about 6.000 protesters entered the historical centre and started loading their wheelbarrows with ruins of the collapsed buildings. The protest generated other civic initiatives, suggesting possible scenarios of participative democracy. But conflicting atmosphere still remained. The whole post-seismic scene at L’Aquila was controversial: while citizens expressed their dissent for the way emergency was being managed, media celebrated the work of *Protezione Civile* and the government. The citizen’s protest was crushed by media, movements were labelled as derivations of parties and/or local political leaders, active citizenship was dismissed (Calandra, 2012).

Final remarks

Studying disasters with a “territorialist approach” can be useful for different reasons. Shock events, as it was noted, reveal the structural and social characteristics of local contexts, their latent conflicts and reorganization dynamics, their relationship with the politic “center”. Comparing the earthquakes that hit Italy in 1980 and 2009 allows us to propose some reflections on this topic. In the first place, the comparison provides empirical evidence that falsifies the idea of a unique pattern of response of local communities to disasters. This idea is based mainly on stereotyped and homologating readings on the local contexts and it is supported by a public representation - largely influenced by the media - “totalizing” the events. Moreover, very often this representation has highlighted negative elements (helplessness, disorganization, corruption, lack of civic consciousness, etc.), homologated territories, and local practices in the frame of an extreme vulnerability. On the contrary, this study highlighted a heterogeneous framework of experiences in terms of resilience, even within the same seismic crater. In the area affected by the 1980 earthquake the local communities revealed the ability of an immediate response to the disaster; a certain dynamism of the social fabric (even economic) after the resettlement of affected populations, as well as, an administrative dynamism which involves new skills and styles of local government. After the seismic shock the Mayors remained central nodes of a resilient network which grew through the connections with external actors coming to support the recovery. Citizens too were part of this resilient network, as individuals or orga-

nized groups. However, Avellino, capital city of the province and seat of the Prefecture, lost a great deal of autonomy a few weeks after the earthquake, when became the crucial point of the technical and institutional network managing the crisis. In the crater of 2009 the *recovery* phase overlapped with the *response* phase. A few hours after the shocking event, the *Protezione Civile* took on a fundamental role in post-disaster reorganization. The “heavy” intervention of the State marginalized the local government and inhibited the Community’s resilience. In this scenario the small municipalities developed different dynamics compared to the capital city of the province, somewhat similar to those of the 1980 earthquake, even though at a more hectic pace. Mayors kept autonomy and control of the territory; they put at stake their abilities and capabilities, they were central in the organisational networks, and negotiated resources between them and with external actors. In L’Aquila the local community appeared “stunned”, waiting for the events, unable to develop “therapeutic” strategies of resilience. The Mayor of the city came into direct conflict with the central government; social vulnerability has fueled beyond the damage itself. In practice, the differences of scale seem to favour the small municipalities compared with the cities, which are affected to a greater extent to a “democracy lack” produced by the institutionalization of the catastrophe.

In the second place, both case-studies reveal the importance of some territorial elements in determining the adaptive performances to post-seismic emergency; they overall reveal the centrality of the space-time dimensions. In terms of space, the most crucial elements identified are: the extension of the seismic crater, the geophysical characteristics of the affected territories and their reachability; geographical distance from the political “center”. In terms of time, they are: the “historical” time in which the event occurs, the time that the first external aids employ to arrive, the *latency* time of the State’s answer and the duration of the condition of “exceptionality” (Schmitt 1998). The latter is understood as the primacy of the decision on the norm, to foster a more immediate recovery action. As we have seen, the crater of 1980 covered a wide inner area, geographically distant from the political “center”, marked by a weakness of the infrastructures, also severely damaged by the earthquake. Also communication networks in this area were particularly weak, even in relation to the standard of the time: the first, uncertain alarm was launched in the ether by a radio-amateur. The first volunteers reached the crater on the day after the earthquake. The State came much later; the extraordinary commissioner Zamberletti promoted a “light” intervention in the *recovery* phase, favoring the condition of “exceptionality” (also validated by Law 219/81 which assigned the management

of reconstruction funds to local municipalities). The area affected by the earthquake in 2009 was relatively circumscribed, it is accessible and not far from the political “center”. Especially, the epicenter coincides with the provincial capital: an average city with a remarkable artistic heritage. The communication networks are highly specialized now: the news of the seismic event spreads while it happens. As we have seen, first aids arrive immediately and are coordinated by the *Protezione civile*. The State expresses a “heavy” intervention hindering the autonomy of local institutions and communities, overall in the region’s capital city, L’Aquila. All these elements interact with the social complexity of local contexts in generating different resilience performances.

We can draw some general conclusions from these experiences of disasters. Firstly, they show that the *resilience* should be understood as a situational and dynamic concept. It can develop on different bases in different contexts and have different ways and intensities depending on the *setting*. Secondly, it is evident that resilience needs space, time and goals to be enacted. In any case, the practices of community resilience are an important field of local governance experimentation; for this reason, resilience should be set as a policy goal. In a model of *Protezione Civile* based on devolution, it seems a precondition for the autonomy of local governments in crisis management. Knowing the territories, develop administrative skills to manage the emergency, put the “risk mitigation” as an issue of decision making emerges as inevitable steps of this path. What is more, citizens’ awareness of risk appears as a necessary aspect to achieve this goal. In this perspective, the individual and collective memory emerges as a crucial source of resilience, as tool of self-defense and also of prevention. Finally, this study highlights that the local individual and collective memory is a particularly effective source for “catching” the social dimension of risk, vulnerability and resilience. Furthermore, this study reveals the opportunity to focus on the first phase of post-disaster emergency, still little considered in previous research. This provides a privileged angle of view for grasping the potential resilience of local communities. What happens in the emergency phase tends to orient the course of the subsequent recovery and reconstruction phases.

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THE PHASES OF THE FRIULI EARTHQUAKE

by *Bernardo Cattarinussi**

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 1976 earthquake a team of researchers working at ISIG, the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia, started visiting the areas affected by the earthquake, driven by the most various reasons: family ties or friendship, desire to do their part in the relief phase and be active in the social animation. The outcomes of this first phase of respectful participant observation were collected in a special issue of the journal «Animazione Sociale». More systematic analyses regarding the conduct of the organizational structure and of the international network of relief as well as the feelings among the displaced have been collected in the book «Friuli: la prova del terremoto (*Friuli: the proof of the earthquake*)». Confindustria, for its part, studied the economic dimension of the disaster with specific analysis of the various productive sectors. Until then, the Italian sociology had produced only a research about the Vajont disaster, by Giuseppe Capraro, while American sociologists had already published numerous contributions in the context of the *Disaster Research Center* at Ohio State University, directed by the Italo-American Enrico Quarantelli. Aware of the implications of disasters on different levels, the ISIG researchers collected in the book «Disastro e azione umana (*Disaster and human action*)» the views of some colleagues about not only the psychological dimensions, but also about the perspectives of sociology, political science, human geography and urban planning. A contribution from the National Research Council also triggered a massive investigation into the psychosocial consequences of the earthquake, effected five years after the event and reported in the book «Disastro: gli effetti di lungo termine (*Disaster: Long-term effects*)». At the same time, in the Middle Friuli area a team of the Technique University of Monaco, led by the geographer Robert Geipel, examined the community reconstruction process ten and twenty years after the 1976 event. The anniversaries of various environmental and man-made disasters, as well as the occurrence of more and more severe national emergencies, led

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Isig researchers, then scattered in other research institutions, to develop some comparative analysis in an attempt to shed light on the social dimensions involved in the various phases through which a disaster can unfold. The following pages aim to summarize some of the results of the above mentioned researches.

1. The emergency

The emergency can be defined as the period following a disastrous event, during which a human community tries to regain its normality within a system that has been struck violently in its constituent parts: individuals, economic structures, urban structures, social institutions.

After the initial inhibition to action, an overactivity phase follows during which, after rescuing themselves and the family, individuals look for news about, and bring help to, the loved ones. News are looked for, relief is provided according to the intensity level of the emotional ties.

Thus, small collectives groups are formed in order to bring help to affected people and to face the first survival problems, starting up the behaviour known as “informal mass struggle”. The sharing of traumatic experiences and widespread sufferings results in a temporary breaking of the rigid existing social stratifications, limits the conflict behaviours and motivates many people to dedicate their forces to reciprocal help. So, we can observe a strong increase in social solidarity and the establishment, for a variable period of time, of a “therapeutic” community (Quarantelli, 1987).

On the disaster scene, more or less promptly a number of groups, institutions and organizations intervene. The institutional, primary task, for some of them, is to assist the disaster victims; for others, instead, this is a temporary role; moreover, side by side with permanent organizations, new groupings are formed, connected with the emerging needs, with single or multiple goals (Cattarinussi, Tellia, 1978).

Usually, there is no exact needs definition and quantification. The large geographical range of some disasters, the lack of certainty and the impossibility to monitor rumours, the uncertainty and urgency atmosphere typical of disasters, all are factors that likely hinder efforts to detect needs accurately.

The recovery is a very delicate phase because, once the heroic and overactive initial phase ends, discouragement and depression phenomena can occur among the disaster victims, sometimes culminating into self-aggression. The personal recovery speed is associated with factors such as

the previous experience with similar events, the level of emotional involvement and of psychological stability. The fact that several rescue institutions operate on the disaster location has the effect of confining individuals in a dependency position, not always totally accepted. Moreover, since very often the individuals do not know the totality of the rescue operations, a tendency can be registered to ask for a larger quantity of material help, in order to get enough of it: this, in turn, can cause feelings of relative deprivation and occasional conflict relationships among the different segments of the population.

Negative psychological consequences can derive also from the extent of the material damages. In fact, the damages to the settlements, to the productive sectors, to the collective organization, worsen the hardship in some population groups, more exposed to risk: the homeless, the unemployed, the children, the disabled, the elderly.

Afterwards, the accommodation in tent camps, in caravan camps and then in prefabricated building settlements is likely to emphasize the loss, disorientation and abandonment feelings.

In the period following the disaster, usually a greater family integration arises, together with the overcoming of the possible previous tensions. Moreover, disasters tend to bring out usually latent family ties. On the other side, some typical family functions (such as food preparation, elderly care, child socialization, ...) are committed to more formal organizations inside the community (Strassoldo, Cattarinussi, 1978).

The disaster, through its direct and indirect consequences, is more likely to affect mostly the groups of people who in the pre-disaster period already experienced a high hardship level and those who in the impact phase suffered a hard negative experience.

The precarious temporary dwellings, the forced cohabitation, the absence of privacy for individuals and families, the missing spaces for children, the uncertainty make up further hardship sources for the individuals, especially considering that the situation - felt and lived as temporary - can last many years.

2. The reconstruction

The reconstruction phase can be both substitutive and ameliorative.

By *substitutive reconstruction* we mean the period through which social and economic activities go back to the pre-disaster levels. The end of the

phase is marked by the total achievement of functional equivalents for satisfying the housing and employment needs and the community activities.

An *ameliorative reconstruction* phase may entail a bettering transformation of the affected communities.

With reference to the lasting psychological effects over this phase (long term effects) at the individual level, the research on the subject hints the hypothesis that natural disasters give rise to more severe and long-lasting consequences on the psychological than on the economical level.

The changes inside a community that can be noticed after a disaster feature an acceleration of processes already going on, rather than new directions in the social change process, even though usually the changes induced by the disaster drive the individuals to perceive the chance for sweeping transformations in the economic, social and physical environments. For instance, we can mention some fanciful proposals made after the Friuli earthquake, such as to build new phalansteries or to have new whimsical economic-urban arrangement: the "Great Udine", or the urban settlement along a single road axis.

During the reconstruction phase, the community can display features indicating the development of a "disaster subculture", that seems likely to develop in a number of communities that experienced a reiterate impact from specific disaster agents. Such a culture includes the array of - actual and potential, social, psychological and physical - adjustments used by a population of a specific area to cope with disasters that hit, or could hit according to local traditions: its elements are norms, values, beliefs, knowledge, technology, legends and institutionalized models for an intra- and inter-organizational response.

Concluding a comparative research on the reconstruction process in San Francisco, Managua, Alaska and Rapid City, some American geosociologists state a number of generalizations that can serve as hypotheses for the analysis of the Friuli case.

1. *The reconstruction process is ordered, knowable and predictable.* Generally speaking, all communities are reconstructed at the original place. The initial appraisal of damages is always overestimated. Inside the family, the housing problem is dealt with an institutional or parental or autonomous approach, the choice depending on norms and resources available inside the community before the disaster. Whereas during the emergency a straightaway social levelling happens, the reconstruction is a largely uneven process.

2. *An ambitious planning is counter-productive.* If too much time is used for study or planning, if proposed changes are openly ambitious, if

plans are awesome and generate uncertainty, conflict and further delay, scorching defeats are the likely results.

3. *Changes in land use.* The reconstruction often requires some changes in the land use. The damaged town may require new, large areas for temporary services and for development. At the same time, other areas may be expropriated, temporarily (e.g. for piling up ruins) or permanently (e.g. to reduce the future vulnerability of the place).

4. *Home and employment.* According to the point of view of the hit individuals, the pivotal reconstruction problems are homes and employment. Considering temporary housing solutions, the present approach in many western disasters shows this preference order: house rebuilding financing; private rents; minimal repairs; caravans and mobile houses parking lots. After a disaster, often a change in the commercial and industrial base of the area; some jobs disappear and other come in, e.g. those connected to the construction industry. Indirect victims may arise, when commercial and/or industrial plants not directly affected by the event are seriously damaged by the enforcement to relocate, without having the right to the support granted to direct victims. The suggested strategy to face this contingency should be to protect the employment as far as possible and to grant a temporary support when needed.

5. *Uncertainty reduction.* In the phases that follow a disaster, an inordinate uncertainty concurs in exacerbating the victims' psychological and social disruption, in slowing down the reconstruction, in wastefully doubling the resources investment, in foiling plans that are fundamental for the ameliorative reconstruction of the community. A further effect of the uncertainty is the encouragement of a range of illegal responses.

6. *Temporariness-definitiveness.* The chance of the "temporary" turning "permanent" is a pivotal problem. As supporting instances, we have many examples, shown in resounding news, concerning post-disaster periods not only in the Third World, but also in Italy (Belice, where permanent brick houses have been accomplished ten years after the earthquake; Irpinia, where the earthquake in 1980 hit people still living in hovels built after the earthquake of 1930) (Cattarinussi, Pelanda, 1981).

3. Surveys during the reconstruction phase in Friuli

During the reconstruction phase, several researches have been developed, aiming at identifying the long-term psycho-social effects.

Within a first survey, respondents were requested to give a general assessment of the disaster effect. Just under half among them stated that hardships were temporary, one quarter maintained that hardships had not been overcome yet and a fifth was able to mention also positive outcomes.

General psychological, as well as physical, situations were perceived as worsened rather than improved (45% against 6% of the respondents), mostly among women, the most educated and the elderly respondents. However, the family atmosphere was perceived as "rather serene". Intra-family conflicts in families dwelling in temporary houses were declared four times more than in families living in brick houses (Cattarinussi, Pelanda, Moretti, 1981).

As for kinship relations, the sociological literature on the subject maintains that after a disaster the kinship solidarity tends to broaden and strengthen. In the Friuli case, this event seems not to continue in the long term and the return to "normal" pre-disaster relationship appeared to be more likely. However, in a number of cases a co-operation, with work and technological exchanges, had been started.

The increase in community solidarity and a corresponding reduction in community conflict are among the most undisputed responses to catastrophic events: a "therapeutic community", an "utopian lifestyle" set in, lasting over different time spans. In the Friuli case, findings about the perception of the possible community solidarity after the disaster seem to disconfirm the hypothesis coming from the "sociology of disasters". As a matter of fact, just one fifth of respondents agreed with the statement that, after a disaster, a general utopian climate arises, where general interests overcome the individual ones and conflict and selfishness decrease; around 17% of the respondents stated that solidarity among the people was definitely not present, while 33% recognized it among just some community members. Moreover, among those who perceived a limited community solidarity, some attributed it just to the two weeks immediately following the May earthquake, others (one third) declared it as covering all the summer until the September earthquake, while just one fourth had noticed it extending over the years. Other findings about the long term effects, stemming from the survey, point out a higher difficulty in psychological recovery among those people who already revealed uneasiness symptoms before the disaster and a slower recovery in mountain, demographically disadvantaged, communities experiencing undue internal conflicts that died down the reconstruction planning.

At the beginning of the '80ies a set of researches has been developed on the families living in the affected areas, on the families engaged in rebuild-

ing activities, on the families having at least one member working in the construction sector, on the craft and industrial business. Findings have been especially interesting, both because a picture of the turbulent reconstruction reality was taken and because of some resulting “surprises”. The heavy spatial and temporal concentration of the high demand in the construction sector had caused a heavy rising in raw materials prices, in the labour costs and in the firms profit margins. As for the houses size, the smaller buildings had been enlarged and the larger ones had been reduced; a definite preference was present for single-family detached dwellings. But the most significant finding was that about a half of the families had contributed “physically” to repair or rebuild the houses and that the financial support granted by the regional laws had covered less than a half of the costs.

Further researches have been developed in 1986 and in 1996 by the Geography Institute of the Munich University. Twenty years after the event, not everybody had finished to pay for the house; only 10% of the interested people had the costs fully covered by the regional funding; about two thirds had to supplement by own savings (45,5%), by bank mortgage (32,3%) or both (13,2%). At the question “After the experience You did, would You today rebuild exactly the same way?”, 60% of the interviewees in 1986 and 70% in 1996 gave a positive answer. Interestingly, the highest percentage of those inclined to rebuild exactly the same way is among the people aged more then 65; the percentage is systematically decreasing in the younger age groups, down to the group 25 - 35 years old, which is the most critical toward the reconstruction.

The satisfaction for the dwelling place (centre vs. periphery) is connected with the type of dwelling: the highest satisfaction is directed toward the detached and the single-family house, most diffused in the peripheries.

Those who reconstructed by private means were able to achieve almost completely their project, thus accomplishing a dream sometimes already present before the earthquake; they express the highest level of satisfaction. The large majority can thus be considered as highly satisfied: the house is more secure, more airy and sunny; however, the surrounding environment is felt as artificial and alien.

The negative evaluation about the environment quality - despite the increase and improvement of infrastructures, the estate rearrangement and the antiseismic security - likely depends on a rather formal and anonymous reconstruction, in any case “different” from the past, with which people, especially the elderly, identify with difficulty.

It is relatively easy to understand the uneasiness among those living in a place different from the past, since they lost the familiar neighbourhood

situation which enlivened interpersonal relationships; more difficult is the understanding of the negative evaluation from those (12%) who still live in the same location. One reason can be dependent on the fact that, during the reconstruction period, several attempts to gain favours, concessions and financial contributions caused disagreements, envy and disputes which disrupted the traditional relationships and brought grudges still asleep. But also the new settlements favoured the disintegration of the social structure: the old traditional courtyards, favouring encounters and social interaction, have been cancelled and weakened social relationships are more anonymous.

Comparing the findings of the 1986 research with those of 1996, the latter describe the house more beautiful, the environment less depressing, the neighbourhood less unfriendly: over time, the recollection of the pre-earthquake fade slowly and the life organization conforms to the new conditions.

Thirty years after the disaster, a further survey has been performed among a sample of the inhabitants of the Osoppo municipality. According to the answers, the reconstruction - that has been rather fast - seemed to be accepted by the large majority of the respondents: the settlement is substantially more functional and simple, while a traditional touch has been preserved through the arcades along the main street. The few negative evaluations came from the elderly, that understandably prefer to remember the old shape of their village.

37% of the respondents maintained that the overall experience after the earthquake had positive consequences, despite what had to be done for the recovery; 34% believe at the beginning, the earthquake induced heavy hardships, mitigated over the time; 15% had to completely change their life due to event; 11% maintain that for them nothing has changed.

According to the opinion of 37% of the respondents, working conditions bettered and a further 54% gave a positive evaluation; only 3% of interviewees are unsatisfied.

27 years after the event, the majority of the residents - 80% - declared that, should a new earthquake hit the area - they will stay on place, loyal to the land, while 10% will move temporarily and 7% will move finally to a different place.

Technology and new antiseismic construction criteria have at least partially turned away the fear for the tremors and creaks in case of high intensity earthquakes: one third of the respondents declare to feel rather secure, and more than half to feel definitely secure inside their homes, due to the antiseismic building techniques (De Franceschi, 2003).

4. The memory

After 40 years, it is quite difficult to read social events in connection with the past event.

The earthquake happened in a moment when the Friuli society was moving from an agricultural to an industrial society, going through the sharecropping phase; the patriarchal family, typical for centuries in the central Friulian countryside, was giving way to the nuclear family; craft activities were undergoing a fordist standardization process; the Catholic Church was losing a measure of formal visibility; consumption was increasing, after centuries of lean times, reaching also the poorer categories in the population; workers' sons got university degrees and emigration was gradually substituted by immigration. At the beginning of the XXI century, the family size was shrinking, with an average of 2.1 members against the previous 4.2; little less than half of the Friulian families are now of the nuclear type, while are increasing the singles, the monoparental and the reconstituted families. Marriages are celebrated later, by newlyweds around the age of 30, and children - better said, the only child - is born two or three years later. Thanks also to the university opening, the number of workers in the advanced tertiary sector is expanding, while the agricultural sector is suffering a gradual senescence process. However, the upward mobility seems to slow down and consumption seems to be less diffused, at least in some part of the society. The less valued jobs are performed by members of different ethnic groups, while in schools the presence of the migrant second generation is becoming relevant in percentages.

The territorial bond is still rather diffused: in a survey run in 2000, four out of five people declare a strong or rather strong attachment feeling. The feeling seems to be stronger according to the increase in age and has been certainly a crucial factor for the fast recovery of the settlements in hit area.

The use of the Friulian language shows a high and fast decrease: little more than a half of the population uses it consistently, while in the '90 it was routinely used by an 80%.

Considering the religious behaviours, a recent survey found that one third of the population follows the religious practices at least once per week, another third practices occasionally, one sixth once per month and one fifth does not practice at all: the religious behaviour is more frequent among women and growing according to age.

With reference to moral issues, comparing the findings of two surveys done respectively at the beginning and at the end of the '90ies, over the decade we notice an increase in tolerance toward homosexuality, euthana-

sia, light drugs, divorce; on the contrary, the judgement becomes stiff toward lying for personal gain, seeking not due public advantages, evading taxes and accepting bribes. Some tendencies seem to be present, leading toward a spread of a civic morality, accompanied by an extenuation of some features which characterize the “familistic syndrome”.

As for values, the Friulian people put in first place the post-materialistic ones, such as friendship and love, while those connected with the Yuppie life style and with socio-religious commitment are in the last positions; the desire for leisure and fun, especially among the youngsters, replaced the commitment toward work.

Final remarks

For the adult and elderly Friulian generations, the earthquake is very likely a crucial and meaningful stage marking personal histories, while for the teenagers and the youth it is a past event, a subject for debates once a year among parents and institutions. As it happens for diseases, which are healed but leave some trace in the body, also the memory of the event and of the following recovery period is latent inside the individuals who, directly or vicariously, lived it, even though the possibility of a similar event in the future does not overly concern the inhabitants of the hit area, tanks to the renovation and strengthening of housing and community structures.

The memory is also aroused every time that around the world a catastrophic, natural or man-made, event happens and psycho-social and organizational dynamics are observed, similar to the ones experienced in the past and obviously compared with those that took place 40 years ago in Friuli. In these moments, also the wish to offer advice is awakened, in order to avoid strategic mistakes within the social and territorial recovery processes: the expertise acquired through direct experience allows advices both at the interpersonal and the institutional level.

Thinking over the findings from several socio-psychological researches about the long term consequences, we could affirm that: the risk of turning the “temporary” into “permanent” has been avoided; no uprooting of the population occurred; the Friulian identity became stronger; the recollection of the earthquake experience no more arouses the first years anguish; the “Friulian diaspora”, Friulian migrants living abroad, did not come back to the homeland; the resolution to entrust local communities and individuals with the reconstruction responsibilities has been a winning choice.

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COMMUNITIES AND INHABITED ENVIRONMENT IN THE SOCIO-SPATIAL RECONSTRUCTION AFTER A DISASTER: TWO ITALIAN STORIES

by *Monica Musolino* *

After a disaster that has damaged a town, two basic questions might arise: *where* and *how* it is possible to reconstruct? Around these apparently simple questions, it is structured a complex system of relationships. In the one hand, a relationship of strength among institutional actors, that is between local and central authorities. In the other hand, a set of movements that were rather organized and rooted in the history of the involved populations. Several ways can be applied in the reconstruction and depend on how these power relationships are developed and solved. The different results, in which these tensions converge, create a rearrangement of the relationship between inhabitants and their environment. The present work suggests a comparison between two case studies in which the reconstruction process has resettlement of the entire population: Gibellina and Vajont. Among all the disasters happened in Italy, the choice of these case studies is suggested by several factors. These case studies have special features: they are similar and at the same time different from any others. First of all, in both cases the reconstruction meant in «community relocation» or displacement (Cavalli, 2005: 214; 1995: 6). A dismantling of the damaged sites and a full population movement to another location took place, and a consequent rebuilding of the towns all over again¹. In these cases, in fact, it can be said that real new post-disaster towns were built. This common condition allows to focus the attention on the territorial and spatial aspect as an element of influence in the complex process of post disaster reconstruction. In both in case of the physical reconstruction and in the identity-making and symbolic one are important elements (Ligi, 2009: 51). The two towns are also demographically comparable (approximately few thousands of people). In addition, the local populations, once the disaster happened, had a strong sense of identi-

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¹ The comparison on the two case studies is a part of a wider research done on four case studies about *post-disaster new towns*: Africo and Canolo in Calabria and their reconstruction process.

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fication with their native place, and all the communities had a rural and mountain identity and culture. The disaster that has befallen these populations, took place by the early '60s to the late '60 of the 20th century, so this analysis covers the process of social change occurred over several decades following each event. We have carried out a research between 2011 and 2015 using the method of the socio-ethnographical observation² and study focused on the social and local history of reconstructions. The research is based on a collection of 38 narrative interviews based on life history (Bertaux, 1999; Bichi, 2007). We have reconstructed the environmental and socio-historical process in relation with the local area. According to Guidicini (2007: 553) who underlines how the collected material through life histories must be «utilised for a clear goal; in other words for the reconstruction of socio-spatial ambient in relation to a precise past historical moment». The interviewees have been mostly selected - despite the temporal distance from the event - among those who played an important role in the reconstruction process. In particular, members of the political-administrative élite (town councillors, mayors, etc), - keyplayers of these processes, In addition, other persons, belonging to new generations who were born and moved to the new towns have been interviewed. We have narratively reconstructed the physical and symbolic reconstruction processes and their actual representation, to catch in the middle and long-term the social implications. Particularly, the results will show a double movement of identity-making reconstruction. The involved populations are connected to these two places: pre and post-disaster place. For this reason, it's very important to analyse the social reconstruction processes of displacement. The massive transfer of a population due to a disaster implies in itself particular adjustment processes. Especially when the "inhabitants community" doesn't have a cultural background to participate to the decisive choices. In other words, the *post-disaster new towns* appeared like the result of identity-making reconstruction laboratories, interesting observation research field to understand how the adaptation processes of relocated community are structured.

² Both in Vajont and in Gibellina we have carried out three research stays one week each: the first two between 2011 and 2012, the third one during 2015 coinciding with the finishing of Burri's Cretto in Gibellina and the event of the "Maratona di lettura" in Vajont during the anniversary of disaster

1. Two Italian disasters: Vajont and Gibellina

It's appropriate to remind, basically, which are the implicated disasters, considering they have happened a long time ago.

1.1 Vajont

Vajont, in the province of Pordenone (in the Northeast of Italy), is actually one of the smallest municipality in Italy: its perimeter is 1,5 km². It's very small *new town*, which was developed after the Vajont disaster (1963). Vajont has been described as an "announced catastrophe" because it was caused by the construction of a dyke. The security of this artefact towards the environment and the near populations was considered suspicious (Noto, 2008). The disaster caused 1910 victims³ and it was provoked by a huge landslide detached from Monte Toc. The landslide was produced by the construction of an impressive dyke - the highest dyke of the world in that time - aimed at electrical energy production. The involved towns were Longarone, downstream (province of Belluno), Erto and Casso, in the mountains (province of Pordenone). Longarone was rebuilt in its own site of origin, with an all-out reconstruction. On the contrary, Erto and Casso populations, where the dyke rest on, were divided (Merlin, 1983): a part of them hardly wanted to stay in Erto, despite the ban imposed by the State, while the other part of population moved to the valley, to another village of the province of Pordenone (Maniago) and they found Vajont town.

1.2 Gibellina

The new Gibellina was built after the earthquake in January 1968 (Muscchio *et al.*, 1981), when the entire population moved from the old mountain village, located in Belice valley, among Trapani, Palermo and Agrigento. The earthquake had a destructive effect especially for three towns among the 14 damaged: Gibellina, Salaparuta and Poggioreale, and all three towns were rebuilt after a forced mobility of population. Gibellina had a peculiar reconstruction's story: it was founded again about 20 km far from its site of origin. The new Gibellina was located on a mostly flat area,

³ Most of the victims was recorded in Longarone (BL), in the downstream dyke. Otherwise, there were some victims both in Castellavazzo and in Erto and Casso.

and was built according with an urban plan -following the example of the Northern European garden-cities (Howard, 1972)- produced by a group of architects selected by the National State. On the basis of this urban system, imposed by the central authority, Ludovico Corrao's original idea of open "museum-city" was inserted. He was the main creator of new Gibellina new aspect and he was its mayor for more than twenty years.

2. *Where to reconstruct? Inhabitants community and inhabited environment*

As was mentioned at the beginning, the condition of spatio-temporal distortion caused by a disaster asks an immediate question: *where* to reconstruct? And what is the reason the *where* is so important? Because the relationship between a community and its environment is a key point. It is defined in terms of identity-making, even if we consider it in a dynamic, open and fragmentary way. In fact, when we talk about the relationship between communities and environment, we want to define it as a caring relationship, that is based - it has to be recalled - on a bond of reciprocity (Bonesio, 2007: 201-202; Poli, 2000: 208). A rich debate, which ranges over from the philosophy (Heidegger, 2007) and geophilosophy (Bonesio, 2007) to the human and political geography (Brinckeroff Jackson, 1984; Poli, 2000) and sociology (Simmel, 2006a; 2006b) and architecture (Norberg-Schulz, 1981) and anthropology (Ligi, 2009), provides important reflections and categories about this issue. Starting from the renowned Heidegger's reflection about the concept of living (*Buan*) and of place (*Ort*), the last elaborations of such categories and the new reflections about this theme consider the changing of conditions related to the way of living. In other words, the relationship between inhabitants and environment. Infact, for Heidegger, living is a transformative practice, which allows the transfer from the *space* to the *place* by mankind. So, mankind can realise their possess of world, their "being there" (*Dasein*) or existence trough the caring relationship and identification with the place. Also in the Norberg-Schulz and Simmel's reflections the categories of landscape, *Stimmung*, *genius loci* and place assume unrepeatable features. In other words, strong and unique connotations, because they are cultural products, the dynamic result of the unrepeatable contact between the natural data and the sociocultural construction of a specific society. In Bonesio and Poli's reflections this caring relationship and environmental transformation is not linked anymore to be native in a place, but belongs to the «electivity» (the choice to belong to that place):

In the contemporaneity the place doesn't exist as a natural place (...), the practice of the care and knowledge of the place breaks up totally the difference between *insiders* and *outsiders*. (...) The *insiders* (who reside in a place for a long time) can be relocated. They can choose to establish no active and cognitive relationship which make start again the symbolic and representative values. On the contrary, the *outsiders* (who come from another place) can advantageously interpret the local potentials. (...) Nowadays the place exists only where is kept well, apart from who is the owner: *insiders* and *outsiders* don't possess the place but who keep it well, who recognize it as their own, who continuously protect and revive it (Poli 2000: 208).

This individual and common activity of *care* measured and modulated according to cultural impacts, emotional living and different views of the place, represents a way of living (Heidegger, 2007) and an identity-making relationship linked with a place where some significant elements are selected and developed in a *duration*. This means that a same place can be "culturally constructed" in a different way if the inhabitants community changes. This implies also the improvement of other elements in that place or a new logic and a different form of cultural elaboration of the same elements (Bonesio, 2007: 100). As underlined by landscape geophilosopher Luisa Bonesio, the construction of the relationship between community and place concerns today not the natives of that area but, mainly, an elective community, whose members can have different geographical and cultural origins. They choose to live in a place *keeping it well* (ivi: 201-202). This idea is retaken in the category of «territorial biography» (Poli, 2000: 212): a collective identity, which recognizes «shared places», is linked to the dynamic and relational concept of *milieu* (Berque, 2000: 31-32)⁴, but also to the microcosm one, which express «all the treasure and the complexity of the connection *man-place*, of the relationships between human community and natural environment and between native ecological knowledge and social practices» (Ligi, 2009: 51). In this so complex and dynamic relationship bloom identity-making relationships, based on a high consciousness of their cultural heritage by natives.

⁴ «The contemporary inhabitable space, which is interpreted by *milieu*, is not attributable anymore to the dominion of certainty. It is not taken for granted anymore that the physical context in which people live can produce a sense for who live there and examine it. *Milieu* interprets the late-modern condition of the end of natural community and the coming of a new form of elective community which is structured around the boundaries of potential, interpretation, intentionality and projection towards the future. (...) *Milieu* is composed by a objective part, given by the historical and environmental heritage, and by a subjective part given by the local society» (Poli, 2000: 206).

In the light of these assumptions, it has been very interesting asking ourselves how populations victims of disasters have chosen and accepted to abandon the identity-making place. Moreover, we had the intention to verify if and how has been reconstructed a caring relationship between this population and the new town. We have investigated how this kind of relationship has been mediated and implemented during the reconstruction. Is an identity-making relationship with the new town risen? And if it is so, what kind of form?

3. When a new town is reconstructed: what it happens to the environment-inhabitants relationship?

If we want to understand how the relationship with the new town is structured, but also how the relationship with the abandoned place is changed, is necessary to reconstruct their making-processes through narratives and representations by who has lived those experiences.

3.1 Vajont

After the Vajont disaster, due to security reasons, the National State prohibited to live in Erto and Casso. Finally, in 1965, it was time to decide where to go and where to reconstruct. Local authorities made three different transfer proposals: Ponte in the Alps, Maniago (downstream) and Erto, upriver.⁵ All households had to express their preference. This kind of consultation is usually called *referendum* (Merlin, 1997: 160) but many people and inhabitants have criticized its mode. The majority chose a place of the municipality of Maniago (Luogo del Giulio),⁶ downstream, which was at the end renamed as Vajont. However, this choice brought to a conflict among people of Erto, and a general controversies as it shows in the interviews which talk about the event and the decision-making processes. Today some of them critically reconsider that moment. For example, V. Barzan,

⁵ In Erto, it could have been possible to reconstruct only upriver, at safety altitude, that is at 800 meters above sea level.

⁶ «294 heads of families for a total of 1425 Erto and Casso people choose Maniago; Erto is chosen by 97 heads of families for 442 people; Ponte in the Alps by 70 heads of families for 368 citizens. (...) All Casso people, who no longer have lands to farm because they are all buried in the rockslide of Toc, chose Maniago», Merlin, 1997: 160.

the present deputy mayor of Vajont, who was previously mayor of Vajont and even before of Erto and Casso:

I start from the end. I define, or we are defined, or I defined them...as the deportees, the “democratically deportees” from the valley of Vajont to the plain of Maniago. This is the plain of Maniago, this place in '66 was a desert where the grass never grew because the smallest stone was like a scree. I call them the deportees of Vajont because if you imagine a population that used to live at altitude of 1000 meters on a valley - whether we like it or not but to us it was wonderful, some people do not like it but usually the place where you were born and where you live is the most beautiful in the world - deporting this people to a plain where there is nothing, nothing. People could choose, I repeat, democratically, because I can't say it didn't happened, because there really could choose among some zones where to set up these new...

P., native of the suburb of Spesse (Erto), took part to the referendum and chose Luogo del Giulio:

I was 24 years old. Maybe I was already an adult but politically we were not adults, we had odd jobs, and I didn't study much. (...) A referendum was really done, with folders and questions, and then, for example, people of Casso were more inclined to go towards Longarone, towards Ponte in the Alps, in fact they are neighbouring. (...) But the Mayor of that time forced some people of Casso, giving them more plots of land. If you have ever seen Vajont, the majority of the houses have the area of 18 x 24 meters while to let people of Casso go downward, he promised and gave them more land, about 18 x 48, a sop, “Come down and I will give you something more”.

G. Corona, ex-councillor in Vajont, who was just 14 years in 1963, with regards to that choice states:

These are choices belonging to others, they are not real for people because politics chose the place and then, pretending everybody agreed, they selected here. Later everyone consented...the reason is politics can drag. In such a moment, what did people realize? I don't want to report the administrators because they were managing a matter bigger than their abilities. And during this management, you see, they could have been influenced by someone else. Do you understand what I mean? I don't want to say that mayors of Erto, for example, chose, that's not true. The thing was big, such a disaster was hard to manage and understand and for sure it was up to politicians (...)

We know they took this decision, then they reported it and finally they asked people, the majority, “where do we go?” The majority decided to move here. In this way they had a sort of democracy of numbers, you see? Definitely!

Even worse is F. and E.'s judgement, a sister and a brother coming from Casso. According to F.: "They forced us to move where we didn't want to". E. clarifies:

There was a clan, a clan of politicians, a clan of businessmen who agreed to move. They wanted to evacuate Erto and Casso completely. Erto and Casso must be considered an evacuated zone, geologically dangerous. People of Erto realized that and said: "No, we won't move down, the war must be done here" and, up there, they have stood firm. Others got blackmailed: they must build, "like it or lump it". If you wanted to go and construct in Ponte in the Alps, you were stonewalled, because there was a clan of Christian Democrats and businessmen who had every interest in bringing us here, because the businessmen wanted to exploit the Vajont rights and create an industrial area, and the politicians needed the votes and needed to get a patronage system, that's why we are here. Even if you went to maintenance offices you were stonewalled. You were stone-walled! Because later you had to come here. Because in Friuli the Christian Democrats power had profits here.

D. Mazzucco, from Casso, councillor in Vajont between 1978 and 1983, is very acute regarding the procedures and the ways of development of the referendum for the choice of the site where to rebuild:

According to me, these referendum are without effectiveness because they didn't affect everyone. Who received any damage, like for example in my case my father, my mother, my uncle, etc., essentially could not take part in referendum as they didn't live in Erto and Casso because they were forced to move in 60's, but their properties still remained there. In this way they removed all that part of people, who had his place of residence decided, even if they weren't landowner, they could take decisions for everybody. And, in my opinion, that's the worst mistake they made. I think who received the damage, should have decided and not the contrary... but who received the damage, they couldn't take part to the decisions at all.

3.2 Gibellina

Where to reconstruct Gibellina after the earthquake? It was no more possible where it was located because a State's law forbade the reconstruction in the native place. So, where? On this issue, there were several opportunities. Both Gibellina local government and its inhabitants did not face them in a condition of total isolation. A mayors' organization of all Belice towns damaged by the earthquake was created and it cooperated with Danilo Dolci's Study Centre (Gribaudo, 2012: 98; Barbera, 2011), operating in that area for many years. That debate, arisen in an atmosphere of peas-

ants struggles and popular participation in the previous years, brought to the proposal of the city-territory or conurbation. It was about the proposal of a single reconstruction of the three towns forced to move to a total transfer: Gibellina, Salaparuta and Poggioreale that would have joined Santa Ninfa in its territory. Moreover, right on this area, there was one of the two slums of Gibellina people. The aim of the city-territory was to unify small municipalities facing hard socio-economic conditions, to increase their productive activities and to use common services. Later, this proposal was re-introduced by ISES,⁷ that recalls its main features and present it to people's will (Musolino, 2012: 108-113; Parrinello, 2015). The collected interviews propose again some of the divisions that brought to the failure of this proposal. G. Ippolito, who, at the time of the interview, was Vice President of the foundation Orestiadi, recalls the event in this way:

Gibellina took part completely to the choice of the territory, because there have been several initiatives. At the beginning they have tried to reconstruct the three small towns, Gibellina, Salaparuta and Poggioreale, in a bigger town to have also better services. And that was a big mistake. About the choice of the territory the old men took over and tried to change people's mind, because there still was the old farmer linked to the land and the mule was the only mean of transport. This moving away was a big problem for him and it also was a sort of localism.

L. Barbera, the creator of C.R.E.S.M.⁸, instead, points out the attractiveness of that proposal. According to his thought and to his experience, in fact, it could have been created critical mass also without that kind of socio-urbanistic planning. On the contrary, according to V. Bellafiore, mayor of Santa Ninfa and President of Mayors' coordination, people refused that proposal because an out-and-out plan of action was managed «from above». This strategy, through the local politicians' actions on populations, was intended to break the movement that forced the politicians to match to the democratic planning experience.

Scientifically there was a sort of pressure and intervention, that was *divide et impera*. This means that who didn't want to answer, knowing this unified reality obliged to give answers, and not wanting to answer to everything and to give appropriate interventions to our requests and needs, made a job of breaking. There

⁷ The State Institute for Social Housing was set up by State for the urban reconstruction planning in Belice.

⁸ (Centro di Ricerche Economiche e Sociali per il Meridione) The Centre of Economic and Social Research for Southern Italy was founded by Lorenzo Barbera, after his detachment from the experience of Danilo Dolci's Study Centre.

were some Christian Democrat mayors who were... “No, my little town... No, we won’t move!”. They have scientifically inflamed from above, taking advantage of some dickheads who managed some districts and who, maybe with good intentions, volunteered themselves...they didn’t allow the creation...but coming from above, because to break meant to reduce the pressure to achieve the desired results. Therefore, there was the will, scientifically fomented from outside, resulted in some mayors’ proposals, such as the mayor of Poggioreale, the mayor of Salaparuta “We remain in our territory. We do this”, and so on, in a scientific way, there have been a sort of pressure throwing that plan from the bottom away, a plan that was forward-looking. (...) When there is a population without an appropriate knowledge and consciousness about new development processes, the well-known people leaders, the well-known local politicians, connected to play their government game, of course they, demagogically, demagogically... once I was in Poggioreale, during a public conference about conurbation “The mayor of Santa Ninfa, doesn’t want to move us in his area - you see - no, no, we’ll stay here”, namely, in this plan, necessary to who was against me to secure his future, I was seen as the mayor who wanted to bring them near his territory to speculate, to take advantage, because in this way it was fed. The simple person, not having an opinion of what they wanted to do, was influenced, exploited and became an obstacle, which means that these proposals also had the assent of a part of population.

Once the conurbation was rejected, as well as an area within the old Gibellina territory, a site near Salemi municipality was chosen. It was a swampy land belonging to some bosses of the zone, Salvo cousins. The mayor Ludovico Corrao, in order to the debates about this choice, declared that just the expropriation of these extended lands, would have caused important losses for their owners: the Salvos. Furthermore, that position would have guaranteed to the new town the close proximity to highway and to railway station, facilitating the mobility system and connecting it to the main towns of the province of Trapani. Many interviewees, who were close to mayor Corrao at that time, support this view, once more criticized by other people, like L. Barbera:

In my opinion, the choice of this place, was based, once again, on false arguments. I’m talking about anyone, because doesn’t mean that even us, the cleverest people, cannot make blunder. Because at that time, immediately after the earthquake, the highway had already been planned, hadn’t it? So, the argument ‘we are going close to the highway, we are immediately linked to the world, to this and that, and so on...’ That was supposed to be an advantage, wasn’t it? But an advantage for who? Considering what this people did in old Gibellina, bringing them here, they didn’t become protagonists, I mean, that people weren’t inclined to commercial and industrial business.

G. Navarra, Corrao memorable political opponent and, at last, mayor of Gibellina, specifies:

As Corrao is dead, it's very difficult to talk about this subject, and maybe I'd prefer not talking about it, because it is not easy to express an opinion, because we are dealing with the Corrao position: for 25 years he was a symbol "All the decisions have been taken in people congresses, according to people will". Ludovico Corrao is a symbol of all that. One year ago we met again, so I don't want to talk again about that period. The only thing that I want to say is that the reconstruction of Gibellina, for better or for worse, in all its positive and negative aspects, is called, for 80%, Ludovico Corrao. Then, people can think what they want. There are some beautiful things. You have been around. The city-museum, something that could have hardly been imagined at that time.

From the collected narratives, it is clear that the tendency in favour of the final choice of the new site, was strongly supported by the mayor of that time. Meeting some people request, he meant to push all the population to a place of settlement that could increase its relations with the outside world integrating it in a wider context. This choice, apparently, had a special attraction also for other political actors, who were outside the community of Gibellina and who would benefit from it: in parallel, in fact, there was a split of the unified action that linked local populations, also about other battles and common claims.

4. The *new town* post-disaster: impact and social and identity-making effects

What are the effects that these choices produce and what are the ways they are made on the reconfiguration of the relationship between people and their environment? Once left the birthplace, how to reconstruct in terms of space and city planning and also concerning the identity-making and symbolic profile? What are the new caring relationships - if any - with the site and the landscape newly founded? There is not a single answer, even if we refer only to our two case studies. This depends on the complexity of mechanisms and power relations (Saitta, 2015: 204; Olori, 2015: 112-114) already mentioned above. However, the comparative analysis, can isolate some interesting recurring processes.

In physical and urbanistic terms, each of the two *new towns* has some significant peculiarities. During the reconstruction of Vajont and Gibellina, the continuity with the historic structure of birthplaces was radically bro-

ken. Vajont and Gibellina were planned according to a modern concept of city planning based on a rigid space functionalism approach. Regarding its overall dimensions, Vajont is a small ring of concrete it is, in somebody words, a «fence» or an «indian reservation» according to someone, that no longer holds its present inhabitants, while Gibellina is starkly oversized (Cannarozzo, 2009). Furthermore, in this last case, the Modernist imprinting of the city planning was increased by Mayor Corrao's politics of identity-making construction, since 1976⁹: «It was necessary a reconstruction that could rejoin the history of a small town of farmers and serfers to the big cultural center that, in the past, had settled in that territory leaving an imprint of their stay. And what else if not art, culture, music and poetry, could the rebirth?» (Corrao, 2011: 12-13). The physical and also the identity-making reconstruction of the two new towns was a second break with the rural past and the isolation of the old villages and project towards a modernity. The collective representation of modernity was a promise for an improving of socioeconomic status. Beside the fact that it was imposed by the law, this representation of modernity induced people to move to another place. But this transfer was a breaking point with the original local identity connected with a characteristic way of living. This new life brought many problems. The experience of the reconstruction and its resulting adjustment, in fact, is described like a second common and individual trauma, as some of the interviewees explain:

There was a trauma, we can't hide this or turn a blind eye to this, there is a trauma. These people lost their home overnight, then they moved in a bad town, I mean, objectively bad, where they lost their reference points and where there is not even a square. I understand them because objectively it's not easy (M., a thirty-five years woman from Gibellina, born in the slums)

They entrusted the task to Northern city planners who didn't know the historical background of the place...for me a city planner must be, before to be a city planner, a sociologist. He has to understand what is the local identity... if there isn't this knowledge it's a disaster, as it happened in Gibellina. I mean disaster not in negative sense, I mean that this new place is a place without a spatial point of reference (...). What it happened is that during the reconstruction people walked in the streets and nothing was relevant for them We noticed that this village had no identity. It was a town fully composed by new anonymous houses. We were, here, absolutely maladjusted! (Former employee of "Pro loco" in Gibellina)

⁹ In 1976, because of the lobbying exerted after the earthquake in Friuli, a national law-ratified the devolution of powers regarding the reconstruction.

Gibellina, though Corrao's activity with the cooperation of many artists is still a place with no identity, where people has no place to meet each other and sharing something. (L. Barbera, activist and founder of C.R.E.S.M.)

Young people don't but old people... suffered by a collective sadness, many of them died. Infact, in the early years after the transfer, many old people died... Plant, transplanted in other place, can hardly flourish as in the original place. After the death of the old generation, young generation has adapted itself. I cannot adapt myself because it's not my world. (Erto inhabitant who has lost his family and house during the disaster. At that time he was 24 years old)

My generation had surely psychological trauma, because for me to adapt myself was a huge disaster. (Casso inhabitant. At that time he was 16 years old)

As result of the collected interviews, these peculiar development actions for the reconstructions, sped up the processes of social change and modernization that were, in many respects, already in progress both in the examined communities and in the whole country.

These evidences were confirmed by Pietro Nimis' analysis (2009: 101-103) about Friuli earthquake 1976, and by Gabriella Gribaudo's analysis (2010: 92-94) about a following disaster, Irpinia earthquake (1980):

Rift caused by disaster was amplified because earthquake happened in a crucial moment, full of social changing dynamics already present in those communities. That was the reason why an acceleration of modernization had a precise direction. Homesickness takes the scenery of a lost socialization, the main square full of neighbours. (...) So earthquake is a sign of the changes in progress in the "Osso italian villages", in the economic depressed mountain areas in the North and in the South.

These changes in progress happened before in Vajont and Gibellina: it's the transition from an agricultural society to a urban one, united, for example, to important changes in the set of job procedures and of economic condition, as well as an increase in the educational and cultural level, to which the involved subjects often refer, without concealing a sense of pride for the obtained status. What's really complicated is the identity-making relationship, the construction of a mutual care relationship with the new place. In this regard, the statement of a young lady of 31 years, coming from Vajont, who was born in the new town but from Casso parents, is probably very clarifying: «It's not a town with its own origins, with its own way of doing or its own peculiarities. (...) Finally you always say *the town rebuilt after*,

so you cannot say Vajont is a village where we can forget it, it's always the reconstructed town».

Also Gibellina and Vajont are linked to the “double movement” of identity-making between population and environment: on the one hand, the pre-disaster place and on the other hand the post-disaster place. But in our case studies such mechanisms of pre and post-disaster are present in a more immediate, defined, radical way concerning the physical ground zero of the destroyed place. Quickly arises the identity-making myth (Cavalli, 2005: 215; Musolino, 2013: 246) of the twice lost place: first time for the devastation caused by earthquake or the dyke building, and the second time for the desertion and transfer. On the other hand, *new town* is rebuilt all over again, starting from an apparent *tabula rasa* of geometric urbanistic transformation and breaking off with the past. *New town* becomes the opportunity of a quick life changing: it's the place of the future, the possibility to enter in the economic modernity, in an industrial and urban development. *New town* represents world made by freedom and functionalization oriented to a great improving of life for populations historically obliged to the isolation and economic rural condition.

Final remarks

In conclusion, in both case studies a sort of double mechanism of identity-making construction in relation to the temporal-space dimension was revealed. Infact, people who moved to the *new post-disaster towns* expressed their complete certainty about the goodness of the choice concerning the transfer, which allowed their socio-economic increase. However, they remained deeply connected to their old village, damaged by disaster, for their own individual and collective identity construction. Once again we are brought to the living dimension in a Heideggerian sense, to the care of the place where the community exercises in a relationship of continuous, dynamic and mutual exchange, even though it's often transferred to memory, which, in tales, is linked to the place of “*before*”. This place is often idealized, partly by the generations who didn't live there and for whom the processing of a memorial relationship with the past personified by that place and with the dramatic rift of the disaster marks the divide, the point zero (Cavalli, 2005: 214) for the individual and generational self-construction. However, the new post-disaster town has been the gateway to modernity. It released those communities from their isolation, made of physic and symbolic procedures of old, peasant and mountain origins. Moreover it quickly

projected them inside those processes of gradual adoption of middle-class manners by the working class, made in the entirely Italian society of that period. In the case studies analysed in this paper is possible to attribute to the disaster and mainly to the reconstructing ways a cause of acceleration of the urban, socioeconomic and identity-making changing processes. Reconstruction in displacement becomes a laboratory of analysis of these dynamics of social changing acceleration, which focuses the territorial and spatial dimension. This dimension amplifies, infact, the break caused by the disaster and the negative effects due to the inadequate participation by the populations in the reconstruction processes.¹⁰

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¹⁰ “Thanks to Maurizio Pallone”

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L'AQUILA 2009-2016.
THE EARTHQUAKE IN THE ITALIAN SOCIAL SCIENCES

by *Fabio Carnelli, Giuseppe Forino, Sara Zizzari**

The 2009 L'Aquila earthquake has been a watershed in the landscape of Italian social sciences focusing on risk and disaster issues. The massive destruction provoked by the event, whose epicentre was located just below a town of 70,000 inhabitants, together with the *mediatization* of its controversial post-disaster management has stirred a *tsunami of discourses* in publications edited by Italian researchers. This paper aims to provide an overview of the main studies edited by Italian scholars, sorted by four themes: mediatisation, role of local communities in post-disaster management, socio-cultural aspects of housing, other relevant aspects.

1. Mediatisation and risk communication

The 2009 L'Aquila earthquake was the first Italian disastrous event broadcasted and followed on blogs and social media 24h. Some research focused on the role of the Internet in both the legitimation of a governmental emergency management and in the construction of counter-narratives as a response by local citizens. Furthermore, the role of risk communication was analysed as an object of a contentious trial, known as L'Aquila trial.

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2. Role of local communities in post-disaster management

The post-disaster management in L'Aquila was controversial. It marginalized local communities and did not ensure grassroots voice emerged. In the emergency camps, citizens' rights of free assembly were neglected. Likewise, the new spatial organizations through the C.A.S.E. Project followed a top-down approach which did not consider local communities needs and expectations. However, some individuals and community groups enacted own initiatives and attempted to reflect upon and to propose a different spatial and social reorganization of the city.

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4. Miscellaneous

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STUDI E RICERCHE

LA CONFIGURAZIONE SPAZIALE DELLE POLITICHE SOCIALI IN ALCUNE AREE DEL DISAGIO NAPOLETANO

di *Stefania Ferraro* *

Introduzione

Il saggio analizza il nesso tra crisi dello Stato sociale (Supiot, 2013) e crisi urbanistica, riportando i risultati di una ricerca svolta nelle aree del centro storico di Napoli denominate rione Sanità (nel quartiere Stella), Borgo dei Vergini e Largo dei Miracoli (nel quartiere San Carlo all'Arena); si tratta di spazi che dal punto di vista amministrativo afferiscono alla Municipalità 3 di Napoli.

Obiettivo della ricerca è dimostrare che l'articolazione del tempo e dello spazio di tali aree della metropoli partenopea non possa aprioristicamente definirsi espressione dell'arretratezza meridionale, ma sia il risultato dell'avanzare della governamentalità (Foucault, 1978), per mezzo della quale la gestione della crisi del Welfare universalistico avviene definendo nuove e inedite relazioni che vanno a comporre la complessa sfera del rapporto pubblico/privato nella contemporaneità, a partire dalla sostituzione dell'"intervento" con la "prestazione", in base a modalità proprie della transizione dal sistema di *governament* a quello di *governance* (Rose, 2006). La ridefinizione dei confini statali del Welfare State avviene attraverso le funzioni assunte da un *État animateur* (Donzelot, Estèbe, 1994), chiamato a sedare il conflitto sociale e a produrre ordine pubblico (Donzelot, 2008).

Attualmente è proprio ai territori della Municipalità 3, insieme ai più noti Quartieri Spagnoli¹, che si attribuisce la presenza di una popolazione composta per lo più da lazzari, cioè da quella gente che Croce (2009: 85) definiva «plebei in rivolta»². In altri termini, nell'immaginario comune è

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¹ I Quartieri Spagnoli sono costituiti dai quartieri Avvocata e Montecalvario e insieme ai quartieri Mercato, Pendino, San Giuseppe e Porto rientrano nella Municipalità 2. Nella ricerca qui presentata si è scelto di analizzare alcune aree del disagio napoletano a cui la letteratura sociologica ha posto meno attenzione rispetto ai più noti Quartieri Spagnoli.

² È Croce a sistematizzare i tratti distintivi della plebe napoletana, spiegando che essa, pur avendo caratteristiche comuni al proletariato, se ne differenzia a causa delle specifiche condizioni climatiche e socio-economiche di Napoli. In particolare, grazie al clima mite, la *Sociologia urbana e rurale* n. 111, 2016

soprattutto in questi spazi che si condensa il crimine organizzato e l'imprenditoria sommersa presente a Napoli (Petrillo Ant., 2011).

Il presupposto di partenza di tale ricerca è che i discorsi sui lazzari di Napoli siano funzionali al processo di naturalizzazione dei fenomeni sociali, al fine di alimentare la memoria storica nazionale sui temi della colpevole arretratezza del Sud, inespugnabile in quanto geneticamente iscritta nelle popolazioni meridionali (Moe, 2002). Pertanto, al fine di decostruire tale narrazione, nel presente quadro di ricerca sono indagati i fattori micro-sociologici connessi alle politiche sociali progettate e implementate in tali aree³, per dimostrare che le logiche di intervento non possono dirsi neutrali rispetto allo stato di crisi dei suddetti spazi napoletani.

In sintesi - a partire dall'analisi degli scarti tra *l'espace conçu* (quello concettualizzato dagli scienziati, dai pianificatori e dagli urbanisti) e le modalità attraverso le quali la società produce il suo "abitare", lo pone e lo suppone (Lefebvre, 1974) - lo spazio è qui inteso come campo su cui si incontrano e si scontrano interessi e strategie imprescindibili dalla dimensione sociale (Simmel, 1998; Bourdieu, 1984). Muovendo da tali presupposti, la ricerca prova ad analizzare le configurazioni spaziali delle politiche sociali (Bifulco, 2003) nella Municipalità 3 di Napoli. D'altro canto è innegabile che quella urbana sia soprattutto una dimensione topica delle politiche del Welfare (Lefèvre, Roseau, Vitale, 2013); ciò è ancora più visibile in quegli spazi di città in cui si concentrano le lotte per la casa e lo spazio

plebe «può dormire all'aria aperta e nutrirsi di poco, far di meno di molte cose e per conseguenza esser disposta alla spensieratezza; la conformazione morale e intellettuale non spinge alla rivolta, ma inclina agli accomodamenti e alla rassegnazione» (Croce, 2009: 89). La plebe, poi, diviene "popolazione di lazzari" quando assume i tratti del «mascalzone» (Ivi: 90). Ancora oggi persiste la rappresentazione di Napoli come di una città dalla doppia anima: élites e plebe, quartieri "bene" e i "mali" del centro storico e delle periferie. Tale rappresentazione traduce in termini simbolici e culturalisti i complessi rapporti di forza e le articolate relazioni sul piano economico, sociale e politico tra le parti della città (Petrillo Ant., 2011).

³ Nella prima fase di ricerca sono stati esaminati i dati statistici (demografia, istruzione, occupazione, trasporti, ambiente, attività produttive, sanità, edilizia). Inoltre, sono state analizzate le mappe, le rilevazioni topografiche e la toponomastica della documentazione istituzionale e sono state monitorate 9 cooperative e 17 associazioni socio-culturali che operano nelle aree oggetto della ricerca. Una prima analisi di contesto ha consentito l'individuazione dei set di osservazione nei luoghi oggetti di indagine e dei testimoni per la raccolta di account biografici e la somministrazione di interviste. La selezione dei set di osservazione e degli intervistati è stata compiuta grazie alla collaborazione delle cooperative e delle associazioni coinvolte nella ricerca, per cui i luoghi di rilevazione sono stati prevalentemente le loro sedi. Gli intervistati sono soprattutto commercianti (per analizzare la condizione economica delle aree di studio), operatori del sociale, utenti delle cooperative e partecipanti ai progetti implementati dalle associazioni socio-culturali. La ricerca, cominciata a gennaio 2014, è ancora in corso e al momento sono state somministrate 33 interviste.

pubblico (Halpern, Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2014), proprio come accade in queste aree della città di Napoli.

L'analisi del dato statistico⁴ relativo alle aree della Municipalità 3 è stata compiuta in chiave comparativa. Partendo dai dati statistici generalmente riferiti alla città di Napoli, è stata effettuata una comparazione tra la Municipalità 3 (una delle zone di maggior criticità socio-economica, dovuta soprattutto all'elevata percentuale di disoccupati e precari) e la Municipalità 1, composta dai quartieri di Chiaia, Posillipo e San Ferdinando, che è una delle aree di maggior benessere cittadino (rappresentato da un'elevata concentrazione di abitanti con reddito medio-alto, in particolare liberi professionisti).

1. Territorio e popolazione

Rione Sanità, Borgo dei Vergini e Largo dei Miracoli, pur costituendo buona parte del cuore storico della città, negli anni sono divenuti spazi periferici (Petrillo Ag., 2013), caratterizzati da una bassa qualità della vita, come attestano gli elevati tassi di disoccupazione, precariato, sottoccupazione e illegalismo, il basso reddito pro-capite e la compresenza marcata di “nuove povertà”, oltre alla scarsità di servizi⁵ e alle reiterate emergenze ambientali (Petrillo Ant., 2009). Si tratta, dunque, di luoghi caratterizzati dalla coesistenza di popolazioni (compreso un'elevata percentuale di migranti) escluse dal centro cittadino “ripulito”; sono gli spazi della “penombra” della città (Ferrarotti, 2009).

In tali aree la crisi della città come spazio politico è cominciata a seguito delle logiche di ricostruzione del dopo sisma del 1980 (Pagano, 2001) e si è acuita negli anni Novanta, quando le piccole imprese e l'artigianato - che caratterizzavano la vita economia di questi spazi di città - sono state messe in difficoltà e rese scarsamente competitive dall'economia politica globa-

⁴ I dati utilizzati fanno riferimento - in parte - al Censimento della popolazione e delle abitazioni e al Censimento dell'industria e dei servizi del 2011. Sono stati esaminati anche i dati elaborati nei seguenti documenti: ISTAT, *9° Censimento dell'industria e dei servizi e Censimento delle istituzioni non profit.*, 2013; Centro Studi Interistituzionale per l'Integrazione Sociosanitaria, Comune di Napoli/ASL Napoli 1, *Profilo di Comunità della Città di Napoli 2010-2012. Il sistema di Indicatori integrati sociali e socio sanitari*, 2013; Coordinamento Centro Studi Interistituzionale per l'integrazione Sociosanitaria - Comune di Napoli/ASL Napoli 1, *Profilo di Comunità Municipalità 3. Distretto 29. Stella/San Carlo all'Arena - 2010-2012*.

⁵ Per una disamina di tali percentuali si veda ISTAT, *9° Censimento dell'industria e dei servizi e Censimento delle istituzioni non profit*, 2013.

lizzata, producendo la precarizzazione della piccola borghesia e della classe operaia (Sanyal, 2007). Negli stessi anni, a seguito delle politiche di gentrificazione di alcune aree del centro storico napoletano (Dines, 2012), rione Sanità, Borgo dei Vergini e Largo dei Miracoli hanno accolto anche il sottoproletariato e i migranti espulsi dalle aree “ripulite”. Da allora in questi spazi di città si annidano popolazioni in condizioni di forte disagio economico e sociale.

Pertanto, nonostante la presenza di un consistente patrimonio storico-monumentale, tali luoghi non sono ricompresi nei tragitti dei flussi turistici, il che contribuisce ad alimentare il degrado urbano - visibile soprattutto attraverso la fatiscenza degli spazi pubblici. Di rimando, è il governo cittadino a definire linee politiche di esclusione di determinate aree dai circuiti turistici (Dines, 2012).

L'area della Municipalità 3, con 103.633 residenti (72.933 a San Carlo all'Arena e 30.700 a Stella)⁶, resta una delle zone della città più densamente abitate. A tal proposito va detto che rispetto al più generale abbandono delle aree del centro storico di Napoli da parte delle famiglie con reddito medio/basso - spostatesi in gran parte verso i rioni di edilizia popolare costruiti negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta o verso le costruzioni in prevalenza abusive realizzate nei comuni della provincia - il fenomeno di allontanamento dalle aree del centro riguarda in percentuale molto bassa la Municipalità 3. In altri termini, i residenti difficilmente abbandonano tale zona, tant'è che non vi sono case disabitate e persiste una correlazione inversa tra il costo dell'affitto e le condizioni delle abitazioni; più precisamente, in tali aree l'aumento di richieste di locazione, soprattutto da parte di migranti che svolgono attività di badanti, ha coinciso con le fasi di gentrificazione di altre zone del centro storico napoletano e quindi con il conseguente aumento del costo degli immobili ivi presenti. Per quanto nella Municipalità 3, e in particolare nel rione Sanità, sia ancora possibile trovare abitazioni a costi più contenuti rispetto al resto della città, spesso le condizioni delle case sono piuttosto precarie⁷.

Un dato particolarmente significativo è quello relativo all'istruzione: a San Carlo all'Arena e a Stella le persone in possesso dei titoli di studio più elevati, in particolare dei diplomi di scuola secondaria superiore e dei diplomi di laurea raggiungono complessivamente il 36,38%; una percentuale sostanzialmente in media con il valore cittadino (Napoli 35,18%). Più bas-

⁶ Dati ISTAT, Censimento della popolazione e delle abitazioni, anno 2011.

⁷ Coordinamento Centro Studi Interistituzionale per l'integrazione Sociosanitaria - Comune di Napoli/ASL Napoli 1, *Profilo di Comunità Municipalità 3*, op. cit.

sa, rispetto al dato cittadino, è la percentuale dei residenti che hanno soltanto la licenza media 28,96% (Napoli 29,21%), così come l'incidenza della popolazione senza alcun titolo di studio 10,36% (Napoli 11,31%). Ciò dimostra che in queste area non si addensa un tasso di bassa scolarizzazione, come di norma si suppone, associando il disagio sociale con il basso livello di istruzione. A ciò si aggiunga anche il tasso di disoccupazione, che è del 29,56% rispetto al 31,39% cittadino⁸. In sintesi, a differenza di quello che si potrebbe presumere, i dati statistici non disegnano un quadro particolarmente differente rispetto al più generale panorama cittadino. In realtà la vera peculiarità della Municipalità 3 è data proprio dall'incrocio dei dati relativi ai tassi di scolarizzazione con quelli relativi ai livelli di disoccupazione: ad alti livelli di scolarizzazione corrispondono altrettanti alti livelli di disoccupazione. In queste aree persiste un'evidente difficoltà dei "nuovi" laureati ad accedere al mondo del lavoro in maniera molto più netta rispetto ad altre aree della città e tale condizione è percepita dagli interessati come sintomatica dell'assenza di un'adeguata rete di relazioni sociali che consenta ai residenti in tali aree il raggiungimento di un traguardo occupazionale adeguato al titolo di studio conseguito. Detto in altri termini, nonostante le possibilità di accrescimento del capitale culturale la loro esclusione dal mondo del lavoro viene considerata conseguenza dell'impedimento di crescita in termini di capitale sociale (Bourdieu, 1984), dunque di possibilità reali di tessere relazioni.

I dati dimostrano che il livello di criticità in termini di disoccupazione è più basso proprio tra coloro che, pur vivendo in tali aree, appartengono a famiglie caratterizzate da livelli maggiori di benessere, con il capofamiglia imprenditore o libero professionista e abitazioni di proprietà in buone condizioni.

Le difficoltà di accesso al capitale economico e simbolico di buona parte della popolazione che occupa gli spazi oggetto della ricerca possono avallare l'ipotesi di partenza: questa non è un'area in cui naturalmente esiste una popolazione marginale, al contrario in questi spazi si "produce" marginalità, sia per mezzo di rapporti di forza materiali sia attraverso ordini discorsivi (Petrillo Ant., 2011).

I rapporti di forza, definiti in base a criteri economici, favoriscono la concentrazione della povertà in specifiche zone della città, quelle poste ai margini rispetto alla parte di città resa immediatamente visibile dai processi di gentrificazione (Avenel, 2004); gli ordini discorsivi descrivono tali aree di margine come l'archetipo del male di vivere (Petrillo Ant., 2011), traccian-

⁸ *Ibidem*.

do i perimetri dei quartieri sensibili, quelli che necessitano, dunque, di interventi “eccezionali”. La capacità degli ordini discorsivi di incidere in termini di stereotipizzazione è presto dimostrata facendo ricorso, per esempio, ai dati statistici relativi ai fenomeni di microcriminalità nella Municipalità 3 di Napoli: essi presentano percentuale pari al dato cittadino⁹, senza alcun particolare tratto distintivo, avallando le critiche già esercitate da Small (2004) rispetto alle teorie sugli effetti negativi della concentrazione di povertà in specifiche zone.

2. Nei quartieri dei perdenti

Naturalmente sappiamo quanto la “produzione” di povertà sia funzionale alla struttura economica reale (Sanyal, 2007). Tuttavia, rispetto a queste aree della città di Napoli, i dispositivi di narrazione - ancorati al racconto dell’arretratezza di una popolazione composta per lo più da lazzari - celano un dato importante: qui vivono molti napoletani profondamente moderni, in quanto appartenenti alle nuove povertà connesse al precariato contemporaneo (Castel, 1999), con storie di vulnerabilità in età lavorativa e senza alcuna forma di assistenza di Welfare in quanto abili al lavoro (Bergamaschi, 2010).

I dati demografici relativi a queste aree della metropoli partenopea descrivono una popolazione per lo più destinata alla flessibilità e alla precarietà lavorativa (e quindi sociale¹⁰), cioè caratterizzata da quegli elementi resi “invisibili” dalla narrazione occidentale della modernità (Sanyal, 2007).

Ne segue che a Napoli persiste una produzione dello spazio sociale inteso come omogeneo e quantitativo, cioè una *machines à habiter* (Lefebvre, 1974). Più esplicitamente, la sostanziale differenza - in termini socio-demografici - tra le aree di disagio e quelle di benessere della città attesta la volontà di gestione degli spazi in termini di razionalizzazione economica della popolazione e del territorio, a difesa dei capitali e dello spazio in cui essi si riversano (Ginatempo, 1976). In altri termini, Napoli è strutturalmente articolata «in quartieri dei vincenti e quartieri dei perdenti» (Petrillo Ant.,

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ La precarietà sociale è qui intesa quale conseguenza diretta della condizione di instabilità lavorativa. L’incertezza in merito alla natura dei contratti di lavoro, alla loro durata e alla relativa entità di guadagno incidono fortemente sulle *chance* di definizione del proprio futuro (Gallino, 2012), definendo processi di inclusione solo parziale nel contesto sociale di riferimento (Castel, 1999).

2000: 17) e, siccome nei quartieri della Municipalità 3 si addensa una popolazione in prevalenza caratterizzata da una precarietà economica e sociale, essi costituiscono il luogo dei perdenti.

A differenza di quanto avviene nelle metropoli occidentali, a Napoli la distinzione tra “perdenti e vincenti” non è restituita solo nell’articolazione di quartieri residenziali e quartieri popolari e/o quindi periferici (Vicari, Haddock, 2013), ma anche nella definizione dei confini delle aree che costituiscono il nucleo storico della città.

La distanza simbolica tra questi spazi e il resto della città è, pertanto, politicamente definita attraverso l’implementazione di interventi gestionali che concentrano il “disordine” in tali aree e conseguentemente li gestiscono in termini di *État animateur*, garantendo l’ordine sociale nel resto della città. Di rimando, chi abita e vive in questi luoghi avverte nel quotidiano tale distanza a seguito della strutturale assenza di servizi pubblici e di interventi sociali realmente finalizzati a dare risposte ai disagi socio-economici della popolazione.

Volendo, poi, arricchire il *parterre* delle retoriche pubbliche sulla città, si tenga conto che parte dei quartieri Stella e San Carlo all’Arena fanno parte dell’area centro storico UNESCO di Napoli e rispetto a ciò è inevitabile rilevare le aporie tra le linee di riprogettazione urbanistica della città in termini di *Cultural Heritage* e la reale qualità della vita di molte aree protette dal vincolo UNESCO. In particolare, negli spazi di città oggetto della ricerca la patrimonializzazione coesiste con il disagio quotidiano in termini di oggettivazione culturale, prodotta attraverso procedure di controllo e di classificazione di beni e spazi (Palumbo, 2003). È ciò che Herzfeld (2009) definisce “practical orientalism”, cioè la colonizzazione attraverso la valorizzazione.

Si consideri, per esempio, che le aree UNESCO della Municipalità 3 sono contraddistinte da una cronica assenza di servizi sociali e assistenziale, ulteriormente acuita dalle politiche di razionalizzazione del Welfare e dalla crisi economica in atto. In particolare, a rione Sanità, nel Borgo dei Vergini e a Largo dei Miracoli è molto elevata la percentuale di famiglie investite di eccessivi “compiti di cura” (data la numerosità del nucleo e la presenza di figli minori, persone anziane o disabili) e costrette all’autogestione delle esigenze sociali e assistenziali (Näre, 2012). Pertanto, in questi spazi napoletani si sovrappone alla carenza di servizi pubblici con il modello culturale delle solidarietà familiari e parentali (Barwick, 2014).

Per inciso, si tenga conto che a Napoli coesistono - in maniera più evidente che altrove - un Welfare di tipo familistico e un corposo mercato del lavoro di cura informale, con un elevato numero di migranti irregolari (Ta-

paninen, 2007). Inoltre, negli spazi della Municipalità 3 persiste il fenomeno del familismo forzato¹¹, e cioè una situazione di sovraccarico familiare determinata dal basso livello di reddito pro-capite che costringe a forme di coabitazione forzata. Detto in altri termini, il nucleo familiare tende a estendersi - accogliendo, per esempio, anche i figli sposati - per esigenze economiche; ciò facilita pure la rappresentazione folclorica di tali spazi (Castrignanò, 2014). A ciò si aggiunga il fatto che queste aree presentano una fortissima emergenza abitativa dovuta a migliaia di sfratti pendenti¹².

Caratteristica sociale, oltre che architettonica, degli spazi della Municipalità 3 è la persistenza dei cosiddetti “bassi”. Sono abitazioni oggi occupate anche da molti migranti, ma da sempre considerate quale simbolo del bene e del male della città di Napoli e definite luoghi di promiscuità psicosociale (Allum, 2003). Al di là delle definizioni, i bassi oggi sono - da un punto di vista sociologico - spazi di resistenza popolare in aree della città sottoposte a progetti di riqualificazione del tessuto urbano, nei quali persistono modalità relazionali osmotiche certamente non proprie delle metropoli globalizzate, ma tipiche della porosità di Napoli, così come Walter Benjamin (2000) la intendeva.

Sempre in contrasto con i principi di patrimonializzazione e valorizzazione del territorio, si consideri che il basso reddito pro-capite degli abitanti di tale area napoletana incide profondamente sulla definizione degli stili di vita, determinandone la quantità e la qualità dei consumi. I dati sui consumi dimostrano che nel 2012 in queste aree sono quasi del tutto comprese le spese voluttuarie o comunque non essenziali per la sopravvivenza; mentre il consumo di beni di prima necessità - pur non essendo diminuito in termini quantitativi - risulta significativamente caratterizzato dall’acquisto di prodotti presso i discount e sicuramente limitato rispetto al consumo di alimenti più pregiati e costosi¹³. Naturalmente ciò incide fortemente sulla qualità di vita e conseguentemente sulla salute¹⁴.

Oltretutto, anche in nome della tutela del patrimonio, queste aree sono spesso soggette ad azioni politiche di “ripulitura della città” e costituiscono uno dei punti nevralgici delle politiche securitarie e delle logiche di cittadinanza dall’alto (Pérouse, 2013), che frequentemente si traducono in forme di privatizzazione degli spazi pubblici (Mazzette, 2014).

¹¹ *Ibidem.*

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ ISTAT, 9° Censimento dell’industria e dei servizi e Censimento delle istituzioni non profit., 2013.

¹⁴ Coordinamento Centro Studi Interistituzionale per l’integrazione Sociosanitaria - Comune di Napoli/ASL Napoli 1, *Profilo di Comunità Municipalità 3, op. cit.*

3. Costruzione dei confini del margine

Vivere il rione Sanità anche solo per poche ore, giungervi attraversando i Vergini e confondersi nei rumori e nei colori del mercato dei Miracoli, significa abbandonarsi all'idea che esista realmente una Napoli che sfugge alle definizioni (Velardi, 1992). Qui, dentro i confini geopolitici dei quartieri Stella e San Carlo all'Arena, si comprende pienamente che Napoli è la città porosa in quanto «il definitivo, il caratterizzato vengono rifiutati» (Benjamin, 2000: 78). Qui, molta gente non entra nelle case ma ne esce, facendo vita comune sulle scale o nel vicolo poiché, come avviene in diversi quartieri svantaggiati, si investe molto nelle relazioni interpersonali (Daconto, 2014), che costituiscono spesso uno dei pochi canali per occasioni lavorative formali e/o informali.

Se porosità è anche mutevolezza, mutevole è il volto del quartiere Stella, che custodisce l'architettura tipica del centro storico napoletano, fatta di vicoli e gradini. È soprattutto l'analisi storico-sociologica a tracciare il perimetro della mutevolezza di tale territorio. Nel Cinquecento comincia l'urbanizzazione di quest'area con la costruzione della Porta di Costantinopoli, che apre per la prima volta quest'area alla città. Proprio grazie alla salubrità del luogo il *vallone* prese il nome di Sanità e fu zona residenziale dei nobili della città (Ferraro, 2008a). Il primo vero intervento di ridefinizione urbanistica dell'area fu realizzato nel XIX secolo da Gioacchino Murat che, per raggiungere la sua residenza, cioè la Reggia di Capodimonte, fece realizzare un asse viario rettilineo (l'attuale via Santa Teresa degli Scalzi e corso Amedeo di Savoia), che saliva la ripida collina di Santa Teresa e sormontava il vallone della Sanità mediante un ponte, il ponte della Sanità appunto (Ferraro, 2008b). Il rione - che per molti anni aveva rappresentato un crocevia di corti in transito verso la reggia di Capodimonte - proprio a seguito della costruzione del ponte, visse una fase di isolamento rispetto alle arterie stradali della città. Indubbiamente ciò ha influito sulla sua conformazione urbana e, proprio per far fronte allo stato di isolamento, a partire dai primi anni del XX secolo si sviluppò un'economia locale molto proficua e un artigianato locale della pelle (in particolare la lavorazione dei guanti). Naturalmente il ponte resta comunque la via di connessione del rione con il resto della città e dunque per anni è stato cruciale anche per il commercio dei prodotti artigianali realizzati alla Sanità, tant'è che la popolazione ha sempre mostrato la forza di difenderlo: emblematici gli episodi accaduti durante la seconda guerra mondiale, in particolare la barricata in via Santa Teresa e l'aver impedito ai nazisti di far saltare il ponte della Sanità.

Per San Carlo all'Arena, invece, il destino - in termini di proletarizzazione - fu già scritto da Carlo III di Borbone che fece costruire il Real Albergo dei Poveri, detto anche Palazzo Fuga o il reclusorio nel gergo popolare (Ferraro, 2008a). Quest'area di confine può essere immaginata come un quadrato stretto ai lati da palazzo Fuga e l'ex-manicomio Leonardo Bianchi. Qui, percorrendo Salita Miradois, si giunge nello spazio metropolitano detto Malpertugio: è il luogo delle "cattive maniere" (*Ibidem*), chiamato Largo dei Miracoli. Le frequenti narrazioni di una popolazione rozza e poco cauta coprono le memorie della civiltà contadina napoletana che occupava quest'area, lì dove troneggiano Villa di Donato e Convento S. Eframio Vecchio. In tale zona, fino a inizio Ottocento è prevalsa la connotazione tipica delle masserie agresti, trasformatasi, in epoca più recente, in un addensamento urbano circoscritto da modesti edifici e case popolari (De Seta, 1989). La situazione dei casali è stata compromessa dalla selvaggia urbanizzazione degli anni Cinquanta del XX secolo.

Successivamente, tutta l'area agricola dei Miracoli è stata integralmente distrutta dal progetto dell'infrastruttura Autostrada del Sole A54 (detta Tangenziale), che prese vita il 31 gennaio 1968, e dal Piano regolatore del 1972 (Dal Piaz, 1988). Da quel momento l'agricoltura ha ceduto il passo all'edilizia popolare. Gli ex-agricoltori si sono rapidamente trasformati in portinai dei nobili edifici, custodi di ville, domestici e - i più fortunati - sono stati assunti come inservienti d'ospedale, per mezzo dell'intervento politico dei proprietari terrieri, che hanno avvertito una sorta di "obbligo morale" nel prendersi cura del destino dei loro ex-agricoltori (Pagano, 2001).

Se poi si arriva al Borgo dei Vergini, che in parte cade nel quartiere Stella e in parte si estende nell'area di San Carlo all'Arena, ci si rende conto che è una zona popolosa e "chiassosa" ed è un'area esasperata da un'edilizia sorta dalle moderne acquisizioni delle tecniche di fondazione ancora influenzate dal Risanamento classe 1975 (Buccaro, 1991).

Negli studi sulla struttura sociale delle grandi città è diffusa l'idea che la globalizzazione abbia favorito i processi di polarizzazione sociale e di divisione spaziale della città (Sassen, 1991), producendo fenomeni di nobilitazione dei centri urbani - o gentrification (Lees, Slater, Wyly, 2010) - a seguito della localizzazione dei nuovi ceti elevati. Non di meno è dimostrato che i processi di polarizzazione innescati dall'economia globale non sono così forti da rimpiazzare lo strutturarsi locale delle diseguaglianze, almeno dal punto di vista della morfologia urbana, e che la divisione spaziale della città è ancora fortemente condizionata dall'evolversi delle dinamiche locali (Cremaschi, 2008), proprio come avviene in queste aree di margine della città di Napoli; non a caso esse sono gli spazi della città che hanno mag-

giormente resistito al processo di gentrification, proprio come dimostra lo scarso tasso di abbandono dell'area da parte degli abitanti dei ceti medio-bassi. Che poi la definizione spaziale di tali aree abbia, negli anni, contribuito alla costruzione di una marginalità è innegabile: l'area della Municipalità 3 assume i confini di una sorta di cuneo tra centro storico e zona orientale della città e da un punto di vista orografico si presenta notevolmente eterogenea, in quanto in parte è disposta sulla zona collinare e in parte è letteralmente infossata negli antichi alvei della città; in particolare, il rione Sanità, il Borgo dei Vergini e Largo dei Miracoli, pur costituendo il nucleo ancestrale della città, restano simbolicamente distanti da essa e appaiono soffocati a nord dalla Tangenziale e a sud da via Foria.

Tale conformazione geografica da un lato ha sempre creato notevoli problemi di mobilità interna ai suoi abitanti, almeno fino all'avvento della metropolitana collinare; si pensi che alcune aree del quartiere - come per esempio tutta l'area a nord di via Foria - ancora oggi non sono servite dal trasporto pubblico, contribuendo al loro isolamento. Dall'altro ha certamente coadiuvato il processo di rinsaldamento del tessuto sociale, rendendo tale area una sorta di microcosmo all'interno della città (Cremaschi, 2008). Altrettanto indubbio è che il valore della cultura e della patrimonializzazione in queste aree di degrado possa facilmente tradursi in interventi finalizzati alla sola rendita privata (Delgado, 2011) e al folklore.

Non di meno, molti degli abitanti intervistati evidenziano la consapevolezza che tali luoghi della città siano più di altri un laboratorio privilegiato di politiche emergenziali, spesso favorite da eventi naturali, come è stato per il colera del 1973 e per il terremoto dell'Ottanta. Essi descrivono le logiche di intervento urbano e sociale in termini di isolamento sociale dell'area. Gennaro, che ha una macelleria a rione Sanità, spiega:

Tagliando fuori dai percorsi più frequenti le strade e i vicoli dei quartieri Stella e San Carlo all'Arena, è successo che ci hanno chiusi in un ghetto, distruggendo la micro-economia locale. Per esempio, in questo modo hanno distrutto anche l'identità del rione Sanità come quartiere operaio, dove c'erano tante fabbriche a conduzione familiare che davano lavoro a molta gente. Qui c'era un benessere diffuso, con fabbriche di guanti, di scarpe, di fuochi artificiali, botteghe artigiane di valenti maestri mobiliari e di vetrerie (Intervista a Gennaro, 54 anni, commerciante, Napoli 6 luglio 2014).

Nelle testimonianze raccolte è evidente il senso di isolamento e abbandono della gente che vive questi spazi di città, che non è comunicato in termini rassegnazione o di vittimizzazione, ma con la consapevolezza di precise strategie politiche di fabbricazione della marginalità. Per esempio,

Pasquale - che ha 61 anni, vive da sempre a Largo dei Miracoli e attualmente fa il portinaio in un palazzo a via Chiaia - racconta:

Rimpiango il passato agricolo di quell'area; molti di noi, agricoltori dei casali da generazioni, sono soggetti di una "metamorfosi feudale" che ci ha trasformati in portinai, inservienti, domestici, comunque attraverso il mantenimento di un rapporto di dipendenza clientelare con i proprietari delle terre che coltivavamo (Intervista a Pasquale, 61 anni, portinaio, Napoli, 3 gennaio 2015).

Del resto, a Napoli «la classe dominante locale, in gran parte derivante dalla vecchia nobiltà feudale, risulta utile alla gestione della disgregazione sociale: essa si arricchiva tramite la rendita agraria, gestiva un processo di terziarizzazione, [...] garantiva il controllo delle tensioni sociali» (Ginatempo, 1976: 47).

Dopodiché, dalle testimonianze e dalle biografie raccolte si evince che quando vivi in queste zone «sei costantemente conscio di non vivere semplicemente un'esperienza urbana, ma di vivere la vita urbana come un problema, come un interrogativo, come una provocazione» (Savonardo, 2007: 67). Tant'è che tra chi abitata questi spazi e il resto della città persiste un netto scarto in termini di leggibilità del luogo (Lynch, 1960): chi non li abita ha difficoltà nell'orientarsi perché non li vive come spazi della città. Francesco, un operatore sociale iscritto al corso di laurea triennale in Scienze del Servizio Sociale, racconta:

Vivo da sempre alla Sanità e vorrei non dover mai andare via, nonostante non sia facile vivere qui perché ci sono tanti problemi, di viabilità, di caos, di fame. Però, posso dire che mi fa tristezza il fatto che i miei colleghi di Università, napoletani per nascita, non sanno neanche come si arriva alla Sanità. Non ci sono mai venuti e molti di loro forse non ci verranno mai. Hanno paura, ma non si capisce di cosa. Qui è come in tutta Napoli solo che siamo in tanti, tutto qua. Qualcuno di loro passa per i Quartieri Spagnoli, ma perché è costretto per andare a via Roma, a via Toledo. Nel mio rione, non essendo luogo di attraversamento della città, non ci vengono proprio (Intervista a Francesco, 24 anni, operatore sociale, Napoli, 6 giugno 2014).

Essendo comunque aree di una metropoli contemporanea, questi spazi di città sono quotidianamente contaminati da magie e paure (Amendola, 2007) e sono un'opera perpetua degli abitanti (Lefebvre, 1974), coinvolti in esperienze di riappropriazione del diritto alla città inteso come esercizio collettivo (Harvey, 2012). Per esempio, tra gli intervistati c'è chi racconta il proprio rifiuto di trasferirsi altrove, di cedere alla gentrification, come atto di

resistenza pura. Assunta, pensionata nata e vissuta sempre al Borgo dei Vergini, racconta:

nel periodo del post-terremoto del 1980, a molti di noi dei Vergini la casa fu dichiarata inagibili e ci fu proposto il trasferimento nelle abitazioni popolari dei paesi in provincia di Napoli. Andare in provincia significava lasciare per sempre Napoli, poiché muoversi con i mezzi pubblici è veramente difficile. Io non ci sono voluta andare e sono rimasta qua, in questa casa che sta ancora in piedi da che era inagibile (Intervista a Assunta, 71 anni, pensionata, Napoli, 3 gennaio 2015)¹⁵.

È chiaro che qui come altrove il tentativo di gentrification risponde alle «necessità di tutela della “purezza” e della “sicurezza” dei gruppi dominanti» (Petrillo, 2009: 31), ma qui più che altrove la sua origine è storica, poiché qui «le grandi operazioni del Risanamento e lo sviluppo di interi nuovi rioni residenziali e popolari avevano ormai concentrato nell’investimento immobiliare la prospettiva della borghesia e degli imprenditori napoletani» (Galasso, 1978: 28).

Nelle aree indagate le pratiche di negoziazione rispetto allo spazio urbano sono continue e costanti. Si pensi, per esempio, alla gestione e alla condivisione degli spazi antistanti i bassi o i negozi al Largo dei Vergini, dove ogni cosa è esposta; si pensi a quanto la loro “invasione” possa essere un tentativo di restituzione di uno spazio alla socialità. Del resto, questa continua ridefinizione dello spazio pubblico genera i cosiddetti pori urbani (Stavrides, 2007), che - come le porte di Simmel (1997) - connettono mentre separano e separano mentre connettono. Solitamente, tale occupazione dello spazio è semplicisticamente classificata come arretratezza e stravaganza; non di meno può essere interpretata come una forma di resistenza in difesa della porosità urbana, che a sua volta potrebbe significare difendere il diritto allo spazio come un diritto a superare l’identificazione attraverso la localizzazione (Stavrides, 2007).

4. Welfare démodé, care economy e produzione di working poor

Quello che accade in queste aree è che

i fatti della collettività sono “messi in scena” secondo le trame di una socialità che si regge su due ordini di riferimento: un’appartenenza, forzata o compiaciuta, cioè

¹⁵ Per un’analisi sociologica delle politiche di sviluppo urbano dei paesi in provincia di Napoli a seguito del sisma del 1980 cfr. Di Costanzo, 2013.

una localizzazione ristretta e contestualizzata, oppure una sorta di apertura, che può raggiungere lo smarrimento, dove si accolgono - nel bene e nel male - le influenze culturali di altri paradigmi di umanità (Savonardo, 2007: 67).

Queste due polarità negli spazi del rione Sanità, del Borgo dei Vergini e di Largo dei Miracoli si definiscono attraverso una composizione sociale che semplicisticamente può dirsi articolata in tre macro-tipologie di soggetti: quelli che hanno avuto il posto fisso; quelli (sempre di meno) che continuano a vivere dell'economia del rione e che avviano i figli alla scalata sociale portandoli alla laurea, attraverso cui poi si alimenterà il mercato del precariato intellettuale; quelli in attesa di un lavoro, tra cui c'è chi rientra nella percentuale dei disoccupati e chi, invece, decide di trasformare il provvisorio in certezza e si presta all'illegalità. Del resto, è in questi territori che la camorra può reclutare manovalanza, attingendo «dalle file dei disoccupati organizzati delusi di non riuscire a entrare nel mercato del lavoro legale, nonché dai giovani sottoproletari sbandati» (Allum, 2003: 185). Qui, sin dagli anni Settanta, la camorra costruisce un mercato clandestino e parallelo del posto fisso (Amaturo, 2004; Di Costanzo, 2013). In tale ottica, per esempio, può essere letta anche l'esperienza del contrabbando di sigarette, che però ha significato anche aspirazione al lavoro, a costruirsi una casa, a formare una famiglia (Di Consoli, 2002). Pertanto, l'assenza di politiche di intervento socio-economico in risposta alle difficoltà della popolazione spiana la strada a una sopravvivenza nell'illegalità (Gallino, 2012; Alietti, 2013).

Di rimando, le risposte istituzionali ai disagi di tali aree si sono quasi sempre limitate ad attivare il dispositivo legalitario, che rafforza se stesso attraverso la riproduzione degli stereotipi della violenza e del crimine e tiene naturalmente conto che «per lo strato sociale superiore una rigorosa codificazione del comportamento non è solo uno strumento di prestigio, ma è soprattutto un mezzo di dominio. E diventa necessaria la collaborazione dei dominati, diventa indispensabile servirsi di loro stessi, modellando il loro Super-Io» (Elias, 1988: 98).

Da un punto di vista istituzionale rione Sanità, Borgo dei Vergini e Largo dei Miracoli sono ancora descritti come laboratorio e modello di creazione di capitale sociale per consentire uno sviluppo endogeno e riproducibile nella sicurezza (Leonardi, Nanetti, 2008). Il dato discordante è che a fronte degli investimenti istituzionali, in queste aree della città è più elevato che altrove il ricorso informale ai professionisti privati della *care economy* (Molinier, Laugier, Paperman, 2009), poiché il complesso di interventi realizzati in termini di politiche sociali non risponde alle reali esigenze socio-

assistenziali della popolazione; la maggior parte delle attività svolte dalle cooperative e dalle associazioni presenti sul territorio è finalizzata alla lotta al crimine e alla devianza e non garantisce alla popolazione servizi socio-assistenziali che sopperiscano ai tagli effettuati al Welfare State¹⁶. Di fatto, in queste aree napoletane è estremamente evidente il processo attraverso il quale gli interventi di politiche sociali rafforzano il percorso di etnicizzazione (Petrillo, 2011) e di costruzione sociale di una certa identità napoletana, quella del crimine e della devianza, assolutamente funzionale all'attuale processo di smobilitazione del Welfare, poiché agisce secondo le retoriche del principio di responsabilità individuale (Rose, 2006).

Queste sono aree della città in cui più che altrove è stato prodotto, proprio in nome e per conto di progetti di inserimento e/o reinserimento sociale, una cospicua fetta di precariato. Un esempio: 20 milioni di euro è costato il progetto Bros, acronimo di "Budget per il reinserimento occupazionale e sociale". Il progetto ha formato migliaia di persone, per lo più provenienti dalla Municipalità 3, specializzate nella raccolta differenziata, nella bonifiche e nella riqualificazione del territorio, ma queste persone dopo la formazione non hanno trovato un lavoro, nonostante le cicliche emergenze rifiuti che vive Napoli e la Campania (Petrillo, 2009). Inoltre, in tali spazi di città le politiche di inserimento lavorativo hanno prodotto una percentuale elevatissima di operatori sociali, attraverso lunghi percorsi di formazione professionale; anche essi attualmente compongono una corposa fetta del precariato intellettuale prodotta in nome dell'assistenza e destinata a lavorare solo con contratti a progetto. Da un'analisi dei Piani di Zona e un esame delle tipologie di progetti finanziati e implementati in queste aree è stato possibile rilevare che la maggior parte delle cooperative e delle associazioni che operano in tali aree della città svolge attività volontaristiche di tipo culturale, sportivo e ricreativo per bambini e adolescenti e, in minima parte, attività di assistenza socio-sanitaria e di protezione civile. Ne segue la funzionale assenza di politiche sociali finalizzate a dare concrete risposte alla precarietà economica e sociale delle popolazioni che abitano tali spazi di città.

Del resto - cavalcando il desiderio di riscatto sociale e di accesso al capitale culturale di buona parte della popolazione che abita questi luoghi e che vede nel percorso universitario e formativo dei figli la possibilità di superare i confini del margine sociale - le politiche sociali implementano interventi che producono *working poor* (Peña Casas, Latta, 2004) e, senza

¹⁶ Si tenga conto che la maggior parte dei progetti implementati è finanziata con fondi europei e pertanto la natura della progettazione è condizionata dagli obiettivi previsti a livello comunitario.

dubbio, guidano questi spazi di città verso la modernità, che è innegabilmente anche flessibilità, precarietà e instabilità. In merito al corposo numero di operatori sociali presenti nella Municipalità 3 di Napoli, si consideri che un'elevata percentuale di professionisti della cura rientra nella categoria dei *working poor*, poiché questi sono molto esposti allo *stop and go* contrattuale (Filandri, Struffolino, 2013).

Pertanto, l'arretratezza di queste aree napoletane non è insita nelle popolazioni, ma negli interventi di governo del territorio, che operano con una struttura di Welfare *démodé*, ancora connessa alla legalità e alla sicurezza e totalmente incapace di risposte ai bisogni reali della popolazione.

Dal altro canto è ben noto che i processi di disgregazione del tessuto territoriale siano funzionali all'accumulo di ricchezza socialmente prodotta nelle aree geografiche scelte come centro dell'economia nazionale e globale; meno evidente è che tale disgregazione, attraversando spazi di città ai margini, investe e travolge le biografie di uomini e donne. È stato così per Carlo, che vive al rione Sanità e ha 36 anni. Il suo racconto pare essere il più degno epilogo di quanto sin qui scritto:

Sono stato molte volte in carcere perché tossico. La mia è una famiglia disastrosa, 11 figli di cui 8 tossici nonostante mia mamma e mio padre abbiano sempre lavorato e sono brave persone. Ho fatto la comunità e poi ho completato gli studi e finalmente ho cominciato a lavorare in una cooperativa come operatore sociale con funzione di cuoco. Ricordo che mi sono sentito finalmente normale il mio primo giorno di lavoro. Solo che ora non ci stanno pagando e sembra che con un lavoro ma senza soldi sono di nuovo uno diverso (Intervista a Carlo, 36 anni, operatore sociale, Napoli, 5 giugno 2014).

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*RESILIENZA COME ESITO STABILE O PROCESSO DI
TERRITORIALIZZAZIONE? UNO STUDIO DI CASO IN SERBIA*

di *Elena Battaglini* *

Introduzione

A partire da un approccio socio-territoriale, questo contributo propone un'analisi di esperienze di innovazione locale, interrogandosi sulle criticità di alcune categorie analitiche utilizzate dagli studi regionali (*regional studies*), come “sviluppo sostenibile” e “resilienza”. L'osservazione empirica di un contesto spazio-temporale determinato e delle peculiarità culturali e antropiche di una comunità locale è qui supportata, infatti, da una rielaborazione della definizione argomentata da Turco (1988) del concetto di “territorializzazione”, ossia del processo attraverso cui le comunità percepiscono la specifica natura del luogo in cui si insediano, attribuiscono simboli alle risorse e alle caratteristiche locali, reificano, strutturano e organizzano lo spazio. Il processo descritto attraverso il concetto di territorializzazione è di tipo coevolutivo (Norgaard, 1994) e si costituisce come un rapporto dialogico in cui le configurazioni sociali e le conformazioni dell'ambiente detengono pari potere di *agency* (Battaglini, 2014; Dessein, Battaglini, Horlings, 2016). In questa prospettiva, che oltrepassa la dicotomia antropocentrica nel rapporto uomo-natura, entità sociali e ambientali vengono osservate come un aggregato in cui interagiscono elementi eterogenei, che si relazionano, concorrendo a preservare, rimuovere cognitivamente, o distruggere, gli equilibri del sistema ecologico in costante evoluzione. La complessità che connota le interconnessioni fra le dinamiche di tipo ambientale e quelle di tipo sociale, rende perciò sempre più incerte alcune coordinate analitiche imponendo la riformulazione di metafore e di categorie concettuali.

L'obiettivo di questo saggio è quindi duplice:

- da un lato presentare uno studio di caso, articolato nell'osservazione di due pratiche di produzione agricola rilevate da un gruppo di ri-

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cerca italo-serbo nel villaggio di Sirogojno, situato a 230 km da Belgrado in un'area montana con alte potenzialità turistiche, oltre che agricole, della regione Zlatibor, nella Serbia occidentale ai confini con Bosnia e Montenegro;

- dall'altro applicare al materiale di ricerca dispositivi concettuali e teorici *non-mainstreaming* dal punto di vista disciplinare, testandone la possibile efficacia nell'interpretazione della concreta relazione tra fatti sociali e aspetti ambientali.

L'intervento è così strutturato: nel paragrafo 1 sono esplicitati i concetti operativi che sottendono l'impianto complessivo nella formulazione delle domande di ricerca che hanno guidato il disegno progettuale dello studio di caso. Nel paragrafo 2 vengono problematizzati alcuni concetti chiave nel dibattito attuale dei *regional studies*, quali "sviluppo sostenibile" "resilienza" per arrivare a illustrare la metodologia e le procedure utilizzate. Nel paragrafo 3 ci si sofferma sul concetto di "territorializzazione", assunto quale sfondo teorico di riferimento nello sviluppo delle ipotesi di ricerca. Il paragrafo 4 riporta i risultati della ricerca. Seguono alcune riflessioni conclusive.

1. Le domande di ricerca

La ricerca si è posta l'obiettivo generale di analizzare percorsi di sviluppo locale in relazione a pressioni e limiti di tipo endogeno o esogeno. Assunto principale dell'analisi è che l'adozione, da parte di una comunità locale, di un modello di sviluppo si correli al radicamento territoriale e, quindi, ai significati e ai valori attribuiti dalla stessa comunità alle risorse accessibili. Questa prospettiva analitica richiede innanzitutto alcune precisazioni di ordine lessicale e concettuale al fine di chiarire la progressione del progetto di ricerca ed esplicitare l'attrezzatura teorica messa in campo e implementata nello studio di caso qui presentato.

Un concetto chiave intorno al quale è rivolta l'attenzione dei *regional studies* è quello di *milieu* (Aydalot, 1986; Aydalot, Keeble, 1988). "Quel qualcosa nell'aria" (Marshall, 1890) che può essere interpretato come l'atmosfera locale che spiega e interpreta le reti di cooperazione - le *untraded interdependencies* (Storper, 1995; 1997) - e che si esprime in specifiche forme di diffusione di conoscenze, di organizzazione della produzione e di regolazione sociale. Prossimità geografica e prossimità socio-culturale vengono quindi studiate in riferimento alle forme di interazione e sinergia fra gli attori socio-economici locali che, in molti casi, orientano positivamente lo sviluppo e l'organizzazione locale. Alla luce della letteratura sullo svi-

luppo locale, anche in questo contributo, si è assegnato un ruolo cruciale al concetto di *milieu*, quale sistema di relazioni, conoscenze, fiducia che costituisce la lente interpretativa e trasformativa del patrimonio territoriale. In base all'ipotesi che le dinamiche bi-direzionali complesse tra ambiente e società locale siano mediate dal *milieu*, è stato infatti costruito un modello concettuale in grado di catturare le dimensioni delle variabili riferite alla natura dei luoghi, alla percezione e alla attribuzione di qualità e valori alle risorse in relazione con il *milieu* locale. Il concetto è stato perciò operativizzato nelle seguenti dimensioni:

- *la prossimità geografica*, riferita alla posizione geografica, al clima, alle risorse naturali, culturali, economiche, alla qualità della vita, alle strutture economiche;
- *la prossimità socio-culturale*, rapportata, invece, a fattori immateriali, alla cultura, alle conoscenze tacite, alle tradizioni e ai costumi, al capitale sociale, al clima relazionale locale (aperto/chiuso; progressista/conservatore; reattivo/proattivo; inclusivo/esclusivo, e così via) alla qualità della governance, alla fiducia reciproca, e a tutte le regole informali che permettono agli attori di lavorare insieme pur in condizioni di incertezza.

Per analizzare l'*agency* della natura del luogo nello scambio dinamico con la cultura dei suoi abitanti, è stato ritenuto decisivo il concetto di *affordances* (Gibson, 1979). Esso si riferisce alle opportunità d'azione latenti che l'ambiente offre all'attore sociale e, quindi, a quelle particolari caratteristiche di un oggetto naturale che potrebbero attivare in modo automatico azioni adeguate, prima ancora della mediazione percettiva e valoriale della cultura. *Affordance*, riferito a entità naturali, luoghi, oggetti, suggerisce l'idea di un "invito" all'attore sociale, che però si attiva soltanto nella relazione che si viene a instaurare fra uomo e ambiente. Non costituisce una prerogativa dell'ambiente, né dell'utilizzatore, ma è equamente "distribuita".

Altra precisazione riguarda il termine "risorse" con il quale qui è indicato l'insieme del patrimonio territoriale costituito da beni economici, ambientali e sociali nelle forme specifiche in cui la comunità locale le reinterpreta e trasforma a proprio uso e consumo e, in definitiva, a proprio beneficio. Risulta perciò opportuno distinguere, tra "patrimonio dato" e "risorse", ponendo l'accento sui valori che la società locale attribuisce ai singoli beni e che orientano la scelta di usarli, trasformarli o semplicemente conservarli.

Su queste basi, le domande di ordine generale che hanno guidato la ricerca possono essere così formulate:

- come individuare le variabili che orientano una comunità ad attribuire valori e significati al proprio patrimonio e a determinare l'uso, o il non uso, delle risorse locali?
- in che modalità questo processo di iscrizione degli interessi sociali alle risorse naturali configura la propria compatibilità, o meno, con il processo di “sviluppo sostenibile” e “resiliente” di una comunità locale?
- studiare i percorsi di sviluppo territoriale implica necessariamente il ricorso a concetti normativi generali, quali “sostenibilità” e “resilienza”, o sono possibili altri approcci per conoscere e analizzare gli specifici contesti spazio-temporali?
è possibile, cioè, osservare come le innovazioni siano assimilate dalle pratiche quotidiane, dalla *routine* comportamentale, dagli stili di vita e così via?

2. Problematiche dei *regional studies* e strumenti della ricerca

Questi interrogativi ci inducono a problematizzare due importanti attrezzi concettuali con sempre più evidenti tangenze nei *regional studies*, come “resilienza” e “sviluppo sostenibile”. Innanzitutto, la “resilienza”, intesa come la capacità di un aggregato territoriale di adattarsi e auto-organizzarsi di fronte a disturbi esterni (variabilità o disastri naturali, crisi sociali, economiche o politiche), mantenendo un livello di vita soddisfacente. Riferendosi alla letteratura socio-ecologica, la resilienza è indicata come la grandezza di disturbo (*magnitude of disturbance*) che un sistema è in grado di assorbire dopo un cambiamento radicale, ossia la sua capacità di auto-organizzarsi e adattarsi alle circostanze emergenti (Adger 2006: 268-269). Analogamente, parlando di “rural resilience”, Heijman *et al.*, (2007) sostengono che essa può essere descritta dalla “misura” (*how well* nel testo) in cui un'area è in grado di bilanciare simultaneamente il suo ecosistema, nonché le funzioni culturali ed economiche, per far fronte sia a debolezze interne che a minacce esterne, tra cui politiche inefficaci e forme regolative inadeguate.

La questione di come costruire la resilienza delle zone urbane e rurali, anche per far fronte alle sfide del cambiamento climatico e mitigarne gli effetti sta richiamando grande interesse da parte di studiosi e di attori politici. Inoltre, nella letteratura socio-economica in cui si fa strada la linea di pensiero ecologica, la “resilienza” viene considerata strettamente connessa alla “sostenibilità” degli ecosistemi, costituendo una finalità normativa e una componente chiave dello sviluppo sostenibile (Common, 1995; Folke, 2006). Se la resilienza è la capacità di un sistema ecologico e sociale di adattarsi alle pressioni esterne, pur mantenendo le sue funzioni e la sua

identità, lo sviluppo sostenibile è la capacità di questo sistema di intraprendere percorsi duraturi di sviluppo socio-culturale, economico e ambientale (Folke *et al.*, 2002 ; Walker *et al.*, 2004). In che modo può essere intesa questa apposizione/sovrapposizione fra resilienza e sostenibilità?

Il termine resilienza ha un significato trasversale e conosce infinite applicazioni. Esso, infatti, è diventato un «pervasive idiom of global governance», dal momento che concettualmente è «abstract and malleable enough to encompass the worlds of high finance, defence and urban infrastructure» (Walker, Cooper, 2011: 144). Altrettanto può essere sostenuto, rispetto a un altro concetto fondamentale nella politica ambientale - quello di “sviluppo sostenibile”, introdotto nel 1987 dalla Commissione Brundtland (WCED, 1987) - comunemente adottato nell’accezione di necessità di preservare la qualità delle risorse naturali per le generazioni presenti e future. Tuttavia, per alcuni autori, il concetto è ormai così generalista da risultare svuotato di significato (Marshall, Toffel, 2005; Baker, 2006). Già nel 1990, l’economista Pearce (Pearce *et al.*, 1990) osservava, a questo proposito, che è difficile non essere d’accordo con gli assunti di base dello sviluppo sostenibile perché, come “la mamma e la torta di mele”, costituiscono temi su cui tutti dovremmo convenire.

In termini di sostenibilità, un «resilient social-ecological system in a “desirable” state has a greater capacity to continue providing us with the goods and services that support our quality of life while being subjected to a variety of shocks» (Walker, Salt, 2006: 32). In questo senso, il concetto di resilienza è inevitabilmente normativo (Keessen *et al.*, 2013; Duit *et al.*, 2010), così come lo è il concetto di sviluppo sostenibile.

Non esiste, infatti, una modalità diretta di applicazione della sostenibilità o della resilienza nei processi di sviluppo locale: tali strategie richiedono scelte normative in riferimento alla distribuzione di responsabilità pubbliche e private per il conseguimento degli specifici obiettivi di sviluppo, di adattamento o di mitigazione degli effetti del cambiamento climatico e implicano la ricerca di un aggiustamento tra interessi individuali e generali che si configura a partire da precise configurazioni spazio-temporali. In questo senso, sono le società locali a decidere cosa sia una “buona” o “cattiva” resilienza o sostenibilità (Pisano, 2012), in parallelo con l’integrazione istituzionale degli assetti che ne regolano l’implementazione.

Assunta tale valenza normativa, tanto per la resilienza quanto per la sostenibilità, si pone quindi il problema di come misurarle, di come osservarne gli esiti. I tentativi riusciti di misurazione della resilienza sono quelli in cui l’analisi si riferisce a dinamiche di sviluppo contestualizzabili in una precisa scala temporale e spaziale (Walker, Salt, 2006). Resilienza e sostenibilità hanno, infatti, come comune denominatore le forme specifiche in cui la

comunità locale “reinterpreta e trasforma” (Battaglini, 2005) il proprio patrimonio locale, le proprie condizioni di sviluppo nel tempo.

In questo senso, tra gli studiosi è condivisa l’idea di considerare la resilienza come processo, piuttosto che un esito stabile (Brown, Kulig, 1996; Peterson *et al.*, 1998; Pelling, 2003) e viene in generale utilizzata sia per indagare la relazione co-evolutiva tra gli esseri umani - individui, gruppi o società - che la natura, sia per descrivere l’abilità di comunità, istituzioni e assetto economico di resistere a *shock* esterni nelle modalità con cui queste si riprendono da tali perturbazioni (Tinnerman, 1981; Folke, 2006). L’essenza del concetto di resilienza in termini processuali è quindi proprio l’accettazione del cambiamento: resistergli o ignorarlo aumenta infatti la vulnerabilità di un sistema socio-ecologico (Walker, Salt, 2006). Queste precisazioni rispetto alle valenze processuali e relazionali della resilienza offrono la possibilità di procedere a una riflessione *critica* sull’innovazione e sullo sviluppo territoriale a supporto degli interrogativi specifici che hanno sostenuto la ricerca, ossia:

- come viene costruito socialmente un percorso di sviluppo?
- quando e in quali modalità lo sviluppo può essere definito “sostenibile” e “resiliente”?
- qual è il ruolo specifico della natura e del patrimonio naturale del luogo?
- quali caratteristiche naturali/ambientali sono classificabili come *affordances* e, perciò, percepite dalle comunità come prerogative del patrimonio locale?
- quali valori, norme e significati sottendono a questa attribuzione di qualità?
- in che modo il *milieu* locale condiziona questi processi?

A fronte degli assunti, delle domande-guida e delle risorse a disposizione, è stato quindi costruito il disegno d’indagine.

Innanzitutto l’individuazione dell’area locale oggetto di studio nel villaggio montano di Sirogojno, nella regione Zlatibor della Serbia occidentale. Zlatibor costituisce una delle zone serbe di maggiore afflusso turistico e centro di produzione della Zlatibora Company Ltd., azienda agroindustriale di grande successo commerciale, che lega la sua identità di impresa e i suoi prodotti al territorio. La Serbia ha costituito per questa ricerca un laboratorio a cielo aperto per almeno due ragioni: si tratta infatti di un Paese in fase di riterritorializzazione dopo gli effetti della decostruzione della Jugoslavia e dei due conflitti degli anni Novanta; è, inoltre, un Paese che, specie nelle aree rurali, per storia e tradizione culturale ha sviluppato traiettorie e politiche locali di tipo endogeno.

La selezione della regione montana di Zlatibor poteva quindi consentire, da una parte, di indagare comunità che avevano subito processi di deterritorializzazione e, dopo i conflitti, erano indirizzate a riterritorializzare l'area di appartenenza; dall'altra, di analizzare le variabili che determinano la direzione e l'orientamento di questi processi nel contesto della transizione post-socialista.

Per tentare di rispondere alle domande di ricerca, è stata adottata la tecnica dello studio di caso (Yin, 1984) che per la sua struttura formale, permette di utilizzare più tecniche di ricerca all'interno dello stesso strumento. La costruzione del disegno di ricerca e il suo sviluppo sul campo sono stati condotti da un gruppo italo-serbo composto da un sociologo del territorio, un sociologo dell'economia, un economista rurale e due antropologi.

Sono quindi stati accostati e triangolati materiali e tecniche di ricerca sia *desk* che *field* articolate in più fasi.

- 1) Fasi *desk*: studio dei dati ecologici a livello territoriale e analisi documentale della stampa locale e nazionale al fine di analizzare descrittivamente:
 - il patrimonio geografico e fisico, i beni economici, ambientali, culturali e il capitale sociale (risorse umane, sociali, istituzionali);
 - le modalità e il livello di utilizzo del capitale territoriale economico, ambientale e culturale.
- 2) Fasi *field*:
 - 20 storie di vita condotte con esponenti della comunità locale, appartenenti a tre generazioni che hanno vissuto i fenomeni di deterritorializzazione e riterritorializzazione dopo le guerre degli anni Novanta;
 - osservazione partecipante a due pratiche agricole e di trasformazione (raccolta dei lamponi, come pratica esogena, la produzione lattiero-casearia come pratica legata alle tradizioni e conoscenze locali (pratica endogena) per studiare le relazioni dinamiche tra la conformazione naturale di luoghi e prodotti e la cultura degli attori;
 - tecniche visuali per analizzare le *affordances*, quali componenti del patrimonio locale riconosciute come risorse del *milieu* territoriale.

3. Frame teorico della ricerca: sviluppo o territorializzazione?

Da tempo, il dibattito scientifico internazionale nei *regional studies* ha posto l'accento sulla rilevanza della dimensione territoriale (*place-based*) nei processi di sviluppo. L'approccio endogeno allo sviluppo ha informato diversi statuti disciplinari e scientifici (si veda, a riguardo, Stimson, Stough, Njikamp, 2011) e ha sfidato i paradigmi della crescita che, come nel model-

lo di Solow (1956), espungono le variabili relative alle risorse (considerate come “costanti”) e allo spazio.

Il dibattito intercorso sul binomio sviluppo/crescita ha condotto, nel corso degli anni, a valorizzare il ruolo della prossimità e i conseguenti vantaggi, come l’accessibilità delle informazioni grazie a contatti informali o casuali (*rumsors* finanziari o commerciali) e la cooperazione in senso stretto, derivante dal coordinamento e dal controllo reciproco fra unità produttive, dall’abitudine a contatti ripetuti, dalla fiducia o dal comune senso di appartenenza a una comunità - di affari o in senso ampio - che condivide atteggiamenti e valori.

La prossimità determina, infatti, vantaggi relativi alla produzione di lavoro qualificato, favorisce l’imitazione e la diffusione di modelli organizzativi o di *routine* gestionali, incoraggia l’individuazione di strategie commerciali comuni di promozione e *marketing* e stimola le innovazioni tecnologiche e organizzative. Fattori, questi, che contribuiscono anche alla riduzione dei costi di produzione e di transazione oltre alle sinergie tra attori e alla costruzione di un’immagine locale unitaria.

Nel ricercare i fattori della competitività locale, l’accento è stato progressivamente rivolto alla *learning economy* (Lundvall, Johnson, 1994) dei fattori immateriali e dell’apprendimento collettivo, al capitale relazionale e alla cultura locale.

Ambiente e società, in interazione dinamica, sono protagonisti di un processo che si configura nel tempo, condizionando il rapporto tra comunità insediante e terra insediata, con posizione, risorse e clima specifici. Entrambi agiscono e orientano la qualità e la direzione di uno sviluppo territoriale inteso sostanzialmente come processo di territorializzazione, attraverso il quale uno *spazio* diventa *luogo*, successivamente *posto in cui vivere* e, quindi, *territorio*.

Dallo spazio al luogo: le possibilità di insediamento di una comunità in un’area sono strettamente legate alla conformazione pedologica, idrografica, morfologica, vegetazionale, alla posizione, al clima dell’area stessa, quindi, alla accessibilità del patrimonio disponibile. Prima che essere costruita socialmente, la natura di questo “patrimonio dato” si apre allo sguardo e agli altri sensi degli osservatori che ne percepiscono, in *primis*, la materialità e la fisicità. È in questo senso che anche lo spazio fisico - nella sua configurazione morfologica, climatica, etc. - presenta una *agency* vera e propria, che concorre a orientare le comunità insediate. Solo successivamente il patrimonio naturalistico si dischiude a un’attribuzione di significati e simboli che ne determina le modalità di utilizzo. Le caratteristiche materiali e fisiche del patrimonio locale costituiscono i significanti, a cui la comunità ascrive, in questa prima fase, dei simboli, e la *simbolizzazione* dei significanti naturali indirizza il processo di radicamento territoriale di una

comunità (Turco, 1988). In questo senso, il processo di simbolizzazione costituisce lo stampo entro il quale si modellano e a cui si adattano i comportamenti individuali e collettivi, e che dà avvio al processo di identificazione e appropriazione dello spazio. Per chi scrive, questa costituisce una fase cruciale perché la natura del luogo e il suo ruolo quale forza indipendente e generativa sia riconosciuto. L'*agency* dell'ambiente naturale si esprime, infatti, in termini di *affordances* e si relaziona con le capacità sociali di coglierne il significato in termini di valori e simboli (Battaglini, Babović, 2016). In questo senso, il ruolo della cultura è funzionale all'individuazione delle specifiche modalità con cui la natura del luogo e il suo patrimonio vengono percepiti e, poi, conosciuti e agiti.

Dal luogo al posto in cui vivere: questo passaggio avviene quando il luogo - e i suoi segni naturali - si struttura attraverso l'occupazione, l'uso del suolo e la trasformazione degli spazi. Il patrimonio naturale percepito e simbolizzato nella prima fase del processo si arricchisce dell'attribuzione di significati e valori divenendo risorsa. I valori che sono attribuiti dalla comunità insediante, come l'economia ambientale insegna, non sono solo di scambio o di uso ma anche di non uso.

In sostanza, lo spazio attraverso il processo di simbolizzazione e, successivamente, di *reificazione* diventa *luogo elettivo*, luogo in cui si è scelto di vivere e di cui sperimentare l'appartenenza. Ed è questo passaggio che concretizza il modo in cui le comunità locali, interpretando le caratteristiche di un contesto fisico, le stesse che partecipano alla definizione di tratti della loro identità, producono azioni di trasformazione in un nesso bidirezionale, più o meno solidale - ma radicato - fra soggetti e spazio. In questo processo di radicamento spaziale è la cultura, attraverso specifiche pratiche, a mediare nella costruzione di un rapporto tra comunità e natura.

Da posto in cui vivere a territorio: il processo di strutturazione di un luogo conduce all'esigenza di difenderlo fissandone i confini, "organizzarlo" attraverso segni e regole, stabilire criteri per lo sviluppo in modo da assicurare alla generazione insediata vantaggi e benefici. È attraverso questo processo che una comunità locale, in relazione al patrimonio, ai significati e ai valori ascritti alle risorse, attribuisce al territorio un insieme di significati cognitivi e normativi: procedure e gerarchie che marcano il territorio tanto da diventare segni identitari della comunità insediata. In questo processo di definizione di funzioni e regole, è la cultura di una data comunità a definire i quadri cognitivi che presidono le politiche (Battaglini, 2014).

In questo senso, è il processo di territorializzazione di una comunità, in una specifica area geografica, a dar conto della sostenibilità del suo sviluppo, della presenza di competenze e risorse comunitarie che permettano o meno la

resilienza del sistema locale a disturbi e stress ambientali, politici o sociali. Le tre fasi o dimensioni (*layers*) del processo di territorializzazione (*simbo-lizzazione, reificazione e organizzazione*) permettono infatti di studiare la caratterizzazione del patrimonio naturale di un luogo, le modalità con cui fattori ecologici e fattori antropici hanno interagito affinché le comunità assegnasse-ro al patrimonio locale un significato prima, valori e regole d'uso poi. Così come l'esigenza di far proprio quel territorio ne ha plasmato le sorti, attraverso l'organizzazione e la regolazione degli spazi antropizzati o naturali.

La suddivisione in diversi stadi o fasi del processo per cui uno spazio diventa territorio ha una valenza puramente analitica, serve cioè a definire categorie o riferimenti idealtipici per l'analisi di casi concreti. Essa, quindi, non implica che la territorializzazione debba essere pensata in termini stret-tamente sequenziali, ovvero come una successione ordinata e lineare di fa-si, rigidamente distinte le une dalle altre.

In sostanza, il processo di territorializzazione è un concetto che allude alla natura dinamica del processo di percezione, insediamento e organizza-zione degli spazi, ed è quindi cruciale per chi vuole studiarne gli esiti in termini di conservazione, innovazione e sviluppo. In questo senso, qui si propone una concettualizzazione di territorio da non intendersi, come vor-rebbe il *mainstream* disciplinare, quale sub-categoria di spazio ma come concetto relazionale e processuale, strumento analitico principe per studiar-ne i processi di trasformazione (Mubi Brighenti, 2010).

4. Percorsi di sviluppo a Sirogojno. Due pratiche agricole a confronto

Quanto illustrato nei paragrafi precedenti, supporta l'ipotesi che rapportare alla complessa dinamica della territorializzazione le questioni inerenti l'innovazione e lo sviluppo, possa conferire all'interpretazione dei processi socio-territoriali una maggiore consistenza. Sulla base dei risultati della ricerca apparirà chiaro come, ad esempio, il processo di selezione di una coltura sia influenzato dall'interazione di diverse variabili: le *affordan-ces* delle risorse locali (caratteristiche dei prodotti, della terra di coltura e del clima); i fattori economici (in relazione al mercato, ai sussidi e alle strategie di sostegno); i fattori culturali, ossia i valori d'uso e non uso e i valori di tipo "affettivo", "cognitivo" e "selettivo" (Sciolla, 2012) attribuiti alle risorse accessibili e alle pratiche di coproduzione ad esse correlate. Si tratta di variabili attraverso cui è possibile individuare i fattori che influenzano i processi di selezione di alcuni prodotti e non di altri; spiegare le ragioni che portano una strategia di produzione a introdurre alcune colture e

non altre; chiarire le modalità secondo cui tali strategie interagiscono, con la resilienza di una comunità locale, alle pressioni interne ed esterne.

4.1 La produzione di lamponi

I lamponi sono un esempio di produzione esogena, orientata al mercato, che ha attecchito nell'ambito locale d'indagine. Anche se i frutti di bosco costituivano un prodotto tradizionalmente legato alla dieta e al commercio locale, la coltivazione dei lamponi è una pratica agricola relativamente nuova, introdotta negli anni Novanta, che ha reso famosa la regione di Zlatibor.

Il fattore economico più importante è l'accessibilità al mercato attraverso la presenza di un'importante impresa locale di trasformazione, nata a seguito della privatizzazione di una cooperativa che, dopo lo smantellamento dello stato socialista, si è orientata verso la trasformazione e il congelamento di lamponi e di frutti di bosco. Questa azienda a conduzione familiare è diventata, nel tempo, uno dei principali esportatori di lamponi congelati della intera Serbia, stimolando i produttori locali a introdurre, e progressivamente aumentare, la coltivazione di lamponi in vista di benefici economici immediati. Le persone intervistate percepiscono la società come un acquirente equo e affidabile che paga nei tempi pattuiti, distribuisce gli incentivi che lo stato serbo fornisce e i fertilizzanti più economici per i produttori.

Tuttavia, un'analisi più approfondita rivela l'importanza dell'interazione tra le *affordances* del lampone e la cultura che orienta la loro coltivazione attraverso i simboli, i valori e le cognizioni, attribuiti dagli agricoltori intervistati a questa tipologia di produzione.

L'ambiente naturale locale svolge un ruolo importante nello sviluppo della coltivazione dei lamponi. Innanzitutto, la morfologia del terreno permette facilmente l'impianto di questa coltura: i pendii scoscesi che caratterizzano il paesaggio locale consentono un buon drenaggio durante le diverse stagioni. Tale conformazione territoriale si è rivelata particolarmente adeguata durante gli eventi estremi avvenuti nel corso della primavera e dell'estate del 2014. Nonostante gli sforzi supplementari necessari a coltivare il terreno collinare e montano che caratterizza l'area locale, gli intervistati hanno descritto la convenienza dell'impianto di filari di lamponi su tale trama paesistica proprio al fine di ottimizzare e valorizzare le caratteristiche del luogo. In secondo luogo, il cambiamento climatico, che in quest'area alterna stagioni di siccità ad alluvioni, nevicate impreviste in maggio e inverni miti, rappresenta una seria sfida per i produttori locali. Le strategie adottate per farvi fronte includono la scelta di specifiche varietà di lampo-

ne, l'introduzione della meccanizzazione e il ricorso a sistemi assicurativi. Al fine di ridurre i rischi ambientali, alcuni degli intervistati ritengono utile impiantare differenti tipologie di lamponi che siano resistenti alle diverse condizioni climatiche. Altri invece preferiscono piantare varietà che hanno già mostrato segni di adattamento all'ambiente locale. In terzo luogo, la struttura fondiaria locale, basata, su ridotte porzioni di suolo, consente buone rendite nella produzione di lamponi.

Attraverso questo tipo di coltivazione sono, poi, veicolati valori relativi allo status socio-economico e alla prosperità della piccola impresa familiare nonché valori di tipo estetico, attribuiti alle caratteristiche della pianta di lampone. Per la quasi totalità degli intervistati un campo di lamponi è infatti un luogo di bellezza a beneficio del paesaggio dell'area agricola aziendale e dell'intero territorio.

I rispondenti più anziani ritengono che le rendite ottenute da questa coltura possano motivare le giovani generazioni a continuare la tradizione familiare agricola. Effettivamente, il miglioramento delle condizioni di vita e le opportunità economiche derivanti dalla produzione di lamponi, unitamente alle difficoltà vissute dalle aree urbane serbe durante gli ultimi anni di crisi economica e occupazionale hanno contribuito al fatto che i giovani membri delle famiglie degli intervistati non si siano spostati altrove. Alcuni hanno trovato fonti integrative di reddito nelle città vicine pur continuando a vivere nel paese di provenienza e a partecipare alla produzione agricola aziendale. La loro decisione di proseguire l'attività agricola familiare è ritenuta di significativa importanza per la sostenibilità della produzione di lamponi, in quanto attività ad alta intensità di lavoro.

4.2 La produzione lattiero-casearia

A differenza del caso precedente, la selezione della produzione lattiero-casearia di Sirogojno, che costituisce l'attività prevalente delle piccole imprese analizzate, è legata a fattori endogeni. Tradizionalmente, nell'area indagata, i prodotti lattiero-caseari sono strettamente connessi alle conoscenze locali, alla dieta e alle percezioni di salubrità legate a questi prodotti. Inoltre, la caratterizzazione ambientale del territorio è favorevole a questo tipo di produzioni: l'abbondanza di prati e pascoli, la qualità dell'aria e del foraggio, fin dagli inizi del Novecento, hanno reso questa regione particolarmente vocata all'allevamento del bestiame e alla produzione di latte e formaggio.

Dal 1990, i processi di transizione verso un'economia di mercato hanno introdotto profonde trasformazioni nella struttura socio-economica locale.

In epoca socialista, la vendita di prodotti caseari era effettuata dalle cooperative locali. La loro successiva chiusura e la nuova regolazione normativa hanno drasticamente trasformato il mercato dei prodotti lattiero-caseari e gli intervistati riferiscono di essere stati costretti a trovare nuove soluzioni per mantenere le loro abitudini alimentari e per fornire un reddito stabile alle proprie aziende.

Posto che si tratta di piccoli allevamenti (fino a sei mucche), è stato difficile trovare nuovi acquirenti che fossero interessati a raccogliere il latte dalle singole aziende. A fronte di questo problema, i produttori hanno iniziato a conferire il latte ad un'azienda di trasformazione della zona organizzandone personalmente il trasporto. Strutturando dei turni, ogni mattina, un singolo produttore era incaricato di raccogliere il latte dalle diverse fattorie e di consegnarlo all'impresa.

Alla fine del 2005, un nuovo rivenditore si è introdotto nell'area, offrendo la fornitura di un serbatoio per il raffreddamento del latte. Accettando prontamente quest'opportunità, i piccoli imprenditori locali hanno quindi riorganizzato la catena di produzione. Il serbatoio è stato collocato nell'impresa locale più grande; ubicato in una posizione favorevole, si è reso accessibile durante tutto l'arco dell'anno, 24 ore su 24. Inoltre, dal momento che a livello nazionale sono stati introdotti incentivi per i produttori in grado di vendere almeno 40 litri di latte al giorno, il gruppo di produttori intervistati ha deciso di organizzare la filiera in modo che uno solo di essi (l'"imprenditore-chiave") vendesse ufficialmente il latte e l'intero gruppo potesse ottenere e condividere i bonus.

Negli ultimi dieci anni, questa modalità di cooperazione informale è stata regolata in maniera partecipativa: il serbatoio di raffreddamento del latte, costantemente accessibile, è posizionato nell'impresa-chiave; ogni componente del gruppo trasporta il proprio latte collocandolo nel serbatoio e registrando la quantità conferita in un registro. Ogni mattina, un rappresentante dell'azienda lattiero-casearia di trasformazione viene a raccogliere il latte e ne controlla la qualità. I pagamenti vengono effettuati due volte al mese, mentre le quote-latte hanno una cadenza più irregolare. L'imprenditore-chiave raccoglie e distribuisce reddito e bonus agli altri componenti della rete di produttori, proporzionalmente al loro contributo, e fornisce il mangime per il bestiame in virtù di altre forme di sovvenzione statale per i produttori di più di 40 litri di latte giornalieri.

L'efficacia di questa esperienza non si riferisce solo agli aspetti economici descritti, ma anche alla flessibilità organizzativa nel conferimento del latte. L'accessibilità del serbatoio di raffreddamento e il tipo di approccio *self-service* forniscono la cornice più adatta per l'attività delle piccole im-

prese del territorio. Se generalmente altri rivenditori di latte della regione richiedono la consegna del latte durante determinate ore, i piccoli produttori di questa cooperativa informale possono godere di maggiore flessibilità e di margini di discrezionalità.

Per comprendere la genesi del caso descritto, è importante considerare due fattori importanti: le *affordances* della morfologia del territorio indagato e il clima relazionale segnato dai legami socio-territoriali della comunità. Sirogojno è un paese ubicato in un'area montana. La piccola comunità di imprenditori intervistati vive in una parte del paese che è fisicamente separata dall'area centrale e dalle altre frazioni più vicine al centro. Le loro aree aziendali presentano, rispetto alle altre, problemi di accessibilità specie durante la stagione invernale, a causa di strade strette e impervie. La caratterizzazione morfologica dell'area descritta si può affermare faccia "presa" (in senso di *affordance*) sugli agricoltori di questa comunità nell'attivare relazioni solidali e cooperative attraverso le modalità organizzative descritte. In secondo luogo, i legami socio-territoriali tra gli intervistati sono densi e caratterizzati da fiducia, reciprocità e buon vicinato. Di conseguenza, la cooperazione tra attori si è potuta stabilire anche in un contesto socio-istituzionale in cui il capitale sociale preesistente alla dissoluzione dello stato jugoslavo, alla guerra e alle nuove e repentine forme di regolazione economica verso un'economia di mercato era stato a messo a dura prova.

Anche se i vantaggi più visibili di questa cooperativa informale sono di tipo economico, il conferimento regolare di latte è altresì l'occasione per lo scambio e la condivisione di informazioni e conoscenze relative alle pratiche di allevamento, in un contesto istituzionale in cui le organizzazioni di meso-livello per l'istruzione e la formazione delle tecniche di coltura e allevamento sono ubicate in centri urbani lontani da Sirogojno. Le modalità organizzative della rete informale di agricoltori locali sono inoltre cruciali per l'approfondimento e l'ispessimento delle relazioni comunitarie locali. L'esperienza descritta rafforza dunque ulteriormente l'appartenenza socio-territoriale all'interno della comunità, aumentando la fiducia, la solidarietà e la cooperazione tra gli attori locali. Tutti gli intervistati esprimono con consapevolezza i benefici che questa collaborazione implica e consensualmente ritengono che le modalità organizzative della cooperativa informale e la sua efficienza economica siano state possibili grazie ai legami territoriali, alle rappresentazioni, ai valori e alle conoscenze condivise attribuite alle risorse locali attraverso la solidarietà e il senso di reciprocità presente a livello comunitario.

In questo modo, la cooperativa informale rappresenta una buona pratica socio-istituzionale: nata in risposta alle sfide poste dalla transizione socio-economica serba verso un'economia di mercato, essa ha consentito alle sin-

gole aziende e alle famiglie di essere resilienti alle dinamiche in atto e ha contribuito anche alla riterritorializzazione della comunità permettendo il mantenimento e la valorizzazione delle attività tradizionali legate alla produzione lattiero-casearia, la cui esistenza era stata messa a dura prova dalle nuove forme di regolazione economica. La rete informale tra imprese permette, infine, la sostenibilità aziendale e la costruzione di nuove forme di capitale sociale che può essere investito nel medio-lungo periodo in nuovi percorsi di sviluppo a beneficio dell'intero territorio.

Riflessioni conclusive

I problemi nella definizione di “territorio” nel campo delle scienze sociali derivano dalla difficoltà a «conceptualizing the interplay between physical space and the organisation of relations and functions that come along with it,[which] is in the first place an epistemological difficulty» (Mubi Brighenti, 2010: 59). Questa difficoltà riguarda essenzialmente il *black box* del dualismo di natura/cultura.

In questa prospettiva, il contributo aveva due principali obiettivi d'analisi: in primo luogo, confrontando due pratiche agricole (una di tipo esogeno e l'altra di tipo endogeno), sono state messe in relazione le traiettorie di sviluppo della comunità di Sirogojno con la caratterizzazione ambientale, sociale ed economica delle risorse locali accessibili. Si è cercato di argomentare come ciò che induce gli attori a selezionare e a implementare pratiche agricole resilienti rispetto alle pressioni del mercato e alle condizioni climatiche e ambientali siano le percezioni, i significati e i valori con cui si interpretano le *affordances* delle risorse locali.

La coltivazione dei lamponi e la produzione lattiero-casearia costituiscono le principali risorse su cui si fa leva per la sostenibilità e la resilienza complessiva delle piccole imprese indagate. Come è stato illustrato, l'accessibilità dei prodotti, le conoscenze tradizionali che questi veicolano, la morfologia e le caratteristiche del terreno agricolo, la qualità dei foraggi e del clima hanno “presa” (nel senso di *affordance*) sulle pratiche descritte nonché sulle forme organizzative intraprese nella produzione, trasporto e vendita dei prodotti. Allo stesso tempo, le forme di radicamento socio-territoriale e i percorsi di sviluppo implementati hanno contrastato fenomeni di spopolamento rurale.

Da questo punto di vista, l'analisi evidenzia come i processi di riterritorializzazione dell'area, a seguito degli esiti dello smantellamento dello stato jugoslavo, delle guerre degli anni Novanta e della transizione economica

post-socialista, siano indirizzati da pratiche agricole che combinano le *affordances* delle risorse locali accessibili e le diverse percezioni e i valori attribuiti a queste nel corso delle fasi di simbolizzazione e reificazione del processo di territorializzazione.

Attraverso i due casi analizzati, lo studio illustra come i valori veicolati - quelli d'uso connessi al mercato, quelli di tipo "affettivo", "cognitivo" e "selettivo" legati allo status-socio economico e all'estetica del paesaggio - inducano gli intervistati a approfondire e a ispessire i legami simbolici e relazionali con il territorio e all'interno della comunità di appartenenza, fornendo altresì nuove opportunità di resilienza in riferimento alle pressioni di fattori esterni. Redditi soddisfacenti, produzioni sostenibili sul piano ambientale, consumo di cibi gustosi e salubri, vita e lavoro in un ambiente sano e bello, sono i fattori chiave per i legami e l'identità territoriale della comunità di Sirogojno.

Il secondo obiettivo, di tipo teorico, del contributo è stato quello di analizzare i percorsi di sviluppo locale tentando di superare la normatività e la logica globalizzante di concetti quali lo sviluppo sostenibile o la resilienza in modo da tenere conto degli specifici contesti spazio-temporali in cui essi si dispiegano. Il concetto di territorializzazione, così come è stato illustrato, può dare concretezza allo studio della resilienza e della sostenibilità di un sistema locale, in quanto mette in evidenza la dimensione spazio-temporale nell'uso e nel consumo delle risorse. Ciò che conta, negli studi sullo sviluppo locale, sono le relazioni che le comunità insediate costruiscono e normalizzano, nel tempo e nei luoghi d'elezione, in riferimento alle risorse e alle specificità locali. La territorializzazione può rivelare l'esistenza o meno del senso di appartenenza e di identificazione della comunità con lo spazio abitato, secondo segni tangibili di riconoscimento o differenza, armonia o distanza rispetto alla conformazione sia morfologica sia organizzativa. Essa può quindi orientarne le sorti anche in termini di equità intragenerazionale e inter-generazionale nell'uso delle risorse. In questa prospettiva, dunque, il processo di territorializzazione esprime l'identità di una comunità sia attraverso i segni paesistici che la trasmissione di regole di comportamento, di conoscenza tacita (Polany, 1966), e di tutte le forme specifiche di organizzazione sociale e comunitaria.

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*CITTÀ E SFIDA AMBIENTALE: PROSPETTIVE E LIMITI
DEL DIBATTITO SULLE POST-CARBON CITIES*

di *Silvia Crivello**

Introduzione

I temi relativi alla transizione energetica verso forme più leggere e a minor impatto ambientale rispetto a quelle finora utilizzate hanno, recentemente, acquisito rilievo all'interno di una moltitudine di dibattiti, accademici e politici (While *et al.*, 2010; Chatterton 2013; While, Whitehead, 2013).

Il presupposto è che l'attuale modello di sviluppo che caratterizza le società "avanzate" risulta insostenibile, tanto da mettere a rischio le basi stesse della vita sul pianeta; le preoccupazioni riguardanti lo stato di salute dell'ambiente in cui viviamo stanno portando verso la logica del cosiddetto "carbon control" (Redclift, 2009; While, 2010), intendendo con tale termine una società che punta a limitare il consumo di energia, a diffondere l'uso di forme di energia più pulita, a ridurre le emissioni di gas-serra, a combattere il cambiamento climatico.

La lotta al cambiamento climatico e la transizione verso forme di utilizzo di fonti energetiche maggiormente compatibili con le ragioni dell'ambiente possono essere naturalmente considerati come elementi di uno sviluppo sostenibile. Il concetto relativamente generico di "sostenibilità" è stato, tuttavia, affiancato da espressioni più specificatamente riferite al problema energetico.

In particolare, nel dibattito scientifico due sono le espressioni che assumono particolare importanza: la prima si riferisce all'idea di una transizione "a basso contenuto di carbonio". In estrema sintesi, l'obiettivo di tale transizione è la promozione - per esempio attraverso innovazioni tecnologiche o strumenti economici di mercato - di strutture e forme di organizzazione sociale ed industriale con un impatto energetico-ambientale minore rispetto a quelle utilizzate finora. Rientrano in questa categoria, per esempio, programmi di promozione di fonti rinnovabili o strumenti come i meccanismi di permessi negoziabili di emissione.

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La seconda espressione, usata prevalentemente nei dibattiti accademici, si riferisce all'idea di una società non solo "low-carbon", ma più marcatamente "post-carbon". In questo caso (e in analogia con altri discorsi delle scienze sociali che si avvalgono del prefisso "post") l'idea è quella di rovesciare totalmente le prospettive del progresso socio-tecnico, interrogandosi su possibili forme di organizzazione delle società radicalmente differenti rispetto a quelle attuali. Rientrano, in quest'ambito, per esempio, il discorso sulla decrescita reso celebre da Latouche (2006), o le critiche sullo sviluppo portate avanti dai teorici del post-sviluppo (Sidaway, 2007). Secondo questi autori il discorso sullo sviluppo sostenibile e sulla transizione low-carbon avrebbe assunto toni e obiettivi estremamente modesti e conservatori: in estrema sintesi, l'obiettivo primario sembrerebbe essere la ricerca di quegli adattamenti minimi al nostro sistema socio-tecnico-economico che permettono di evitare la catastrofe ecologica trasformando il meno possibile i nostri stili di vita e gli attuali equilibri di potere. In questo senso, la ricerca di sostenibilità può essere comparabile ad una sorta di operazione di "modernizzazione ecologica" capace sì di ricercare soluzioni tecniche e gestionali per rendere più efficiente il sistema, ma non di mettere in discussione le razionalità che ne stanno alla base. Differentemente, i critici del post-sviluppo e del "post-carbon" giungono a criticare i presupposti del capitalismo neoliberista, del consumismo, della frattura fra Nord e Sud del mondo.

Nella realtà del confronto politico e della sperimentazione sociale, i confini fra prospettive "low" e "post" sono estremamente incerti, e in questo stesso l'articolo non si insisterà più di tanto sull'ipotetica contrapposizione fra i due orientamenti.

L'articolo è strutturato in quattro parti principali: la prima, di carattere introduttivo, inquadra il problema della transizione energetica all'interno delle strategie delle società contemporanee e riflette sulla necessità stringente di raggiungere forme di società ed economie più impegnate, rispetto a quelle attuali, nella questione ambientale.

Il terzo e il quarto paragrafo si concentrano su due, tra i vari, aspetti del problema: in primo luogo, viene indagata la trasposizione del concetto di transizione energetica alla scala delle città. In secondo luogo, si sottolineerà come la sociologia urbana sia in grado di fornire una prospettiva privilegiata di indagine laddove non considera la transizione energetica come una questione meramente tecnica o economicista (il passaggio verso l'uso di combustibili alternativi o la costruzione di infrastrutture più efficienti, per intenderci), ma radica la transizione all'interno di sistemi socio-tecnici urbani e nella concreta e complessa realtà dello spazio sociale, politico ed economico della città. Verranno analizzati, specificatamente, il rapporto fra sostenibilità, transizione energetica e crisi economica delle città, le princi-

pali epistemologie volte ad interpretare il problema ambientale urbano, il concetto di giustizia energetica in relazione agli scenari della sostenibilità e del cambiamento climatico-energetico.

Alcune note conclusive sottolineeranno come la sociologia urbana, attraverso i propri strumenti concettuali e metodologici, possa aiutare a comprendere il fenomeno della transizione energetica e contribuire alla formulazione di nuovi scenari.

1. Verso la “transizione energetica”

Come anticipato, negli ultimi anni, si è diffusa, sia a livello accademico che non, tutta una serie di nuovi concetti atti a delineare l'esigenza, per le società contemporanee, di una maggiore attenzione nell'utilizzo di energia e nell'emissione di sostanze inquinanti. Tra i vari, termini come per esempio “low-carbon” (Peters *et al.*, 2010; Bulkeley *et al.*, 2011), “post-carbon” (Heinberg, 2004; Evans, 2008), “zero-carbon” (Dunster *et al.*, 2008), “carbon neutral development”, “carbon trading”, “carbon footprints” (Newman *et al.*, 2009), indicano, pur ognuno con diverse sfaccettature, il perseguimento di forme evolutive di economie e società che introducono nella atmosfera quantità di gas serra sensibilmente minori rispetto a quelle emesse dalle società e dalle economie di oggi.

L'Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, una tra le principali organizzazioni internazionali accreditata ad occuparsi del problema, ha calcolato un aumento nell'ultimo secolo della temperatura media della superficie terrestre di 1°C, come diretto effetto dell'aumento di concentrazione dei gas serra derivanti principalmente dall'utilizzo di combustibili fossili e alla deforestazione¹. Il discorso sulla temperatura richiama scenari catastrofici legati alla riduzione dei ghiacciai e al conseguente aumento del livello degli oceani e dei mari, all'espansione dei deserti subtropicali e alle innumerevoli conseguenze tragiche sulla vita umana, per esempio in termini di migrazioni dolorose quantitativamente senza precedenti (Davis, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2013).

Se da un lato è ormai condiviso da tutti come la logica del “carbon control” rivesta, oggi, un'importanza politica imprescindibile (Bulkeley, 2010), dall'altro lato la costruzione di una società attenta al cambiamento climatico non può dirsi certamente un obiettivo semplice da raggiungere; quest'ultima richiede, infatti, trasformazioni di portata ampia capaci di inglobare anche

¹ I report dell'Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicano che nei prossimi decenni le temperature medie della terra saliranno ancora: è stato stimato un aumento da 1,1 a 6,4°C in più rispetto ai valori attuali (Fonte: IPCC, 2013).

campi non specificatamente legati ai soli aspetti ambientali (Beck, 2000; Agustoni, Maretti, 2012). Tali cambiamenti devono riguardare, tra gli altri, i comportamenti, gli usi, le abitudini investendo ambiti che comprendono la cultura, i trasporti, il cibo, la giustizia sociale (Osti, 2012; Chatterton, 2013).

Senza dubbio, per questo tipo di ragionamento, è la città a rappresentare il contesto privilegiato da coinvolgere (Mela, 2006; Davico *et al.*, 2009): la crescente importanza strategica nello spazio urbano nel definire problemi e soluzioni non rappresenta, infatti, certamente una novità nello scenario economico più recente. È dagli anni '80 del secolo scorso che gli spazi urbani risultano essere sottoposti a importanti cambiamenti dovuti, in primo luogo, alle condizioni dettate dalla globalizzazione: le città sono, oggi, sempre più imprenditrici, spostano le proprie risorse dal welfare allo sviluppo economico e competono quotidianamente per riuscire ad attirare e mantenere capitale mobile (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997; Peck, Tickell, 2002). La cosiddetta “nuova politica urbana” come definita da Kevin R. Cox (1993) vede i regimi urbani imprenditoriali spostare le proprie preoccupazioni dal management dei beni pubblici (tra i quali vi è anche l'ambiente) alla competitività economica, con conseguenze, spesso, negative proprio per molti beni pubblici (primo fra tutti proprio l'ambiente). Con il diffondersi della “nuova” “nuova politica urbana” l'agenda energetica si afferma, invece, all'interno delle logiche strategiche delle società locali: oltre alle preoccupazioni legate a visioni apocalittiche di distruzione del pianeta (Swyngedouw, 2013), temi come quelli della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti energetici o il crescente prezzo del petrolio in una situazione di diffusa crisi economica inducono le società locali, almeno quelle del Nord del mondo, a perseguire forme più o meno significative di transizione energetica. Per questa ragione, sembra utile, prima di addentrarci in questa prospettiva, interrogarsi sul ruolo e sull'importanza della scala urbana nel definire il problema climatico-energetico.

2. Transizione energetica e ruolo delle città

Il ruolo dei centri urbani in riferimento al tema della transizione energetica risulta essere fondamentale; sono molti i fattori che stanno alla base di questa affermazione.

Per primo si deve fare riferimento al tasso di urbanizzazione in crescita continua che vede a livello mondiale la “modalità urbana” come il contesto geografico dominante (World Watch Institute, 2007): dal 2007 la maggioranza della popolazione del mondo vive in città e tra il 2009 ed il 2050 la popolazione delle aree urbane salirà dai 3,4 milioni a oltre 6 (United Na-

tions, 2010). Le attività urbane, proprio a causa di una tale concentrazione di popolazione, sono responsabili dell'80% delle emissioni di anidride carbonica prodotta globalmente ogni anno e del 75% dell'energia consumata (UNEP, 2013); le città sono, dunque, i luoghi che maggiormente incidono sull'inquinamento globale.

Per contro, le città sono, potenzialmente, anche le principali vittime del cambiamento climatico, in quanto oggetto di possibili disastri "naturali" come inondazioni, uragani, black-out energetici (Swyngedouw, 2013; Davis, 2010). Non a caso, il dibattito sulla cosiddetta "resilienza urbana" sta conoscendo particolare enfasi: si tratta di analizzare (e promuovere) la capacità delle città di riprendersi e adattarsi davanti a disastri e a massicce pressioni ambientali, economiche, sociali (Vale, Campanella, 2005; Newman *et al.*, 2009; Pike *et al.*, 2010; Simmie, Martin, 2010). Alla base di simili riflessioni, negli studi urbani, si pone il presupposto che i disastri non siano mai interamente "naturali": l'entità della distruzione dipenderà dalle caratteristiche socio-ambientali degli ambienti colpiti. Per esempio, nel caso del celebre disastro "naturale" di New Orleans, è stato più volte evidenziato come, a farne le spese, sia stata soprattutto la popolazione di colore, che viveva in quartieri fatiscenti e che, non possedendo mezzi di trasporto privati, non è riuscita ad allontanarsi in tempo per evitare l'uragano (Peck, 2006; Keil, 2007).

Un ulteriore elemento riguarda la natura strategica delle città come siti per la formulazione di strategie per combattere la riduzione delle risorse: in particolare, grazie alla concentrazione di persone, beni, informazioni, le città divengono i contesti in cui è possibile sperimentare nuove tecnologie relative all'energia, all'acqua, alla mobilità, ecc. (Hodson, Marvin, 2009). Tradizionalmente le città hanno cercato di garantire la loro riproduzione cercando al di fuori di esse le risorse necessarie (città come sistemi non autosufficienti, si vedano su questi temi i discorsi sul metabolismo urbano e sull'impronta ecologica); approcci di questo tipo sono ora messi in discussione dal momento che i centri urbani cercano, oggi, di re-internalizzare e ri-localizzare la dotazione di risorse creando sistemi ad "anelli chiusi" (Hodson, Marvin, 2009).

Sono numerose le organizzazioni e i network di città (come per esempio la rete C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, la Clinton Climate Initiative, il movimento delle Transition Town, le Low carbon cities Bristol, Leeds, Manchester, ecc.) o città singole che puntano attraverso una serie di programmi a rendersi maggiormente autosufficienti ed efficienti. Ad esempio nell'ambito dei City Climate Leadership Awards 2013 sono state premiate alcune città che si sono distinte nell'approvazione di programmi volti ad un maggiore uso di energie rinnovabili (es. Copenhagen e Monaco), alla diminuzione delle emissioni inquinanti (Mexico City), all'introduzione di sistemi abitativi maggiormente efficienti (Melbourne), alla razionalizzazione dei rifiuti e

all'aumento del riciclo (es. San Francisco), sviluppando meccanismi basati su trasporti più puliti (Bogotá) e servizi più efficienti (Singapore e Tokyo).

È opportuno sottolineare, infine, l'importanza delle città come spazi per la governance del cambiamento climatico ed energetico: in un'era di globalizzazione e di intensa competizione tra i luoghi, le città rappresentano i nuovi spazi di relazione tra i governi nazionali e i loro territori all'interno di un'architettura di governance multi-scalare (Brenner, 2004). La retorica che la città e i governi locali sono spesso sgravati dalle paralisi che affliggono i governi nazionali vale anche in risposta ai temi dell'inquinamento e del cambiamento climatico: le città sono chiamate a responsabilizzarsi non solo dinanzi agli obiettivi della crescita economica (Rose, 1999), ma anche a quelli della sostenibilità ambientale (Davico, 2004; Osti, Pellizzoni, 2008), come già evidenziato negli anni '90 da documenti ampiamente condivisi come la carta di Aalborg. Il discorso sull'emergenza energetico-climatica ha ulteriormente accelerato il fenomeno: non a caso in Europa abbondano oggi i discorsi sulle cosiddette "smart city", da intendere come progetti locali che tentano di coniugare sostenibilità energetico-ambientale, modernizzazione tecnologica, politica di attrazione di investimenti privati (nella fattispecie, investimenti di grosse imprese multinazionali come IBM o Cisco, fornitrici di tecnologie Smart).

Allo stesso tempo, le città sono anche luoghi attivi per la contestazione delle attuali forme della globalizzazione e per la mobilitazione attorno agli obiettivi della sostenibilità e della trasformazione sociale. I movimenti sociali contro il cambiamento climatico, per la giustizia ambientale e altre forme di aggregazione di cittadini-attivi costituiscono fenomeni tipicamente urbani (Rossi, Vanolo, 2012).

È per queste ragioni che pare si stia affermando una nuova razionalità politica "low/post-carbon" basata sulla responsabilità nei confronti dell'ambiente; che cosa, però, questo voglia dire concretamente in riferimento alle politiche urbane è, per molti versi, una questione ancora aperta.

3. Sociologia e transizione energetica

La transizione verso forme più pulite di energia non ha solo a che fare con configurazioni tecnologiche. I sistemi energetici sono, infatti, sistemi socio-tecnici (Miller *et al.*, 2013) che comprendono oltre a infrastrutture, macchine, meccanismi e dispositivi anche soggetti di tipo diverso come imprese, relazioni, politiche, scienza, semplici consumatori, ecc. È peraltro evidente come il settore energetico costituisca oggi uno degli spazi più rilevanti dell'economia e delle relazioni geopolitiche alla scala internazionale.

Analizzare i cambiamenti energetici attraverso la lente dei sistemi socio-tecnici permette di intendere come importanti numerosi aspetti spesso trascurati in altri approcci analitici. Questo include considerare i processi sociali che stimolano e gestiscono le trasformazioni energetiche, le trasformazioni sociali che accompagnano i cambiamenti nelle tecnologie energetiche e i risultati che ne derivano. A loro volta, i cambiamenti nelle tecnologie energetiche riplasmano pratiche sociali, valori, relazioni e istituzioni come modelli di business, forme di lavoro, modi di pensare e di vivere (Miller *et al.*, 2013).

Questo paragrafo esplora tre dimensioni di analisi potenzialmente utili per un approccio sociologico all'analisi della transizione socio-tecnici verso una società "low" o "post" -carbon. Le tre dimensioni non forniscono un quadro esaustivo delle articolazioni dell'analisi sociologica della transizione ma sono proposte in maniera esemplificativa come potenziali ramificazioni della riflessione sociologica:

a) L'analisi del rapporto fra sostenibilità, transizione energetica e crisi economica delle città. In che modo lo scenario di austerità modifica le agende politiche delle città, relegando la sostenibilità in una posizione subordinata alla crescita economica o promuovendo obiettivi ibridi fra competitività e sostenibilità?

b) L'analisi dei differenti framing del discorso sulla transizione. In che maniera le retoriche della sostenibilità, della sicurezza e della transizione sono mobilitate nei discorsi politici? Quali sono le epistemologie dominanti nell'interpretazione del problema ambientale urbano o, in altre parole, quali sono i saperi legittimati a produrre conoscenza sul rapporto fra energia e città?

c) La riflessione sulla giustizia energetica. In che modo gli scenari della sostenibilità e della transizione possono creare nuove forme spaziali di giustizia o ingiustizia? Quali conflitti sono attivati? Quali implicazioni etiche e sociali?

3.1- La transizione energetica nello scenario di crisi globale

Il discorso relativo alla transizione energetica e, in generale, alla sostenibilità ambientale non può prescindere oggi dalla sperimentazione di una fase duramente recessiva per le economie delle Nord del mondo. Occorre, infatti, pensare che l'idea della sostenibilità si era affermata durante gli anni Novanta e primi anni Duemila, in uno scenario che vedeva a livello mondiale una globalizzazione crescente e, per molti paesi, una tendenzialmente stabile crescita economica. In un quadro di questo tipo era relativamente facile immaginare gli obiettivi dello sviluppo sostenibile come compatibili con la crescita economica e con forme di mitigazione delle ingiustizie del

sistema capitalistico neoliberista. Un esempio chiave, in questo senso, è la nota “Strategia di Lisbona” ideata dall’Unione Europea, che in sintesi prevedeva di coniugare competitività, sostenibilità e coesione sociale in un modello di sviluppo “europeo”. Ancora, nei discorsi sullo sviluppo sostenibile si era (ed è ancora oggi) consolidata una retorica che vede nella sostenibilità la possibilità di risparmiare, attraverso aumenti di efficienza, e quindi di generare crescita economica apparendo come una strategia di tipo “win-win” (Raco, Flint, 2012; Gordon, 2005). Naturalmente una simile configurazione è in alcuni casi possibile, ma non si tratta della regola: spesso gli obiettivi di coesione sociale e sostenibilità ambientale implicano il porre dei freni ai meccanismi del cosiddetto “libero mercato”. Il contrasto fra le diverse prospettive dell’ambiente e della crescita economica è stato quindi fortemente amplificato dallo scenario di crisi, dando forma a strategie ibride e a difficili compromessi fra le due logiche (Whitehead, 2012), mentre la stessa strategia di Lisbona è stata oggetto di revisione ed è oggi tendenzialmente passata in secondo piano. La crisi rappresenta un duro colpo all’affermazione della cosiddetta “Terza Via”, che alla fine del secolo scorso sosteneva l’idea post-politica della sostenibilità intesa come la panacea per qualsiasi sfida della società moderna, in quanto un obiettivo, almeno nella sua generalizzazione teorica, condivisibile da chiunque (Swingedouw, 2007; nel dibattito italiano si veda Crivello, 2012).

Dal punto di vista concettuale, la crisi ha, infatti, mutato prospettiva rispetto al concetto di sostenibilità urbana ponendo l’enfasi non tanto sulla dimensione ambientale della sostenibilità, come in passato, quanto sulla dimensione economica. In altri termini, si è cominciato a “chiedere di più” alla sostenibilità, esigendo anche il perseguimento della crescita. Mentre la crisi economica avrebbe potuto offrire la possibilità di un radicale ripensamento del sistema economico mondiale, muovendolo verso una dimensione di maggior regolazione e maggiore sostenibilità, la risposta più diffusa è consistita nell’attribuire le colpe della crisi a pochi soggetti “cattivi” (gli speculatori finanziari, il meccanismo perverso dei mutui sub-prime) e nell’invocare politiche di austerità e di perseguimento della crescita economica a tutti i costi. È in questo quadro che si è affermata una nuova retorica del discorso ambientale, una sorta di “new deal” ecologico che ha assunto almeno due forme che vale la pena citare.

Da una parte, vi è l’uso dell’eco-ristrutturazione delle città come motore dell’economia locale. In Italia, per esempio, gli incentivi per il miglioramento dell’efficienza energetica degli edifici o gli eco-incentivi per il rinnovo del parco automobilistico hanno rappresentato certamente, in buona misura, strumenti di politica economica a supporto di settori evidentemente in crisi, come quello dell’edilizia e dell’industria automobilistica.

Dall'altra parte, le strategie di rinnovamento urbano eco- e tecno-efficienti sono funzionali all'attrazione di investimenti privati. Di fronte all'evidente crisi della finanza e del welfare locale, i già citati progetti di smart-city consentono di tentare di coinvolgere soggetti privati nel finanziamento del welfare locale e della ristrutturazione urbana, con tutti i pericoli che ne conseguono (Vanolo, 2013).

L'idea di transizione energetica appare oggi profondamente radicata in questa linea di tendenza. Il progetto della transizione non è solamente un progetto di sostenibilità ambientale, ma costituisce uno spazio di profitto, di rinnovata partnership pubblico-privata nella gestione dei problemi sociali, di modificazione di equilibri di potere a scale differenti. In questo senso, la sociologia può offrire un ampio ventaglio di strumenti per comprendere le diverse geometrie di potere e di interessi strategici soggiacenti al cambiamento, evidenziando la formazione di coalizioni di interessi, razionalità economiche, strategie di sviluppo urbano nello scenario della crisi globale.

3.2- Epistemologie della transizione energetica

La riflessione sul cambiamento di prospettiva alla base della visione dominante della sostenibilità ha a che fare con un classico della riflessione sociologica: la natura socialmente costruita dei fenomeni umani (Berger, Luckman, 1966). Anche in questo senso, un'analisi sociologica del discorso sulla transizione energetica e sul cambiamento globale può offrire prospettive critiche di primaria importanza per allargare l'orizzonte interpretativo e per mettere in discussione "conoscenze convenzionali" che limitano la possibilità di comprensione e intervento. Allontanandosi dal campo di indagine della sociologia urbana e traendo ispirazione dal classico lavoro di Latour sulla sociologia della scienza (Latour, 1987), sarebbe possibile - e opportuno - riflettere sulle modalità attraverso le quali circola e si forma la scienza del cambiamento globale e il dibattito sulla transizione energetica: come funziona il finanziamento della ricerca? Attraverso quali circuiti di riviste, congressi e pubblicazioni? Quali settori scientifici sono considerati centrali nella creazione di questo discorso, e quali sono invece marginalizzati? Quali "mode" si sono alternate nel discorso sul cambiamento climatico? Attraverso quali immagini e rappresentazioni metaforiche viene descritto e comunicato il problema?

Occorre inoltre tenere a mente che, a partire dai disastrosi e inaffidabili modelli sui limiti delle risorse tratteggiati nel noto rapporto del Club di Roma del 1972, si è evoluto un dibattito scientifico fortemente incentrato sull'elaborazione di modelli quantitativi che giungono a formulare previ-

sioni e scenari che vanno in là nel tempo di anche un secolo. Certamente, si tratta di modelli utili per monitorare e riflettere sulle dinamiche evolutive della società. La sociologia può, in questo senso, riflettere sulle diverse razionalità e prospettive alla base della formulazione di questi scenari, ossia sulle diverse epistemologie del cambiamento globale. Per esempio, una riflessione carente negli studi più tecnici riguarda il legame fra consumo di energia e l'immaginario del "disastro ecologico". È, infatti, evidente come molti discorsi tratteggino il rischio di un possibile futuro apocalittico segnato dal disastro ecologico, un futuro spesso descritto in molti film fantascientifici recenti (come per esempio *The Day After Tomorrow*). Si tratta di un immaginario suggestivo e preoccupante, il quale tuttavia sembra spesso supportare la ricerca di soluzioni per fronteggiare l'emergenza (per esempio tecnologie urbane per contrastare l'innalzamento degli oceani) senza mettere in nessun modo in discussione il modello economico e gli stili di vita che stanno producendo questo scenario. Inoltre, supportando l'idea che il mondo sia unito nella minaccia dal cambiamento climatico, si nasconde o si pone in secondo piano una prospettiva di primaria importanza per la sociologia del cambiamento climatico-energetico: la questione della giustizia energetica.

3.3 Giustizia ed ingiustizia energetica

L'immaginario del disastro ambientale, nella sua costruzione più diffusa, colloca il collasso del pianeta in un futuro più o meno remoto. Una simile idea occulta due aspetti importanti che riguardano la giustizia sociale.

Il primo aspetto ha a che fare con l'idea che il disastro sia collocato nel futuro. Al contrario, il disastro sta già prendendo forma oggi (Swyngedouw, 2013), come testimoniato numerosi eventi come lo tsunami nel sud est asiatico nel 2004, il disastro ambientale della piattaforma petrolifera del Golfo del Messico del 2010, l'esplosione della centrale nucleare di Fukushima nel 2011.

Il secondo aspetto è che l'impatto di queste tragedie non è "globale", ma fortemente locale e, all'interno dei vari spazi locali, socialmente differenziato, come già fatto notare a proposito del disastro di New Orleans. Il disastro non sembra affatto configurarsi come "naturale", ma al contrario come fortemente "sociale": gli impatti climatici possono rinforzare le già esistenti ineguaglianze sociali economiche e di salute e creare nuove vulnerabilità.

Come può la sociologia contribuire a una riflessione sulla giustizia in questo senso? Certamente, a partire dalle ormai classiche riflessioni sulla giustizia sociale, è possibile ipotizzare alcune linee interpretative per un'agenda sulla giustizia energetica; quest'ultima presupporrebbe un'ugua-

le accesso alle fonti energetiche, un'equa distribuzione dei costi, dei benefici e dei rischi, e un'unanime partecipazione nello scegliere se, dove e quali sistemi energetici costruire (Miller, 2012), con riferimento tanto alla produzione quanto al consumo, dalla scala locale fino a quella globale.

Occorre peraltro complicare il quadro della giustizia energetica rompendo la presunta dicotomia fra fonti energetiche "buone" e "cattive". Anche se le energie rinnovabili sono nell'immaginario popolare più giuste, i cambiamenti che esse generano, talvolta, non considerano - o considerano poco - gli input che derivano dalle voci della comunità e dei consumatori, gettando potenzialmente le basi per nuove ingiustizie. Secondo alcuni studiosi la distribuzione, l'uso e gli impatti della produzione energetica sarebbero ampiamente ineguali, così come lo sono i benefici politici ed economici (O'Rourke, Connolly, 2003).

Un argomento tanto cruciale quanto complesso è quello relativo a chi ha il diritto di scegliere. Cittadini e comunità hanno, spesso, differenti prospettive sul come, dove, se e quando costruire sistemi energetici rispetto, ad esempio, alle industrie e ai policy maker. In più i framework concettuali operano ad un livello alto spesso privilegiando le idee e i valori di certi gruppi, marginalizzando le prospettive di chi sta in basso nella scala sociale. I sistemi energetici spesso creano ineguaglianze nella distribuzione anche dei danni e dei benefici. Com'è noto, e come già messo in evidenza in molti dibattiti sulla giustizia ambientale, gli inquinanti pericolosi sono spesso concentrati in luoghi o gruppi con poco potere politico mentre i più ampi consumatori di energia vivono spesso senza esporre loro stessi a contaminazioni ambientali. Moore ad esempio dimostra come l'energia derivante dal sole captata nel deserto del Sahara serva i paesi al nord e all'est ma escluda completamente quelli del sud (Moore, 2013).

L'ansia crescente legata al costo sempre più alto delle risorse e alla sicurezza di gas e forniture di petrolio (Newman *et al.*, 2009) può giustificare e legittimare l'estensione di uno stato di potere e di controllo (Swyngedouw, 2007). Nel tempo, questi cambiamenti possono contribuire a creare o rinforzare distribuzioni ineguali di potere e benessere nelle società industriali. E questo porta a domande normative molto importanti: chi controllerà l'accesso alle energie rinnovabili nel ventunesimo secolo? Chi beneficerà dei nuovi sistemi energetici, chi ci perderà, e la vita e i mezzi di sussistenza di chi saranno messi a rischio?

Conclusioni

Alcuni anni fa, Constance Lever-Tracy, in un articolo sulla rivista *Current Sociology*, si interrogava sulle ragioni per le quali il dibattito sociologico pareva piuttosto disinteressato al cambiamento globale, e su quali contributi esso avrebbe invece potuto offrire (Lever-Tracy, 2008; Brechin, 2008; Grundmann, Stehr, 2010). L'anno successivo, il sociologo John Urry presentava argomentazioni simili, discutendo come la sociologia potesse offrire strumenti di analisi importanti, non secondari, per esempio, rispetto a quelli di altre discipline come la fisica o l'economia (Urry, 2009).

Come si è avuto modo di discutere nel corso di questo paper, la transizione energetica e il cambiamento globale sono oggi riconosciuti fra le maggiori sfide del ventunesimo secolo. La promozione di una transizione ecologica, in questo senso, implica processi compositi e multi sfaccettati, cambiamenti socio-tecnici e modificazioni sostanziali nelle abitudini, nei comportamenti, negli usi, negli stili di vita delle società, ossia nel campo di indagine della sociologia.

Fra le molteplici dimensioni del problema, si è concentrata l'attenzione sulla centralità dello spazio urbano dinanzi ai problemi del cambiamento climatico, sul rapporto fra crisi economica e sostenibilità, sul problema della costruzione sociale delle epistemologie del cambiamento globale e sui suoi riflessi in termini di giustizia sociale. Si tratta solo di alcune fra le molte questioni sociologiche che caratterizzano il problema della transizione energetica e del cambiamento globale: questa breve riflessione, utilizzando prevalentemente le chiavi di lettura della sociologia urbana e del territorio, non deve essere considerata come una vera e propria proposta di agenda di ricerca, quanto piuttosto un invito alla costruzione di un dibattito italiano sul tema.

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RECENSIONI

Reardon K. Forester J. *Rebuilding Community after Katrina. Transformative Education in the New Orleans Planning Initiative*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA, 2016.

Secondo la definizione che Ken Reardon e John Forester propongono nel loro saggio, la pianificazione non può prescindere dalla partecipazione perché consiste essenzialmente in un'attività che permette ad ogni progettista di aiutare una comunità ad elaborare una visione di se stessa. Quale pratica sociale, la progettazione diventa una straordinaria occasione per individuare le reali necessità dei cittadini, per discutere del ruolo di una comunità e, in definitiva, per ripensare al rapporto tra pianificazione e condizione urbana.

Il racconto di quanto accaduto a New Orleans per la ricostruzione dei quartieri rasi al suolo dall'uragano del 2005 offre ai due curatori del volume l'opportunità di presentare un approccio alla pianificazione concepito quale processo di educazione alla comunità finalizzato ad un apprendimento permanente della dimensione urbana.

In linea generale, il fattore chiave attorno al quale è organizzata la proposta metodologica per procedere alla ricostruzione di New Orleans considera assolutamente strategico il prendersi cura gli uni degli altri. Tale cura diventa consapevolezza politica allorché subordina la selezione delle politiche pubbliche ad un processo incentrato su un impegno civile generato attraverso pratiche educative di trasformazione.

Rebuilding Community after Katrina non è però né una storia di resistenza né il racconto di un particolare caso di resilienza. E' piuttosto la narrazione di un'esperienza educativa di successo realizzata dalla partnership tra le università Cornell-Columbia-Illinois con un'organizzazione di cittadini a basso reddito ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) e con i residenti della Lower Nine Ward di New Orleans.

Grazie al prezioso lavoro svolto da un gruppo di studenti universitari, l'esperienza raccontata nel libro si avvale di strumenti di chiara matrice etnografica, soprattutto interviste, fotografie e fotodocumentari. Peraltro, la varietà e complessità delle questioni affrontate trova una felice soluzione espositiva mediante la varietà delle tecniche di analisi utilizzate: osservazione, data collection, resoconti di riunioni e workshop, planimetrie. In particolare, il ricorso alle interviste dirette prova quante le università Cornell-Columbia-Illinois siano riuscite a coinvolgere tutte le fasce e categorie di popolazione, a più livelli e con differenti stadi di approfondimento. Cosicché, nel promuovere il capovolgimento del classico metodo di progettazione top-down e vincendo tutte le possibili resistenze per l'accreditamento della comunità di colore nelle fasi progettuali, il team di lavoro è riuscito a ridimensionare la portata dell'interlocuzione con leader ed esponenti politici e in un certo senso a interdire a progettisti e pianificatori la possibilità di influenzare le decisioni, arrivando alla determinazione delle soluzioni finali nel pieno rispetto degli esiti del lavoro svolto.

In linea generale, nel rifuggire metodologie che adottano il teorema della generalizzazione degli effetti attesi per orientare l'ottica progettuale, la contaminazione tra i metodi propri della ricerca sociale con quelli specifici della pianificazione permette al team lavoro di ambientare il racconto di quanto realizzato a New Orleans in uno scenario particolarmente interessante dal punto di vista delle pratiche sociali. Nel merito, la divisione del saggio in quattro parti, articolare in 14 capitoli, rende il percorso progettuale perfettamente leggibile, sia nelle premesse così come negli obiettivi e nei risultati ottenuti. Inoltre, una molteplicità di stimoli, cui corrisponde una notevole ricchezza di definizioni e concetti, contribuisce a comporre una specie di storyboard che attira l'attenzione del lettore e lo induce a riflettere sul significato del rapporto tra "guardare indietro e guardare avanti".

Sotto la direzione scientifica delle università Cornell-Columbia-Illinois, il saggio non si limita a presentare le strategie messe a punto per rimediare ai disastri provocati dall'uragano, ma, di fatto, sviluppa un nuovo modello di pianificazione regionale. Linea guida di tale modello, il cosiddetto "pragmatismo critico" che, secondo il punto di vista di John Forester, prevede che ogni progetto venga accompagnato da un dialogo con la comunità. Per meglio dire, il progetto deve essere parte delle politiche locali, nel senso che deve essere utile alla ricostruzione dei sentimenti interiori di ogni singola comunità. In questa prospettiva, l'attività tecnica in senso stretto acquista rilievo solo da un punto di vista pragmatico, restando innanzitutto condizionata dalle maniere attraverso le quali vengono ad essere selezionate le soluzioni da adottare. In estrema sintesi, il pragmatismo critico permette di: rendere tutti consapevoli della portata del problema; coinvolgere tutti nell'attività di pianificazione; avviare un percorso per organizzare la vita dell'intera comunità; pianificare le opere strutturali da realizzare.

È appunto tramite il pragmatismo critico che diventa rilevante la *transformative education*. Pertanto, il significato di *transformative education* va compreso in una visione programmatica, all'interno della quale le resistenze, le difficoltà, le speranze e le scommesse di rinascita civile diventano le tessere di un puzzle in cui il senso del luogo e, al tempo stesso, dello spazio pubblico acquisiscono una consistenza reale.

In conclusione, l'assoluta originalità di questo libro risiede sia nella maniera di trarre dalle storie individuali le ragioni per costruire una speranza comune e sia nel conferire una funzione civica alle università, ovvero anche nell'utilizzo degli studi accademici per ottenere un *empowerment planning*. Diversamente da ogni "classica" rigenerazione o da qualsiasi forma "tradizionale" di progettazione partecipata, l'*empowerment planning* è strategico per collegare lo sviluppo della condizione urbana al rafforzamento dei poteri locali. Poiché concepisce l'intervento delle università non limitato al mero ascolto e alla semplice raccolta di idee e suggerimenti tra i cittadini, l'*empowerment planning* può essere inteso un vero e proprio "servizio di apprendimento permanente". Nel rendere più agevole e diretto l'incontro tra amministratori pubblici, attivisti civili e cittadini, esso, come nel caso di New Orleans, può diventare l'espressione di una nuova forma di civismo. Un civismo strettamente connesso al bisogno sempre più avvertito di politiche pubbliche di rinascita sociale, cioè effettivamente in grado di educare i cittadini ad avere uno sguardo diverso sul mondo e sul futuro.

Fiammetta Fanizza

Petrillo A. (a cura di), *Il silenzio della polvere. Capitale, verità e morte in una storia meridionale di amianto*, Milano, Mimesis, 2015.

Chiedi alla polvere restituisce i risultati di una ricerca socio-etnografica condotta sul campo da UriT (l'Unità di Ricerca sulle Topografie sociali dell'Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa di Napoli) in cui si sceglie di affrontare il tema del disastro attraverso l'indagine di un caso apparentemente marginale, che assurge a emblema degli "ordini discorsivi emergenziali" e delle dinamiche di utilizzo capitalistico di molti territori del Mezzogiorno d'Italia. È nell'Avellino dei primi anni '80, appena devastata dal terremoto dell'Irpinia, che si iscrive un altro dramma, stavolta di origine produttiva, che si dipana, silenziosamente, nell'arco degli ultimi trent'anni: quello dell'Isochimica spa e dei suoi operai. Nella primavera del 1982 l'ente Ferrovie dello Stato (FFSS), per far fronte alle normative europee in materia di sicurezza dei rotabili, decide di esternalizzare gran parte della bonifica delle componenti in amianto ad un'impresa di Avellino costituita all'uopo da Elio Graziano, imprenditore fidato e vincolato all'azienda appaltante da numerosi interessi.

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Come bene sottolinea Petrillo al pari di altri casi di esternalizzazione di comparti di lavorazione pericolosi, caratteristici della prima fase della globalizzazione e ancor oggi perduranti, non sono i lavoratori a spostarsi lungo la tradizionale direttrice Sud-Nord delle migrazioni, bensì il lavoro a seguire la direzione inversa. Le vicende di questa piccola ditta sembrano intrecciarsi, quindi, a dinamiche più ampie che in quel periodo iniziano a riconfigurare il territorio campano - e il meridione in generale - come destinazione finale a basso costo di ingenti quantitativi di scorie tossiche. È così che i 333 operai dell'Isochimica iniziano a "scoibentare" 1.740 vagoni e 499 locomotori senza formale appalto e senza lasciare traccia ufficiale, utilizzando prima un binario morto della piccola stazione locale, per spostarsi, dopo un anno e mezzo, all'interno di un capannone realizzato a circa 200 metri dal popoloso quartiere di edilizia popolare di Borgo Ferrovia. I lavoratori, per la maggior parte giovanissimi, sprovvisti di esperienza nel settore e di una cultura operaia, vengono reclutati attraverso dinamiche clientelari di scambio elettorale tra le famiglie e i potentati politico-economici locali e si trovano ad operare per anni allo scuro dei rischi connessi al lavoro svolto e senza attrezzature adatte né protezioni fino al 1988 anno in cui il pretore di Firenze ordina la chiusura dello stabilimento.

I sette saggi, scritti da altrettanti autori, in modo rigoroso e organico tengono insieme gli aspetti giudiziari del caso, insieme a quelli sociali, sanitari e all'analisi delle narrazioni mediatiche. Pagina dopo pagina emergono così, in modo inequivocabile, le responsabilità politiche e istituzionali che gravano sull'intera vicenda e che chiamano direttamente in causa istituzioni locali e apparati statali: gli organismi di controllo e le istituzioni previdenziali, il potere giudiziario come il mondo sindale. Un silenzio colpevole, fatto di omissioni, che si è giocato sulla *nuda vita* di centinaia di persone, e che ha visto complice anche gran parte del corpo sociale locale. Ma è soprattutto attraverso le interviste in profondità a numerosi testimoni privilegiati e la raccolta di materiali biografici che la ricerca, svolta nell'arco di due anni e mezzo, riesce a ricostruire la cultura di base dei protagonisti della vicenda, il lento e difficoltoso formarsi di una coscienza comune, i tentativi di porre in essere sul piano delle rivendicazioni individuali e collettive, come i rapporti tra operai e città.

Il meccanismo di colpevolizzazione delle "vittime", unito alla compravendita degli attori sociali e dei controllori istituzionali dà vita ad una perversa spirale per cui gran parte degli stessi operai preferiscono ignorare il rischio che incombe sulla loro salute. Quando, dopo alcuni anni di amianto smaltito illegalmente, i primi giovani operai acquisiscono informazioni sul pericolo mortale in cui svolgono il loro lavoro ed iniziano a ribellarsi e ad organizzarsi, si scoprono isolati e accusati di essere portatori di un sovversivismo astratto e velleitario, di un rifiuto irrazionale del modello di sviluppo e prosperità che, faticosamente, si stava costruendo per un territorio da risollevarsi. Muovendo dalle suggestioni teoriche foucaultiane in materia di biopolitica e dallo studio delle forme e dei dispositivi entro i quali si articola la governamentalità contemporanea di territori e popolazioni *Il silenzio della polvere* ha l'evidente merito di affiancare e sovrapporre molteplici piani di analisi. Usando tutte le armi della sociologia critica - l'inchiesta operaia, la conricerca - l'attento lavoro svolto da Petrillo e il suo gruppo restituisce una narrazione sociologica che lega insieme il rapporto Nord/Sud, la decostruzione delle narrazioni correnti, quello tra *nuda vita* e valorizzazione capitalistica e non ultima l'analisi dei blocchi sociali di consenso che si creano intorno al governo emergenziale dei territori. «Isochimica è un laboratorio del capitalismo deregolamentato» (De Biase) che rappresenta in modo emblematico come nel Sud dell'Italia le forme embrionali di economia neoliberista si siano riprodotte all'interno di relazioni di potere di natura coloniale. La ricerca disvela in modo chiaro ed efficace come le politiche postdisastro messe in campo dal piano di ricostruzione e dalla legge straordinaria n.219/1980, consentendo di prescindere dalle leggi ordinarie in materia di appalti, controllo della spesa pubblica, edifica-

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zione dei suoli e autorizzazioni ambientali, preparino il terreno affinché il territorio irpino si configuri come un grande laboratorio in cui sperimentare modelli di sviluppo esogeni, urbanizzazione frammentata, ricatto occupazionale e dissipazione di risorse territoriali.

Le dinamiche che ruotano attorno alla piccola fabbrica emergono come tassello centrale nello scambio e nella mediazione politica. Il diritto al lavoro, ridotto a concessione, appare vincolato al rapporto personale con il potere politico e amministrativo che assume un ruolo di mediazione (Di Costanzo) e che viene incarnato dall'Ing. Graziano, dipinto dai racconti degli operai come un piccolo podestà locale che con abilità elargisce indistintamente ricatti sociali, corruzione e paternalismo.

Marilyn Mantineo

SUMMARIES

Una valutazione di vulnerabilità socio-territoriale per la gestione di eventi sismici: il caso studio di Mirandola, di *Fabio Carnelli, Ivan Frigerio*

L'articolo si propone di costruire un quadro di valutazione territoriale circa l'interazione tra gli indicatori di vulnerabilità sociale e il terremoto dell'Emilia del 2012. Utilizzando Mirandola come caso di studio, cinque indicatori di vulnerabilità sociale sono stati selezionati, mappati e correlati spazialmente ad un indice di danno degli edifici, calcolato utilizzando informazioni georeferenziate degli edifici danneggiati disponibili a livello locale. La valutazione di queste relazioni socio-territoriali potrebbe costituire un utile strumento ai fini di policy di recovery e ricostruzione post-disastro.

Parole chiave: Vulnerabilità sociale, Terremoto dell'Emilia, analisi socio-territoriale, disaster management, disaster recovery, GIS, Mirandola.

A socio-spatial vulnerability assessment for disaster management: insights from the 2012 Emilia earthquake (Italy), by *Fabio Carnelli, Ivan Frigerio*

This article aims to provide a framework to build a spatial assessment about the interaction between social vulnerability indicators and the 2012 Emilia earthquake. Using Mirandola as case study, five social vulnerability indicators were selected, mapped and spatially correlated to a building damage index calculated using geo-referenced information of damaged buildings available at a local level. The evaluation of this spatial relationship may be a useful tool for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction policies.

Keywords: social vulnerability, Emilia earthquake, spatial analysis, disaster management, disaster recovery, GIS, Mirandola.

La ricostruzione post-disastro a Constitución, Cile, di *Davide Olori*

I processi di ricostruzione post-disastro, e le conseguenze socio-territoriali che generano manifestano nel breve periodo il solco delle polarizzazioni pregresse dei conflitti in campo. Così sulle nuove mappe si materializzano le traiettorie degli individui che affrontano cambiamenti repentini nel breve arco temporale forzato dal disastro. Attraverso uno studio di caso cileno, avanziamo l'ipotesi che esaminando queste dinamiche sia possibile indagare come gli attori sociali si muovono nella città in fase di riorganizzazione, riconoscendo i processi di vulnerabilizzazione che alcune categorie di popolazione sono costrette ad affrontare nel ritorno alla normalità.

Parole chiave: ricostruzione, vulnerabilità, disastro, Constitución, dinamiche socio-spaziali, disuguaglianze sociali.

Post-disaster reconstruction in Constitución, Chile, by *Davide Olori*

The post-disaster reconstruction of territories hit by an environmental disaster further stresses the existing social polarizations and the latent conflicts within the areas where the *Sociologia urbana e rurale* n. 111, 2016

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event takes place. Through a Chilean case study, we hypothesize that the investigation of the ways social actors move across the city allows us to understand how people return to “normality” when forced to re-organize their lives in the post-disaster phase.

Keywords: reconstruction, vulnerability, disaster, Constitución, socio-spatial dynamics, social inequality.

Spazi di resilienza: Irpina 1980, Abruzzo 2009, di *Anna Maria Zaccaria, Sara Zizzari*

Confrontando i terremoti italiani del 1980 e del 2009, si propone un'analisi delle dinamiche sociali emerse nelle aree del cratere. Lo studio considera due livelli: il primo si riferisce ai sindaci in carica al momento del sisma e l'altro alle popolazioni che hanno subito i terremoti. Sarà anche indagata la capacità delle società locali di esprimere forme organizzate di interazione. Verrà assunto il punto di vista degli attori attraverso la memoria individuale e collettiva degli eventi.

Parole chiave: terremoti, emergenza, territori, resilienza, memoria, prospettive

Spaces of resilience: Irpinia 1980, Abruzzo 2009, by *Anna Maria Zaccaria, Sara Zizzari*

Focusing on the 1980 and 2009 Italian earthquakes, we propose an analysis of the social dynamics taking place in the crater areas. The study considers two levels: one refers to the Mayors in charge at the time of the events and the other to the people who lived the earthquakes. The capability of local societies to create organized forms of interaction will be also investigated. We will reconstruct actors point of view through the individual and collective memory of the events.

Keywords: earthquakes, emergency, territories, resilience, memory, perspectives

Le fasi sociali del terremoto del Friuli del 1976, di *Bernardo Cattarinussi*

La vicenda del terremoto del Friuli può essere letta suddividendo le conseguenze psico-sociali del disastro in tre distinte fasi temporali: l'emergenza, la ricostruzione e la memoria. Mentre i comportamenti sociali nella prima fase sono abbastanza generalizzabili, specialmente nei contesti in cui è ravvisabile una “subcultura da disastro”, la ricostruzione è maggiormente legata a dimensioni ambientali, culturali e politiche specifiche. Le indagini effettuate a distanza di alcuni anni dall'evento hanno permesso l'identificazione di diverse modalità di risposta al trauma ambientale.

Parole chiave: terremoto, disastro, emergenza, ricostruzione, subcultura, ricordo.

The phases of the Friuli earthquake, by *Bernardo Cattarinussi*

We can read the sequence of events of the Friuli earthquake through the split of its psycho-social consequences into three temporal phases: the emergency, the restoration and the remembrance. Social behaviors during the emergency phase can be generalized sufficiently, especially for social contexts where a “disaster subculture” can be detected; the restoration phase is more connected to specific environmental, cultural and political dimensions. Re-

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searches performed some years after the event allowed to identify different modes for responding to the environmental trauma.

Keywords: earthquake, disaster, emergency, restoration, subculture, remembrance.

Comunità di abitanti e ambiente abitato nella ricostruzione socio-spaziale in seguito a un disastro: due storie italiane, di *Monica Musolino*

Il saggio presenta un'analisi socio-storica ed etnografica centrata su una ricerca comparativa di due casi studio italiani, caratterizzati da un processo di ricostruzione in rilocalizzazione: si tratta di Vajont (Friuli) e Gibellina (Sicilia). La rilocalizzazione rappresenta un nodo cruciale in una prospettiva di medio e lungo termine, soprattutto se connessa con la ricostruzione di città danneggiate. Infatti, la ricostruzione socio-spaziale e territoriale genera diversi effetti rilevanti in merito alla struttura socio-economica e altresì riguardo ai processi di autorappresentazione simbolica e identitaria delle comunità coinvolte in questi fenomeni.

Parole chiave: disastri, identità, ricostruzione, rilocalizzazione, comunità, trauma.

Communities and inhabited environment in the socio-spatial reconstruction after a disaster: two italian stories, by *Monica Musolino*

This work presents a socio-historical and ethnographical analysis and is based on a comparative research of two Italian case studies marked by a reconstruction in relocation: it is about Vajont (Friuli) and Gibellina (Sicilia). The relocation represents a core issue in a medium-to-long-term perspective, above all if it is connected to the reconstruction of the damaged town. In fact, the socio-spatial and territorial reconstruction produces some relevant effects on the socio-economic structure and also on the symbolic and identity-making auto-representation processes of the communities involved in these phenomena.

Keywords social mix, housing, Milan, community empowerment, large housing estates, social innovation.

La configurazione spaziale delle politiche sociali in alcune aree del disagio napoletano, di *Stefania Ferraro*

Partendo dal presupposto che la conformazione urbana è una dimensione topica della politica del welfare, l'autore riporta i risultati di una ricerca svolta in alcune aree disagiate del centro storico di Napoli (rione Sanità, borgo dei Vergini e largo dei Miracoli), per dimostrare che le politiche sociali progettate e implementate in tali aree, essendo fortemente connesse alla governamentalità, non sono neutrali rispetto allo stato di crisi dei suddetti spazi napoletani.

Parole chiave: Crisi, margine, aree di disagio, welfare, Napoli, governamentalità.

The spatial configuration of the social policies in the disadvantaged areas of Naples, by *Stefania Ferraro*

Starting from the premise that the urban configuration is a topical aspect of the social policy, the author analyses the results on a research realized in some disadvantaged areas of

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the Historic Centre of Naples (rione Sanità, borgo dei Vergini e largo dei Miracoli), to prove the point that the planned and implemented social policies in these areas are related to the governmentality and they are not neutral related to the crisis condition of these Neapolitan spaces.

Keywords: crisis, margin, disadvantaged areas, welfare, Naples, governmentality.

Resilienza come esito stabile o processo di territorializzazione? Uno studio di caso in Serbia, di *Elena Battaglini*

L'articolo presenta i risultati di uno studio di caso condotto a Sirogojno, situato in una regione serba con elevate potenzialità di sviluppo agricolo e turistico. La ricerca ha rappresentato l'occasione per problematizzare alcuni dei concetti centrali nel dibattito dei regional studies, come "sviluppo sostenibile" e "resilienza". In particolare, l'analisi si propone di illustrare quest'ultimo, come dimensione del concetto di "territorializzazione", operativizzato nel percorso di ricerca.

Parole chiave: sviluppo endogeno, sostenibilità, resilienza, territorializzazione, regional studies, studio di caso.

Resilience as output or territorialisation process? A case-study from Serbia, by *Elena Battaglini*

This article introduces the case results of a study conducted in Sirogojno, situated in a Serb region with high potentialities of agricultural and tourist development. Research has represented the occasion for problematising some of the mainstream concepts in the debate within regional studies, as "sustainable development" and "resiliency." Particularly, analysis proposes to illustrate this last concept as a dimension of "territorialisation", operationalised in the study.

Keywords: endogenous development, sustainability, resilience, territorialisation, regional studies, case study.

Città e sfida ambientale: prospettive e limiti del dibattito sulle post-carbon cities, di *Silvia Crivello*

Tanto a livello accademico che a livello politico sono, oggi, sempre più numerosi i dibattiti che affrontano i temi riguardanti la transizione energetica intesa come il passaggio verso forme a minor impatto ambientale rispetto a quelle adottate finora. Il paper, partendo dall'assunto secondo cui il modello di sviluppo delle società "avanzate" risulta ormai insostenibile, sottolinea come le preoccupazioni riguardanti lo stato di salute dell'ambiente stiano indirizzando verso una nuova logica cosiddetta del "carbon control". L'articolo si concentra, da un lato, sulla trasposizione del concetto di transizione energetica alla scala di città. Dall'altro, il contributo riflette sugli strumenti concettuali e metodologici che la sociologia urbana è in grado di fornire per agevolare la comprensione del fenomeno della transizione e per contribuire alla formulazione di possibili soluzioni.

Parole chiave: transizione energetica, città, cambiamento climatico, giustizia energetica, post-carbon, carbon control.

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Cities and climate change: a reflection on the debate on the post-carbon cities, *by Silvia Crivello*

The issues related to the energy transition towards forms with less impact than the current ones have today a wide resonance in numerous debates. The paper starts from the assumption that the model of development of the “advanced” societies is today unsustainable, so as to threaten life on the planet; concerns regarding the state of health of the environment are turning the new logic of the so-called “carbon control”. The article focuses on two aspects of the problem: on the one hand, it is investigated the transposition of the concept of energy transition at the urban scale. On the other hand, the contribution reflects on the conceptual and methodological tools that urban sociology can provide to understand the phenomenon of transition and to contribute to the formulation of solutions.

Keywords: energy transition, city, climate change, energy justice, post-carbon, carbon control.

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